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ABSTRACT
Audit Firm Culture: An Evolution of the Audit Profession in Response to External Forces
Cristina T. Alberti
Chair of the Supervisory Committee:
Rae D. Anderson Professor Jay C. Thibodeau, Ph.D., CPA
Department of Accountancy
The COVID-19 pandemic is disrupting business operations throughout the world,
including the working procedures of audit professionals. Yet, to date, research on COVID19’s impact on auditing is limited. This is despite its potential long-term implications.
Thus, my dissertation uses a mix of research methods to examine auditors’ response to,
and regulators’ evaluation of auditors’ response to, COVID-19.
The first paper (co-authored) synthesizes research on audit firm culture (AFC) over
the past decade, reviewing recent developments in research on AFC and its influence on
audit quality and auditors’ work attitudes. Using a three-phase model based on prior
research and professional guidance, our synthesis shows that AFC is most oriented toward
quality if leadership emphasizes professionalism over commercialism, promotes ethical
judgments, and facilitates learning. We contribute to both research and practice by
presenting opportunities where future research can enhance our understanding of how AFC
can be better managed by audit firms.
The second paper (co-authored) uses crisis management and organizational culture
theories to understand COVID-19’s impact on key organizational mechanisms that embed
and transmit AFC. Semi-structured interviews conducted with 18 U.S. audit engagement
leaders reveal that COVID-19 is disrupting the collaborative culture of audit firms.
Respondents describe paying greater attention to the key relational systems (e.g.,
vii

communications) that exist within audit teams in order to minimize affective consequences
(e.g., stress) and maintain high audit quality. They also express apprehension that virtual
work practices do not result in an effective on-the-job learning culture, but acknowledge
that such practices facilitate greater knowledge sharing across geographical locations.
The third paper (solo-authored) analyzes the PCAOB’s inspection reports for audits
completed from 2018 to 2020 by the top eight largest accounting firms, examining
inspection deficiencies and the associated implications for audit quality. I find that despite
the disruption of COVID-19, there is some, albeit limited, evidence to suggest that audit
firms are maintaining a high level of audit quality. Further, despite concerns that COVID19 may impact audit risks for fraud and going concern, there are no deficiencies among
these two audit areas in 2020. This study contributes to the emerging literature on COVID19’s impact on audit quality.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper synthesizes recent research on audit firm culture (AFC) using a
theoretically grounded approach, to inform audit firms, regulators, and scholars about the
current state of knowledge and to identify future research opportunities. Strengthening
AFC has become a key area of attention. Numerous reports of regulators and standard
setters (e.g., International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, IAASB, 2014; Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, PCAOB, 2015; Authority for Financial Markets,
AFM, 2017) encourage firms to establish, promote, and embed an appropriate culture and
tone at the top to support a high-quality audit, and public oversight bodies are focusing on
AFC in their reviews and inspections (e.g., Financial Reporting Council, FRC, 2018;
Hamm, 2018). Further, AFC remains an area of academic interest. Many studies have
accumulated since the review of the literature on culture in audit firms by Jenkins, Deis,
Bedard, and Curtis (2008). Summarizing the findings of extant research can shed light on
the current status of AFC and the cultural factors associated with differences in auditors’
judgments and decisions that determine audit quality, as well as identify further research
opportunities.
Organizational culture encompasses values, beliefs, and assumptions (e.g., Schein,
2017; Hofstede, 1984). Within this broad construct, we focus on core concepts that are
embodied in the IAASB’s (2014) Framework for Audit Quality, which imply that audit
firm leadership should implement, through organizational tone at the top, a culture guided
by professionalism. Using key terms that address these core concepts (and guided by
research in auditing and related disciplines), we search the literature in relevant highquality journals over the period 2008-2019. We then review each study to identify those
that are empirical and relate to the practice of external auditing, yielding 77 studies that
2

form our sample. To organize and derive meaning from this research, we apply a
framework based on Schein (2017), Ehrhart, Schneider, and Macey (2014) and
professional/regulatory frameworks of audit quality, depicted schematically in Figure 1.1.
This framework posits that firm leadership implements culture through embedding
mechanisms (EMs; i.e., organizational conditions), affecting cultural perceptions and
ultimately, consequences for audit quality. Schein (2017) is consistent with IAASB (2014)
in identifying tone at the top as a core focus of AFC. Other EMs include incentives/rewards,
training, resources, organizational design, systems, and procedures. 1 We categorize studies
regarding which EMs are examined, how those mechanisms influence perceptions of AFC,
and the association of EMs and/or cultural perceptions with auditors’ behavior, work
attitudes, and/or audit quality.
[Insert Figure 1.1: Theoretical Model Here]
Our structured approach to synthesizing research on AFC contributes to the
auditing literature by providing insights on how actions taken by firms combine to form
AFC, and consequences of those actions. Our review also contributes to the organizational
behavior literature, as auditing research applies theory to organizations with
complex multiple levels of leadership, fluid multidisciplinary teams, and competing
incentives of professionalism and commercialism. In noting the contribution of our
analysis to the literature, we acknowledge another recent related review by Andiola,
Downey, and Westermann (2020). While both our paper and theirs focus on broad themes

As our search terms explicitly include tone at the top and leadership, we capture the full range of studies on
this core EM in target journals. We further examine our identified studies to detect those studying other EMs
identified by Schein (2017) and IAASB (2014). As it is not feasible for a single paper to review all literature
on each EM separately, our coverage of EMs other than tone at the top is confined to those studies of the core
concepts noted above.

1
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of organizational culture, our paper differs in several ways. First, we synthesize the
literature into a formal structure based on theory and audit practice, coding each study on
multiple dimensions and presenting tables that display patterns of topics examined in the
literature. Through this more structured approach, we arrive at a detailed overview that can
be used by firms to identify effective embedding mechanisms and specific research
questions for future research to help further develop our model of how firms and
individuals formally and informally influence AFC. Second, while Andiola et al. (2020)
distinguish between firm culture and climate, we employ an integrative perspective of these
concepts. 2 Third, we access a broader range of journals than Andiola et al. (2020),
incorporating additional journals with diverse research perspectives and geographical
origin. 3
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background and develops
our theoretical framework. Section 3 presents methods for identifying and classifying
research. Section 4 summarizes findings from sample studies, organized according to three
theoretically

distinct

culture

types

observed

in

our

sample

(professionalism/commercialism, ethical culture, and learning culture), and presents
opportunities for future research. 4 Section 5 summarizes pervasive findings across all
sections and limitations of our analysis.

While we include both “culture” and “climate” as key words in our literature search, we most often use
“culture” as it best aligns with scholarly work in auditing and the general vocabulary of the auditing
profession.
3
While many cites are common, 29 percent of studies in our three main sections (22 of 77) are published in
journals not covered in their paper. Further, the research questions we present are largely distinct from theirs,
although a few overlap at a high level.
4
Online Appendix A [URL here] summarizes the purpose, methods, and results of the identified papers.
2
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2. BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL MODEL
Historically, culture has been viewed as the DNA of the audit firm; i.e., “unique
and proprietary, the very essence of the firm” (Jenkins et al., 2008, p. 48). The end of selfregulation of the auditing profession and the unprecedented increase in regulation
worldwide (e.g., Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) in 2002; revised 8th European Union Directive in
2006) were the hard consequences triggered by a culture that was considered more revenueoriented than quality-oriented. More recently, audit firm leaders, standard setters, and
oversight bodies point to AFC and tone at the top as the catch-all solution to control
auditors’ behavior, improve audit quality, and restore public trust in the profession (e.g.,
IAASB, 2014; International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators, IFIAR, 2015; AFM,
2017). IAASB (2014) notes that AFC influences the values, ethics and attitudes of auditors,
as it affects both their mindsets and the way they discharge their responsibilities. Hence,
regulators recommend that audit firms develop a clear picture of the AFC they want to
realize, aligned with their vision and core values (e.g., AFM, 2017). IAASB (2014)
describes key attributes of a culture of audit quality: (1) appropriate tone at the top; (2)
appraisal and reward systems supporting audit quality; (3) financial considerations that do
not impair audit quality (e.g., budget and time pressure); (4) continuing professional
development opportunities and technical support; and (5) a culture of consultation on
difficult issues. 5 AFC has also become a recent area of attention in inspections by public
oversight bodies (e.g. FRC, 2018; PCAOB, 2018).

Similarly, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO, 2018) recommends that
audit firms describe initiatives designed to encourage a culture of professional skepticism, including
appropriate tone at the top.

5
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The academic literature defines organizational culture as a pattern of shared basic
assumptions, beliefs, and expectations learned by a group through its experience, which
guides its members’ interpretations and actions and is taught to new members as
appropriate behavior within an organization (e.g., Chatman, Caldwell, O’Reilly, & Doerr,
2014; Schein, 2017). Thus, perceptions of organizational culture influence employees’
attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Smircich, 1983) and, ultimately, organizational performance
(e.g., Hartnell, Ou, Kinicki, Choi, & Karam, 2019). The pattern of cultural cues sent by the
web of formal and informal practices, rules, and policies comes to have socially shared
meaning (i.e., perceived culture) in the minds of the organization’s members, as they
observe the behaviors that are rewarded, supported, and expected (e.g., Smircich &
Morgan, 1982; Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 2013; Schein, 2017). These observations in
turn affect organizational behavior (e.g., Schneider, 1975; Zohar & Hofmann, 2012). But
can culture be “managed” to govern professional behavior? While organizational culture
and behavior may be emergent properties that cannot be managed (e.g., Meek, 1988), the
organizational conditions that leadership sets whereunder they emerge can be managed
(e.g., Chatman, 1989; Ehrhart, Schneider, & Macey et al., 2014). Accordingly, as shown
in Figure 1.1, we organize our synthesis around three phases: organizational conditions
instituted by management, the cultural environment (assessed through perceptions), and
the resulting consequences. This model corresponds to Schein (2017), who refers to cues
set by the organization as the “visible artifacts” or (primary and secondary) cultureembedding mechanisms (EMs) through which leaders transmit culture by revealing
underlying values. While this paper focuses on AFC, our model acknowledges that
organizational culture is influenced by forces outside (macro-cultures) and inside

6

(subcultures) the organization that are beyond management’s control (Martin, 2002;
Schein, 2017). While a full treatment of these topics is outside the scope of this paper, we
supplement our main analysis by briefly summarizing research on macro-cultures and
subcultures in online Appendix C [URL here].
The first phase includes four “primary” EMs that integrate Schein’s (2017) theory
with regulatory and professional frameworks of audit quality. First, tone at the top
established by leadership is the initial key criterion cited by the IAASB (2014) as well as
the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ, 2014), justifying its position as a “core concept” in our
search terms. Second, incentives/rewards derives from Schein’s criteria by which leaders
“allocate rewards and status” and “recruit, select, promote and retire members”, and the
IAASB’s

“appraisal

and

reward

systems

supporting

audit

quality.”

Third,

training/development comprises Schein’s “modeling, teaching, and coaching” and the
IAASB’s “professional development”. Fourth, resource allocation is based on Schein’s
“allocation of scarce resources” and the IAASB’s “financial conditions that do not …
impair audit quality.” 6 Schein’s framework also includes secondary EMs that reinforce and
formalize values. In our sample, we find studies focusing on secondary EMs of
organizational design and structure, and organizational systems and procedures. These
EMs are building blocks of AFC (e.g., Schneider et al., 2013); research identifying them
might yield specific practices that are more immediately under firm management control
(Burke, 2017).

6
Thus, resource allocation relates to decisions made by firm leaders about how much time and/or budget is
allocated to a specific objective or engagement task (e.g., a firm’s decision to make a monetary investment
in formal training versus allowing for greater time to be spent by auditors engaging in on-the-job learning).
In contrast, incentives/rewards refer to monetary or other awards provided to individual workers following
measurement of their performance.

7

Our model then links these EMs to behavioral consequences and performance that
arise from a given culture (e.g., Schneider et al., 2013). Research largely supports a link
between culture and performance. For example, Hartnell, Ou, and Kinicki (2011) find that
organizations scoring higher on certain typologies of culture are more successful in terms
of employee attitudes, and operational and financial performance. 7 Hartnell et al. (2019)
show culture’s predictive validity for performance relative to other organizational elements
and that perceived culture is functionally distinct from EMs such as leadership style and
incentives/rewards. Thus, the second phase recognizes studies measuring how individuals
perceive their firm’s culture, as perceptions are important in determining actions. The third
phase identifies studies comparing outcomes (e.g., judgments, decisions, and work
attitudes), to investigate EMs and/or cultural perceptions that differentiate more effective
organizations. In sum, our theoretical framework presumes that (perception of) AFC results
from EMs (i.e., the pattern of organizational conditions) and in turn informs behavior,
resulting in variation in audit performance and quality.
3. METHOD AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
We build on Jenkins et al. (2008) by covering articles published from 2008 through
2019. Consistent with our goals of targeting journals with international reach that include
a broad variety of methods and topics, we rely on the journal quality index of the Australian
Business Deans Council (ABDC). Primarily, we include accounting journals publishing

Despite numerous studies supporting a relationship, there are a few studies drawing contrary inferences.
For example, Wilderom, Glunk, and Maslowski (2000) conclude that it is yet to be substantiated and a decade
later, Sackmann (2011) notes that there is at best “a contingency-type relationship between culture,
performance, and internal and external firm context” (p. 216).
7
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auditing research rated by the ABDC as A* or A. 8 Our search terms include any of the
terms [“accounting firm,” “audit firm,” or “auditing”] in combination with any of the terms
[“culture,” “climate,” “professionalism,” “professional identity,” “commercialism,” “tone
at the top,” or “leadership”]. 9 We identified these key search words based on the Jenkins
et al. (2008) literature synthesis and research on culture in auditing, as well as relevant
literature in other disciplines, such as management, organizational culture and behavior,
and psychology (most notably Schein, 2017).
From the initial set of studies identified, we include those meeting several further
criteria. First, we include empirical research papers that make or infer a link between EMs
and perceptions of AFC and/or its consequences. Second, we include only studies focused
on the auditing line of service of audit firms. Third, we include research on audit
professionals (not those using only accounting students). Fourth, we narrow our focus to
studies including at least Big 4 firms, or a combination of Big 4 and smaller firms,
considering that our model recognizes the interplay between firm-level culture and macrolevel influences such as global networks and national cultures. We then read each identified
study, and classified them into phases of our framework in Figure 1.1 through iterative
discussions. To organize our review, we engaged in iterative analysis and discussion of the
The journals searched are shown in online Appendix B [URL here], by number of papers cited in our main
sections and method. The ABDC journal list is similar to the American Business Schools Academic Journal
Guide. We also searched the Journal of Business Ethics, given that journal’s interest in topics relevant to our
review. We exclude journals on the ABDC list whose focus is primarily tax, managerial or financial
accounting. Due to our focus on empirical research, we also exclude the Journal of Accounting Literature.
9
Our identification of relevant research through search terms omits several types of studies; e.g., those that:
(1) examine the effect on audit quality of factors not directly related to AFC, and do not propose AFC as a
possible reason for findings (e.g., some studies of “contagion” of low audit quality across offices; Francis &
Michas, 2013); (2) investigate individual differences as reason for variation in audit quality (e.g., auditor
performance affecting the review process; Gimbar, Jenkins, Saucedo, & Wright, 2018); and (3) compare
audit procedures, without linking those procedures to culture (e.g., using computer mediation in fraud
brainstorming; Lynch, Murthy, & Engle, 2009). We refer readers to more general reviews of the auditing
literature (e.g., Lennox, 2014; DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Andiola, 2014) that provide information about studies
on each of our topics outside of the core concepts of AFC.
8
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identified literature on the basis of topics, underlying theory, terminology and citations.
This process resulted in three main themes that emerged from our sample studies: (1)
professionalism/commercialism; (2) ethical culture; and (3) learning culture. 10
4. RESEARCH ON ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IN AUDIT FIRMS
In this section, we synthesize research in our sample on the three primary types of
AFC included in the literature: professionalism/commercialism, ethical culture, and the
culture of learning. In each subsection, we present a brief summary of research prior to our
sample period, and a table summarizing EMs studied, cultural perceptions measured,
and/or consequences for auditor behavior or other outcomes. We conclude each subsection
with high-level conclusions on the main learnings and provide a table (Table 1.4) with
detailed summary points and future research questions.
4.1. Research on Professionalism/Commercialism in Audit Firms
We first review research examining AFC through the lens of professionalism
(oriented toward the fundamental values of auditing focused on serving the public interest)
and/or commercialism (oriented toward generating revenues, engagement profitability, and
alignment with clients’ interests). Historical analyses document economic, regulatory, and
social conditions since the mid-1960s that led audit firms to shift from traditional
professional values toward a commercial ethos (Wyatt, 2004; Zeff, 2003a, 2003b).
Specifically, regulatory restrictions on advertising services were relaxed, and facing
saturated local markets and global expansion of businesses, audit firms successively
merged into worldwide oligopolies. As these trends developed, concern was voiced about

We recognize that these themes are not completely distinct; e.g., ethical behavior in auditing
encompasses (but is not limited to) compliance with professional standards. In instances where a study does
not clearly align to one of the three themes, we based our classification on studies citing common literature
or investigating common outcomes, relative to other studies in one of the three themes.
10

10

their potential influence, noting the “inherent dilemma” posed by conflicting goals of cost
control and audit quality (e.g., McNair, 1991). These shifts in practice were achieved
through management controls implemented by leadership; e.g., disciplinary practices and
technologies oriented toward achieving commercial goals (e.g., Covaleski, Dirsmith,
Heian, & Samuel, 1998). For example, studies in this period (e.g., Otley & Pierce, 1996)
document the association of budget pressure with quality-threatening behaviors (e.g.,
premature sign-off and underreporting of time).
In this era when audit services became commodified and consulting fees came to
dominate audit fees, pressure on audit partners to cross-sell services intensified. Power
(2003) notes in his reflections on “the business of auditing” that the pressures for change
in this period were all revenue driven. Gradually, the tone at the top of audit firms shifted
from focusing on stakeholder protection, to accommodating clients and promoting client
service (e.g., Grey, 1998; Anderson-Gough, Grey, & Robson, 2000; Bamber and Iyer,
2007), eroding barriers between auditing and consulting (Jeppesen, 1998). However, others
note reduction in these pressures in later years; e.g., Buchheit, Pasewark, and Strawser
(2003).
Jenkins et al. (2008), noting lack of clarity in the literature, ask “whether accounting
firms have nurtured cultures which emphasize an appropriate level of professionalism and
commitment to serving the public interest” (p. 69). We assess where the literature stands
over ten years later, as summarized in Table 1.1. The identified studies group into three
categories; i.e., research on the status of professionalism and commercialism in AFC; the
influence of professional versus commercial culture on audit quality and the audit process;
and influence on auditors’ mindsets and work attitudes.

11

[Insert Table 1.1: Professionalism/Commercialism Here]
4.1.1. The Status of Professionalism/Commercialism in Audit Firm Culture
We first discuss studies on the status of professional and commercial cultures in
auditing, summarized in Table 1.1 Panel A. Gendron and Spira (2009) study the demise of
Arthur Andersen (AA) through perceptions of former AA employees. They document a
growing commercialistic orientation in the firm through the 1990’s, focusing on monetary
output and reliance on market control of the organization. Interviewees believe AA’s
leaders could have prevented this trend through bureaucratic controls (rules and policies)
and/or clan controls (shared values and norms). However, instead of implementing
professionally oriented controls, AA’s leaders focused on commercialistic values, leading
to its downfall.
Other studies provide evidence of continuing commercialistic ethos since AA’s
demise. Sweeney and McGarry (2011) report that audit seniors perceive partners focus on
profits over other goals (i.e., audit quality, client and staff satisfaction) that are publicly
expressed to clients and prospective employees. Carter and Spence (2014) find that
“economic capital” of successful professionals predominates over other capitals (e.g.,
cultural, social), as managers must navigate the shift from technical expertise to a
commercialistic focus in order to achieve partnership, signaling the true values of
successful partners. Knechel, Niemi, and Zerni (2013) infer performance incentives
through statistical determinants of partner compensation. They find a positive association
with client size, number of public clients, industry specialization, and (in some firms)
gaining new clients, and a negative association with audit failures and (in one firm) loss of
existing clients. However, two more recent studies suggest that professionalism and
commercialism may co-exist. Coram and Robinson (2017) report on factors influencing
12

performance-based pay, finding that while firms track partner performance in revenue
generation and obtaining new clients, they also reward technical expertise and staff
development, suggesting increasing attention on professionalism. They find that in order
to be competitive with the Big 4 firms, mid-tier firms are moving toward similar
performance-based profit-sharing schemes. Broberg, Umans, Skog, and Theodorsson
(2018) find that in non-Big 4 firms, professional identity is associated with three
commercialistic orientations (i.e., market needs and strategies, satisfying customers, and
firm business processes). However, in Big 4 firms, professional identity is associated with
the firm's processes, not with market needs or customer satisfaction. While the association
of organizational identity with commercial focus is expected based on prior research, this
study shows that greater professional identity is also associated with firms’ commercial
activities.
4.1.2. Audit Quality and the Audit Process
Studies

described

in

Table

1.1,

Panel

B

examine

the

impact

of

professionalism/commercialism on audit processes and quality. Johansen and
Christofferson (2017) survey staff auditors on the perceived importance that their firm’s
performance evaluations place on commercialistic values of efficiency (e.g., meeting
budget) and client service (e.g., selling non-audit services) relative to audit quality (e.g.,
compliance with regulations and methodology). They find that dysfunctional behaviors
(e.g., premature signoff, skipping audit procedures) are less frequent with a quality focus,
more frequent with a client focus, and not affected by an efficiency focus. Big 4 auditors
perceive greater (lower) emphasis on client (efficiency) focus and have lower
organizational commitment, but are also less likely to engage in dysfunctional behavior.

13

These results suggest that adopting a client service focus in performance evaluations could
result in reduced audit quality.
Two archival studies find evidence of varying audit quality at the engagement level,
suggesting differing client affinity across audit partners. Ittonen, Johnstone, and
Myllymäki (2015) find higher audit quality for engagements of partners with more public
clients, implying a tone of greater willingness to resist client pressure (i.e., less client
affinity) in the engagements they lead. Chang, Choy, Lin, and Koo (2019) show that when
partners switch firms, clients following to the new firm have lower audit quality than those
that stay with the partner’s former firm. This implies that clients expect continued latitude
in future audits led by those partners, which overcomes the switching costs associated with
changing firms. However, clients are less likely to follow the partner from Big 4 incumbent
firms, consistent with better monitoring controls in Big 4 relative to smaller firms. Bauer
(2015) shows that greater client identification leads to lower audit quality judgments,
consistent with prior research, but finds firms can reduce the effect through guidance
reinforcing professional identity. Koch and Salterio (2017) show that client affinity is
associated with lower audit quality (i.e., adjustments to a client’s proposed aggressive
accounting), but do not find that a client satisfaction survey (implemented by the firm to
measure the client relationship) induces greater client affinity. Relatedly, Hoang, Jamal,
and Tan (2019) use proprietary data from a client satisfaction survey to find that
engagement profitability increases with client satisfaction on intangible service dimensions
(i.e., auditor communication, customized service, and responsiveness). While this suggests
that auditors might attempt to increase client satisfaction by being more conciliatory, they
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do not find that client satisfaction is associated with lower audit quality (discretionary
accruals and audit adjustments).
Two studies examine the role of economic incentives in the balance between
professionalism and commercialism. Lisic, Myers, Pawlewicz, and Seidel (2019) find a
negative association of audit quality with consulting relative to audit revenues pre-SOX,
but this relationship is not observable post-SOX. In contrast, Beardsley, Lassila, and Omer
(2019) find evidence post-SOX that fee pressure at the office level is associated with
greater focus on non-audit services, which in turn results in lower audit quality at larger
offices within a firm, suggesting a commercialistic orientation. The differing results of
these studies suggest that firm-level analysis may be too broad to detect cultural differences
that impact audit quality.
4.1.3. Auditor Mindsets and Work Attitudes
Table

1.1

Panel

C

summarizes

research

on

the

influence

of

professionalism/commercialism culture on auditors’ mindsets and attitudes. In response to
firms’ reputational capital, increased competition, client demands and technology
developments, Picard (2016) shows that a gradual shift from professionalism to
commercialism occurred due to infiltration of marketing personnel and ideology, resulting
in a marketing mindset. Picard, Durocher, and Gendron (2018) show how marketization
resulted in closer relationships with clients, shifting auditors’ ways of “thinking and doing”
away from professional values. They conclude that both firm and individual level aspects
of marketization potentially threaten auditor independence.
Several studies document the effects of pressure exerted by firm leadership on
auditors. Guénin-Paracini, Malsch, and Paillé (2014) distill practices that form and
reinforce a “culture of fear” among staff auditors, “emotionalizing” the audit process that
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prior research considers to be cognitive and technical. This fear arises from the “impossible
mission” of meeting the firm’s demands, driven in part by commercialism. Staff auditors’
anxiety also arises from formal procedures (e.g., “risk framing”), long hours, and incentive
systems. Similarly, Lupu and Empson (2015) find that auditors feel "helpless and trapped"
by the culture of long hours. Firm norms of overworking employees imply that social and
professional status is achieved by acceding to highly demanding work schedules,
reinforced by partners’ expectations and demands.
Ladva and Andrew (2014) also study the dominance of firm norms toward a longhours culture, driven by pressure for efficiency, tight time budgets, and firms’ overtime
policies. This “web of control” reinforces an efficiency-based professional identity, career
oriented and detrimental to work-life balance. While Ladva and Andrew (2014) imply that
auditors adapt to this highly demanding culture with some degree of acceptance,
Kornberger, Justesen, and Mouritsen (2011) show conflicts continue as auditors proceed
on the path toward partnership. New managers reflect on difficulty and uncertainty of this
transition, reporting changes in roles, power, and client relationships suggesting shifts from
the technical to the commercial, instilled by individuals who have themselves made the
transition. They learn to navigate the organizational network by “playing games and
politicking.” Caglio, Cameran, and Klobas (2019) show that auditors exhibit
disillusionment after being immersed in the culture of auditing for a period of years,
implying that professional identity is influenced through AFC. Finally, Daoust and Malsch
(2019) find that auditors who have left public accounting report being overwhelmed by
physical and emotional exhaustion, driven by a mismatch between self-identity and the
cultural norms set by firm leaders. Key causes reported include lack of recognition in the
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incentive structure and budget constraints. However, over time, former auditors’
perspectives shift to more positive feelings of professional superiority over non-auditor
colleagues, and an appreciation of the usefulness of past experiences in their current roles.
4.1.4. Summary
Research cited in this section yields three high-level conclusions that we discuss
here; detailed take-aways and future research questions arising from these studies are
presented in Table 1.4 Panel A. First, in response to the question posed by Jenkins et al.
(2008; i.e., have audit firms nurtured cultures emphasizing an appropriate level of
professionalism), most research in our sample implies that the balance continues to tip
toward commercialism. For example, a commercialized culture is noted to be driven by a
marketing perspective, reinforced through EMs of tone at the top, incentive systems, and
budgetary control. Within this overall finding, specific studies note that the goals of firm
leadership are often oriented toward profits/economic capital, partner compensation is
largely based on gaining and keeping clients, and audit quality is reduced when
performance evaluations have a client focus or individual auditors have stronger client
affinity.
Second, some recent studies imply that commercialism has declined and/or that
professionalism can co-exist with commercial values. The perspective of co-existence is
consistent with Knechel, Thomas, and Driskill (2020), who posit that cooperation between
audit firm and client is necessary; i.e., a successful audit is co-created by auditor and client.
However, they also note the associated risk of abdication of responsibility when
cooperation crosses the line toward client affinity (as studies in our sample demonstrate).
Third, some studies conclude that auditors experience highly emotional responses
to commercialistic pressure imposed by firms’ structure and cultural perceptions, including
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feelings of fear, conflict, helplessness, and exhaustion, even at higher ranks in the firm.
However, other studies describe new auditors as internalizing or adapting to the ethos and
becoming part of the enforcement process. The reasons for this difference in findings are
unclear, as is the impact on audit quality.
4.2. Research on Ethical Culture in Audit Firms
This section covers studies examining the role and impact of ethical culture in
auditing, i.e., social norms and practices that firms establish around ethical behavior,
summarized in Table 1.2. 11 Research on ethical culture in auditing has been spurred by the
auditing scandals of the 1990’s and early 2000’s, which implied declining ethics of
individual auditors and their firms (e.g., Zeff, 2003a; Wyatt, 2004). As studies in this
section fall naturally in distinct groups, we briefly review background literature in each
subsection: auditors’ perceptions of their firms’ ethical culture; the association of ethical
culture with professional skepticism; quality-threatening behaviors (QTBs; i.e., violations
of standards or norms); whistleblowing on others’ unethical acts; and auditors’ work
attitudes.
[Insert Table 1.2: Ethical Culture Here]
4.2.1. Perceptions of Ethical Culture
Research on ethical culture recognizes that perceptions of the ethical culture of the
workplace are important because they influence ethical behavior (e.g., Suddaby, Gendron,
& Lam, 2009). Victor and Cullen (1988) present a multi-dimensional scale widely used in
this literature, which includes ethicality of firm leadership, response to unethical behavior,

These studies rely on theory and findings from the literature on ethics. Authors use different terminology
(e.g., ethical culture, ethical climate or ethical environment) to describe similar constructs; e.g., studies by
Sweeney and colleagues use “ethical culture”, while studies by Shafer and colleagues use “ethical climate”.
To simplify our discussion, we use the term ethical culture throughout.
11
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ethical training, and codes of conduct. For example, Bobek, Hageman, and Radtke (2010)
adapt this scale to detect differences in ethical culture within firms for tax professionals.
Table 1.2 Panel A presents two studies in our sample investigating factors associated with
such differences among auditors. Bobek, Dalton, Daugherty, Hageman, and Radtke (2017)
find that the scale elements form a single factor, implying that multiple EMs jointly
contribute to ethical culture. They also find stronger perceptions of ethical culture in Big 4
than in non-Big 4 firms. Bobek, Hageman, and Radtke (2015) show that non-leaders’
perceptions of ethical culture are higher when they participate in shaping culture and have
a better organizational fit with the firm. Ethical perceptions of leaders increase with strong
professional orientation and/or recent mentoring.
4.2.2. Ethical Culture and Professional Skepticism
Table 1.2 Panel B summarizes research on the role of ethical culture on professional
skepticism, building on a rich existing literature. Reviews by Nelson (2009) and Hurtt,
Brown-Liburd, Earley, and Krishnamoorthy (2013) note that ethical/moral reasoning is a
foundation of trait skepticism. Several of the studies in our sample examine professional
skepticism as part of the fraud brainstorming and risk assessment processes. As fraud
brainstorming became required in the early 2000’s, questions arose as to how firms were
implementing this requirement and its relative effectiveness. While studies prior to our
sample period consider issues of fraud risk assessment and engagement planning (e.g.,
Knapp & Knapp, 2001; Glover, Prawitt, Schultz, & Zimbelman, 2003), relatively few
consider brainstorming specifically. A key study within the fraud brainstorming literature
is Carpenter (2007), who finds that brainstorming sessions yield more and higher quality
fraud ideas and higher risk assessments than individual auditors acting alone, suggesting
greater professional skepticism. In our sample, Dennis and Johnstone (2016) build on
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Carpenter (2007) by showing that audit partners are generally open to ideas during the
sessions, stimulating ethical awareness. In addition, self-assessed levels of professional
skepticism are higher on high risk engagements. Dennis and Johnstone (2018) manipulate
guidance to partners leading actual brainstorming sessions; i.e., emphasizing training,
encouraging balance of effectiveness/efficiency, and skepticism. These practices result in
better mental representations of fraud risk for seniors (but not managers) and better
outcomes. Gissel and Johnstone (2017) find that when the partner supports idea sharing,
less knowledgeable brainstorming participants are more willing to share privately known
information. Carpenter and Reimers (2013) find that partner emphasis on skepticism in
brainstorming results in higher risk assessments and greater effectiveness. Harding and
Trotman (2017) find auditor judgments are improved when partners encourage skepticism
focusing both on testing management’s word and recognizing the fallibility of one’s own
judgments.
Several studies in our sample address the association of ethical culture with
skepticism in the context of accounting estimates, which Nelson (2009) notes is a
particularly challenging setting when conceptualizing skepticism. Stevens, Moroney, and
Webster (2019) consider positive aspects of ethical culture, finding that greater partner
support yields more skepticism of management’s forecast assumptions, but only when team
cohesiveness is reinforced. Martinov-Bennie and Pflugrath (2009) show that audit
managers are more conservative in response to reinforcement of an ethical code when client
management proposes an aggressive valuation. On the negative side, Brink, Tang, and
Yang (2016) find that when obedience pressure comes from a supervisor relative to peers,
auditors judge lower risk and are less willing to investigate a questionable client proposed
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fair value estimate. Brazel, Jackson, Schaefer, and Stewart (2016) show that performance
evaluations reinforce a culture discouraging skepticism, if supervisors penalize a
subordinate’s skeptical behavior when additional investigation does not find a
misstatement. Consulting with supervisors prior to investigation improves performance
evaluations but does not fully mitigate the impact of investigation outcome on the negative
evaluation.
4.2.3. Quality-Threatening Behaviors
Research described in Table 1.2 Panel C assesses the association of ethical culture
with behaviors that violate auditing standards or firm norms. Prior research (e.g., Otley &
Pierce, 1996; Malone & Roberts, 1996; Herrbach, 2001; Pierce & Sweeney, 2004)
investigates the levels of various QTBs in audit practice, establishing that perceptions of
the firm’s quality controls are among factors affecting their incidence. Pierce and Sweeney
(2006) find auditors believe that the risk of detection of QTBs is low and show little regard
for the ethical implications of these acts. From that basis, studies in our sample investigate
ways in which ethical culture can influence QTBs, both positively and negatively. From a
positive perspective, Herda, Cannon, and Young (2019) find that when supervisors
emphasize the importance of auditing for financial report users, auditors are more mindful
of their work and premature sign-off is reduced. Agoglia, Hatfield, and Lambert (2015)
find that firms’ efforts to discourage under-reporting of time are weakened for more
desirable clients, as managers reward seniors who under-report time. However, partners do
not favor under-reporting, suggesting conflict with managers’ incentives. Shafer (2008)
finds lower intentions to engage in QTBs when auditors perceive their firms’ ethical culture
as featuring social responsibility; i.e., the expectation to follow organizational systems and
procedures, laws, and professional ethical codes.
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Shafer (2008) also studies negative influence, finding that an egoistic culture (the
expectation that auditors follow their own moral beliefs) is associated with more unethical
behavior. Auditors at local firms are more likely than those at international firms to
consider aggressive actions as ethical. Tsuogaya, Sugahara, and Chand (2017) find that
obedience pressure from superiors is associated with more QTBs, but conformity pressure
is not. 12 However, professional commitment mitigates the influence of partner pressure.
Sweeney, Arnold, and Pierce (2010) find that unethical tone and pressure influence
auditors’ ethical evaluations of QTBs resulting from time constraints, but only pressure
influences intention to engage in those actions. Timeliness of penalties is not associated
with ethical outcomes, suggesting that pressure by supervisors plays a larger role than
incentives in this context. Sweeney, Pierce, and Arnold (2013) further show that these
associations are mediated by perceived ethical intensity of the QTBs. Sweeney et al. (2010)
and Pierce and Sweeney (2010) find that auditors in larger firms have higher ethical
evaluations and lower intentions to engage in unethical behavior, consistent with greater
organizational support in those firms.
4.2.4. Whistleblowing
Studies described in Table 1.2 Panel D address the association of ethical culture
with whistleblowing. The literature in auditing is guided by general research (e.g., Miceli,
Near, & Dworkin, 2008) that focuses on the importance of organizational and individual
antecedents. Bedard, Deis, Curtis, and Jenkins (2008) and Gao and Brink (2017)
summarize extant literature as showing that organizational culture, incentive systems, and

Obedience pressure is a type of social influence pressure in which individuals change their behavior in
response to commands made by those with authority whereas, conformity pressure results in a change in
behavior due to pressure established by widely accepted beliefs or standards (Tsuogaya, Sugahara, & Chand,
2017; Baron & Byrne, 1981).
12
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design of whistle-blowing channels are key influencing factors (e.g., Brennan & Kelly,
2007). Bedard et al. (2008) encourage further research on features of the auditing
environment and on the changes since the passage of SOX. Research in our sample
responds by studying the importance of tone at the top and other EMs. Alleyne, Haniffa,
and Hudaib (2016) find that whistleblowing intentions are driven by perceptions of the
firm’s ethicality; i.e., support for ethical decision-making from senior personnel and
perceived costs of reporting. 13 Alleyne, Hudaib, and Haniffa (2018) find that drivers of
reporting vary by channel, with greater internal reporting based on perceptions of
organizational support and expectations of the firm’s response. Latan, Jabbour, and Lopes
de Sousa Jabbour (2019) find that whistleblowing intention is affected by financial
incentives, perceptions of pressure against reporting, and opportunity to report. Latan,
Ringle, and Jabbour (2018) show that stronger organizational support and team norms
strengthen the association of antecedents (e.g., opportunity to report and perceived cost of
reporting) with intentions.
Taylor and Curtis (2013) find that a firm’s prior actions (i.e., counseling versus
reprimanding violators) are associated with perceived ethical culture. Taylor and Curtis
(2018) further find that higher quality mentoring improves perceptions of ethical culture,
which in turn improves internal reporting of fraud, through greater trust and organizational
commitment. McManus and Subramaniam (2009) study mentoring processes, finding that
early career accountants’ ethical evaluations of a questionable partner decision are stronger
when mentoring focuses on career development rather than on social support, and peers

Alleyne, Hudaib, and Pike (2013) also develop a model that addresses auditors’ whistleblowing intentions,
establishing key components consistent with Alleyne et al. (2016) as antecedents to auditors’ reporting
intentions.
13
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are viewed as more ethical. Use of an external channel (calling an accounting body for
advice) is greater in small or mid-tier firms, relative to Big 4 firms. Robertson, Stefaniak,
and Curtis (2011) find auditors are more likely to report less likable and poorly performing
supervisors, especially when reporting internally and through non-anonymous channels.
Perceived repercussions of not reporting wrongdoing are more influential in guiding
intention than the possible impact of reporting on performance evaluation.
4.2.5. Work Attitudes
Table 1.2 Panel E summarizes research on ethical culture and auditors’ work
attitudes. Hall, Smith, and Langfield-Smith (2005) summarize relevant research within and
outside of auditing, concluding that commitment to the profession and to the firm affects
job satisfaction and turnover intention. Other research demonstrates the association of
turnover intention with variation in audit quality (e.g., as a predictor of QTBs; Donnelly,
Quirin, & O'Bryan, 2003). 14 Studies in our sample extend the literature by assessing the
influence of aspects of ethical culture on work attitudes. For example, Cohen, Dalton, and
Harp (2017) show that lack of partner support for skepticism is associated with lower
perceived organizational support, less organizational citizenship behavior, and higher
turnover intention. These perceptions are driven by demanding schedules, tight budgets,
and performance evaluations that do not adequately reward skepticism. Large firm auditors
perceive lower levels of partner support for skepticism resulting from these EMs (e.g.,
evaluation systems that emphasize selling non-audit services), compared to auditors in
smaller firms. McManus and Subramaniam (2014) find that new auditors’ organizational

Relatedly, the PCAOB identifies personnel turnover as a root cause of audit inspection deficiencies
(Hanson, 2015); thus, understanding the role of ethical culture in organizational commitment and turnover
intention is important.
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and professional commitment are higher when mentors focus on career development (as
opposed to social support) and top management does not tolerate unethical behavior.
Shafer (2009) and Shafer, Poon, and Tjosvold (2013) find that auditors’ perceptions
of an egoistic culture are associated with greater organizational-professional conflict and
lower organizational commitment. These associations are reversed for more benevolent or
principled ethical cultures that reward following firm procedures and ethical codes. Shafer
et al. (2013) find that professionally committed employees feel less organizationalprofessional conflict when the firm places greater emphasis on the public's interest. Finally,
Herda and Lavelle (2011) go beyond the immediate employment environment to find that
auditors’ propensity to support a firm after leaving is positively associated with perceptions
of organizational fairness and support of their former employer.
4.2.6. Summary
Research in our sample yields three high-level conclusions that we discuss here;
detailed take-aways and research questions arising from these studies are presented in
Table 1.4 Panel B. First, this research affirms that tone at the top established by firm
leadership drives auditors’ perceptions of ethical culture. In these studies, tone at the top is
evidenced by factors such as leaders’ own ethicality, their prior reaction to ethical issues,
and their expectations for compliance with firm policies and procedures. Other studies
investigate tone set by engagement leaders, showing that subordinates’ ethical perceptions
are associated with an encouraging environment that supports skeptical behavior. A
number of studies find that positive ethical tone (e.g., emphasis on audit quality during
brainstorming, maintaining a psychologically safe environment, emphasizing interests of
users, and support for whistleblowing or ethical behavior) influences audit quality and/or
work attitudes. Additionally, some research finds lower audit quality is associated with a
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negative (i.e., unethical) culture (e.g., obedience pressure, or an “egoistic” firm culture
allowing auditors to go their own way rather than follow firm norms). Thus, our sample
studies confirm prior research that ethical culture matters for good or ill. Their use of a
broad mix of tasks and methods enhances confidence in the findings and contribution to
the literature, as does extending to a variety of outcomes. Further, these studies go beyond
direct effects of ethical culture by examining contingent factors; finding for instance that
firms’ efforts to reduce under-reporting of time are undercut for highly desirable clients;
and effects of pressure to engage in QTBs is lower for professionally committed auditors.
Thus, while the overall conclusion of these studies is that ethical tone set by firm leadership
matters, they also identify limits on this effect.
A second observation arising from studies of ethical culture is that some consider
multiple EMs. Because auditors work in complex environments where many EMs operate
simultaneously, such research is important in enhancing understanding of the topic. Of
those studies, many report that several EMs influence cultural perceptions and/or
consequences. However, some studies detect interactive effects among the EMs studied.
For instance, Stevens et al. (2019) find that greater partner support yields more skepticism
of management’s forecast assumptions, but only when team cohesiveness is reinforced.
That finding implies a synergistic interaction, but EMs might also conflict; e.g., when an
auditor experiences a strong mentor but weak ethical tone of leadership, which is the more
important force?
A third point arising from research in this section concerns how ethical culture
develops. While Jenkins et al. (2008) focus on formal ethical training, studies in our sample
concern informal interactions with supervisors and/or mentors. For instance, Herda et al.
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(2019) imply that coaching is the process through which the ethical tone of the organization
is conveyed, and McManus and Subramaniam (2014) find that mentoring style
emphasizing career development is more effective. 15
4.3. Research on Learning Culture in Audit Firms
In this subsection, we review research on AFC related to the learning environment,
summarized in Table 1.3. The literatures on organizational learning (e.g., Popper &
Lipshitz, 1998) and knowledge sharing within audit firms (e.g., Vera-Munoz, Ho, & Chow,
2006) propose that purposeful engagement of leadership, structures, and procedures
encourages learning. These practices support gathering, disseminating, and using
information relevant to task performance. As studies in this section comprise three topics,
we briefly review background literature within each subsection: the role of firm culture in
acquiring knowledge from outside the engagement team; sharing and using knowledge
within engagement teams; and firm/engagement team level cultural practices related to
promoting and assessing individual learning.
[Insert Table 1.3: Learning Culture Here]
4.3.1. Learning from Outside the Engagement Team: Systems, Specialists and Other
Teams
Studies examining the role of AFC in encouraging auditors to acquire and use
knowledge from sources outside the engagement team focus on (1) the use of electronic
support systems; (2) the use of specialists; and (3) communication with other firm offices
(Table 1.3 Panel A). First, electronic support systems are implemented by firm leadership

Jenkins et al. (2008) acknowledged a lack of current information on ethics training in public accounting,
calling for descriptive research, but focus primarily on formal training in firms and universities. While our
search terms would not necessarily detect all studies of ethics training, it is interesting that our sample
references only on-the-job development of ethics, not formal programs.
15
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to capture, organize, and/or disseminate information. Research generally finds that such
systems, widely used especially in large firms (Janvrin, Bierstaker, & Lowe, 2008), are
associated with audit quality (e.g., Banker, Chang, & Kao, 2002). Bedard et al. (2008)
conclude that the pre-2008 literature on audit support systems not only identifies benefits
to audit quality, but also threats (e.g., working around system constraints). Studies they cite
consider issues of systems design and training to mitigate system misuse, but do not stress
aspects of culture supporting auditors’ acceptance and use of technology that are prominent
in general systems research (e.g., Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003); e.g., the role
of social influence factors (cultural norms).
Three studies in our sample reinforce the importance of tone at the top on intention
or actual use of work technologies, and identify ways in which firms can improve their
impact on audit quality. Curtis and Payne (2008) find that a longer budgeting horizon
improves user intentions. Lin and Fan (2011) confirm the importance of peer support in
establishing subjective norms, and show that the influence of such norms on user intentions
is larger in Big 4 firms, where the pressure to comply is presumably greater. Dowling
(2009) finds that perceptions of consensus among firm leaders and peers regarding system
use are antecedents of normative pressure to use the system appropriately. Firms vary in
the extent to which they constrain users in performing tasks, with more restrictive systems
associated with higher audit quality. 16

16
Dowling and Leech (2014) extend this study by examining how the new audit support systems of a Big 4
firm facilitates learning. Auditors consider the system’s restrictiveness as enabling rather than coercive. For
example, results show that the system’s features make the firm’s audit methodology more explicit and
transparent through a hyperlinking function. Thus, the system facilitates learning of the global methodology,
potentially aligning cultures across firms and offices.
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Second, auditors acquire knowledge through consultation with specialists. Hux’s
(2017) literature review notes that the use of specialists is growing, and while there are
benefits to audit quality, issues around their use have captured regulators’ attention. Four
studies in our sample relate to use of audit specialists. Gold, Knechel, and Wallage (2012)
find that mandatory consultation increases forensic specialist use when fraud risk or
deadline pressure is high. Relatedly, two studies demonstrate the key role of firm
leadership’s support in developing trust and teamwork, improving the effectiveness of
consultations. Asare and Wright (2018) emphasize the influence of senior team leaders
who develop a “culture of consultation” based on communication, relationships, and
sharing of real-world experiences. Bauer and Estep (2019) find that leadership’s support
improves relationships between auditors and specialists, and perceptions of the firm’s
culture as “one team” results in improved communication and coordination. In contrast,
Smith-Lacroix, Durocher, and Gendron (2012), Griffith (2019), and Asare and Wright
(2018) argue that use of specialists could increase costs and delays, straining the auditorauditee relationship. Smith-Lacroix et al. (2012) find that greater specialist use to achieve
assurance erodes the role of the audit partner, who becomes a mobilizer of experts rather
than a decision maker. When auditors lack specific knowledge, they must place greater
trust in specialists, resulting in tension between their need for comfort and their authority,
leading to competition over cooperation (Griffith, 2019). This is especially an issue at large
audit firms that have more structured guidelines regarding consultation with specialists.
Third, culture might affect learning from outside the audit team through
communication with other teams and offices. Earlier studies document variation in audit
quality across sub-units of firms (e.g., Reynolds & Francis, 2000; Francis, Reichelt, &
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Wang, 2005), supporting the audit firm as a “collection of geographically decentralized
offices” (Beck, Gunn, & Hallman, 2019, p. 1) rather than a monolithic organization. Two
studies in our sample consider the influence of geographic distance between offices.
Seavey, Imhoff, and Westfall (2018) and Beck et al. (2019) show that audit quality
increases with closer office proximity. Seavey et al. (2018) report auditors’ views that a
culture of knowledge sharing is encouraged by partner-to-partner communication,
appraising knowledge sharing in partner performance evaluations, and joint training
sessions across offices. Beck et al. (2019) find that proximity between large and small
offices of a firm improves audit quality due to a culture of support and knowledge spillover.
4.3.2. Learning Within the Engagement Team
Table 1.3, Panel B presents studies of learning during the course of the audit; i.e.,
learning from prior errors and speaking up to communicate ideas. Vera-Munoz et al. (2006)
cite the importance of information exchange among auditors of differing backgrounds and
ranks. For example, prior research shows long-term positive consequences of
communicating errors (e.g., Van Dyck, Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005), despite the
potential cost to the individual. Zhao and Olivera (2006) specify culture and norms around
error disclosure as key factors affecting error reporting (error management culture, EMC
hereafter). While all studies in this subsection focus on training, they vary in other aspects
of culture studied. Gronewold and Donle (2011) find that a high EMC, reinforced by
leadership’s support for learning from errors, is associated with better handling of the
auditor’s own and client errors. Seckler, Gronewold, and Reihlen (2017) develop a model
of error management, noting influence by effective leadership (e.g., expectations regarding
feedback), training (e.g., learning and development plans), organizational systems and
procedures (e.g., formalized audit methodology to ensure the firm complies with
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professional standards), and organizational design and structure (e.g., geographical
locations and service lines).
Gronewold, Gold, and Salterio (2013) and Gold, Gronewold, and Salterio (2014)
examine the influence of office-level EMC on auditors’ willingness to report errors. Both
find greater reporting of discovered errors in an open EMC, reinforced by leadership
support, performance evaluation systems that do not penalize for errors, and coaching
focused on learning. Gold et al. (2014) additionally find that an open EMC improves
reporting of mechanical errors (e.g., erroneous calculations), but not conceptual errors (i.e.,
relating to complex judgments or adequacy of audit work), likely due to impression
management efforts. Emby, Zhao, and Sieweke (2019) study audit seniors’ willingness to
“model their fallibility” (i.e., discuss their own errors) as a way of coaching, and a signal
of error climate. They find that this practice can stimulate subordinates to think clearly
about their own errors and communicate them to others.
Other studies examine auditor “voice” (i.e., willingness to speak up regarding
problems detected). Stefaniak and Robertson (2010) find that auditors are more likely to
admit errors when the supervisor’s prior reaction to a subordinate’s errors was positive.
Nelson, Proell, and Randel (2016) find that team-oriented leadership increases speaking
up, especially when the issues are aligned with supervisors’ concerns for audit
effectiveness or efficiency, and are mediated by an individual’s commitment to the team
leader and identification with the team. Nelson and Proell (2018) further find that in the
performance assessment process, audit leaders encourage speaking up through higher
performance ratings for those who do so. Lastly, Kadous, Proell, Rich, and Zhou (2019)
find that speaking up is associated with auditors’ intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation for

31

their job performance. Supervisors can leverage that effect by making intrinsic rewards
more salient in their own emphasis.
4.3.3. Learning from Engagement Review, Feedback, and Performance Evaluation
Table 1.3 Panel C summarizes studies examining individual learning through
feedback from engagement reviews, performance evaluation, and coaching employees
toward future success. Andiola’s (2014) review of the auditing feedback literature cites a
number of studies showing the consequential nature of review methods (e.g., Brazel,
Agoglia, & Hatfield, 2004) and review processes (e.g., Trotman & Yetton, 1985). Most
related to our interest, she discusses the limited prior literature in auditing (e.g., AndersonGough, Grey, & Robson, 1998) on the influence of the learning environment (the
organizational context in which feedback is given and received) on feedback quality.
The studies in our sample contribute to the literature by examining features of the
review context. Westermann, Bedard, and Earley (2015) study on-the-job learning of
technical knowledge, through supervisors’ guidance and preferences communicated
through the apprenticeship model. They note that while staff learning is shaped by firm
processes (e.g., performance evaluation, review and coaching), the apprenticeship model
implies that resources are allocated less to formal training (e.g., staff induction) and more
to training on the job. Their results imply that the review process and coaching from
supervisors are insufficiently rewarded. Cameran, Ditillo, and Pettinicchio (2018) find
lower audit quality on engagements with more hours allocated to partners and managers,
suggesting that audit staff lack opportunities to learn from more senior professionals on
such engagements when fewer hours are allocated to them.
Andiola and Bedard (2018) study factors affecting audit subordinates’ responses to
negative feedback during reviews, a necessary aspect of learning from experience. Results
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show that more negative feedback is associated with worse coaching relationships and with
more attempts to manage supervisors' impressions, but also with greater performance
improvement efforts. However, these reactions are moderated by how supervisors frame
the goals of feedback: salience of the coaching relationship declines when supervisors
focus on performance goals, but not on learning goals. Andiola, Bedard, and Westermann
(2019) show that key causes of inconsistencies in subordinates’ perceptions of the audit
review process are variation in the supervisor’s tone, poor feedback, insufficient resources
allocated to reviewing and coaching, and incentive structures that do not reward those
activities. Further, Dalton, Davis, and Viator (2015) find that helpfulness and consistency
of the supervisor’s advice in practice vary significantly and that unfavorable feedback
environments are associated with lower organizational commitment and higher turnover
intention, moderated by an effective mentor.
4.3.4. Summary
Research cited in this section yields three high-level conclusions; detailed
takeaways and future research questions arising from these studies are presented in Table
1.4 Panel C. First, various EMs play a role in cultivating learning culture, including tone
at the top (e.g., leadership support for developing trust and teamwork or leading by example
through their own openness to learning), incentive structures (e.g., appraising knowledge
sharing and learning in performance evaluations), training (e.g., coaching focused on
learning from errors), sufficient resources to enable learning (e.g., having the time to
provide an effective review and feedback), supporting organizational systems and
procedures (e.g., review and consultation policy or the provision of audit aid systems), and
organizational design and structure (e.g., consultation units and the apprenticeship model).
In addition, research finds these perceptions of learning culture affect audit quality aspects
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like auditors’ willingness to speak up about audit issues or openly discuss errors in audit
processes, how audit staff develop and learn from audit review and feedback, and how
auditors consult with experts and specialists.
Second, our sample studies show that the engagement is the key learning
environment, implying firms should focus on how to improve coaching and review. To
accomplish this, studies in this section show that supervisors need to focus on the
subordinate’s learning, not just on their performance, and give solid and consistent advice
(even if negative). Further, audit firms need to support supervisors by providing training,
resources, and incentives to enable supervisors to do that. Similarly, tone at the top is
instrumental in auditors’ acceptance and use of technology, in fostering trust and teamwork
necessary to make consultations with specialists effective, and for knowledge sharing (both
within and across offices). Yet the research documents substantial variation in mechanisms
residing closer to the individual, implying either that leadership is poorly communicated
overall, or there are “pockets” where it is effective or ineffective.
Third, although our review includes a number of papers addressing learning culture
in the context of consultation with peers and specialists, it remains an empirical question
which EMs (e.g., effective leadership, sufficient resources) are most effective in building
a “consultation culture”, a concept that the IAASB (2014) identifies as a key prerequisite
of a culture focused on audit quality. This is of particular interest as some research
identifies cultural differences between audit and other service lines (e.g., systems
consultancy; Bauer & Estep, 2019).
5. LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this review, we synthesize research in high quality journals from 2008-2019
relating to organizational culture in audit firms and provide suggestions for future research.
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In this section, we note limitations associated with procedures we used to prepare this
synthesis, provide an overall summary, and link to future research questions arising from
pervasive issues (Table 1.4 Panel D). First, because culture is a prevalent feature of any
organization, much of the auditing literature is potentially relevant. Our design is aimed at
addressing key issues, within a paper of reasonable length. Thus, our search terms capture
research covering core concepts of culture, interpreted based on a model of AFC developed
from academic research and audit practice, which comprises EMs, perceived culture, and
consequences. Second, because our model implies study of AFC in large, complex
organizations with multiple layers of leadership and international reach, we include studies
of Big 4 firms, and those that compare Big 4 to smaller firms. Third, while we divide
research into three main themes for discussion, we recognize that they are not completely
distinct; e.g., ethical behavior in auditing encompasses, but is not limited to, compliance
with professional standards. Despite these limitations, our review informs audit firm
management, researchers, and regulators on the current state of knowledge regarding the
status of AFC, the EMs under management control that contribute to establishing AFC,
and the influence of those forces on audit quality and auditors’ work attitudes.
[Insert Table 1.4: Main Findings and Future Research Here]
In closing their research synthesis, Jenkins et al. (2008) question whether audit
firms have successfully nurtured cultures of professionalism and protecting the public
interest and note that “time and carefully performed research” are needed to answer this
question. Over ten years have passed since their review, and many AFC studies have been
published in leading journals in the field. Our synthesis shows concern that
commercialization still infringes on professionalism, although recent studies suggest that
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both might co-exist. Further, studies in our sample confirm that firm or engagement level
leadership influences audit outcomes through tone at the top, using a variety of research
methods, specific measures of tone, and measures of consequences related to audit quality
and auditors’ work attitudes. From audit practice, there is evidence that firms have been
working over the past decade to improve AFC; e.g., FRC (2018) reports that about 80
percent of auditors are satisfied with their firm’s cultural design and tone at the top among
firm leaders. But while firms are working to improve AFC, major accounting failures
continue to occur.
Why might this be the case? One possible factor is that tone at the top and other
EMs are not completely congruent. 17 Regulatory (IAASB, 2014; FRC, 2018) and
theoretical perspectives (Schein, 2017) imply that AFC is best driven by a well calibrated
configuration of EMs. Further research is needed that identifies where congruencies or
conflicts occur between tone and other EMs. Further, research that examines several EMs
simultaneously does not always compare between them; e.g., when leadership tone and
incentives conflict, which is more important in driving an auditor behavior? Also, as
research generally focuses on a single level (e.g., firm, office, or engagement), we lack
information on how EMs differ among subunits within a firm; and when cultures diverge,
how these EMs interact in combination and which has the primary influence on auditor
behavior. Relatedly, future research could investigate the extent and circumstances (e.g.,
configuration of EMs) under which increased audit firm focus and public scrutiny on
quality has resulted in changes in AFC (e.g., professionalism over commercialism), auditor
behavior, and actual audit quality.
The FRC (2018) report suggests this explanation, in finding that auditors surveyed are less satisfied with
the quality of monitoring in their firms than with tone at the top.
17
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FIGURE 1.1
Theoretical Model
Macro-cultures
(national, professional and Global Network cultures)
Audit firm culture
(firm, office and engagement level)
Embedding Mechanisms
(pattern of visible
artifacts that signal
underlying values)

Cultural Perceptions
(e.g., social norms)

Consequences
(e.g., auditors’ behavior,
audit quality)

Sub-cultures
(e.g., gender, age, ethnicity)
Notes: This figure presents an overall model of the study of culture in auditing. While our main analysis is at the
(national) firm, office and engagement level, we also consider forces from above the firm (e.g., national identities
and network cultures) as well as sub-cultures relating to individual level characteristics (e.g., gender, age,
rank/experience) that might influence inferences and consequences of culture. These are discussed in online
Appendix C [URL here].
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TABLE 1.1

Elements of Professionalism/Commercialism Culture Measured in Identified Studies
Primary
Embedding Mechanisms
Incentives
Training
(INC)
(TR)

Secondary
Embedding Mechanisms
Tone at the
Resources
Org. design & Org. systems
Top (TT)
(RES)
structure
&
(ODS)
procedures
(OSP)
Panel A. The Status of Professionalism and Commercialism in Audit Firm Culture (AFC)
Gendron &
Leaders’
Compensation
OrganizaSpira (2009) failure to
systems and
tional rules
prevent fall
promotion
and policies
of Arthur
mechanisms
(bureaucratic
Andersen
(market control)
control)
Sweeney &
McGarry
(2011)

Partners’
espoused
goals

Carter &
Spence
(2014)

Partners’
espoused
values

Knechel,
Niemi, &
Zerni (2013)

Key Findings
Cultural
Perceptions
(CP)
CP of shared
values and
norms (clan
control)
CP of publicly
expressed
goals vs. those
espoused by
audit partners
(TT)

Incentive
system for
promotion to
partner (“good
client
management”)

CP of
“capital”
valued by
firms (cultural,
social,
linguistic and
economic)

Partner
compensation
system
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Consequences (CON)

Failure of Arthur Andersen
(CON) could have been
prevented by firm
management (TT) through
bureaucratic controls (OSP)
and clan controls (CP).
Perceived commitment to
profitability over professional
standards (CON) results from
partner’s focus on profits (TT)
as opposed to goals of AQ and
client satisfaction espoused
publicly (CP).
Successful professionals
(CON) result from incentive
systems (INC) that promote
partners whose focus shifts
from technical expertise to
commercialism (economic
capital; CP), reinforcing the
espoused values of those
partners (TT).
Partner compensation (CON)
varies considerably due to
INC systems driven by; e.g.,
client size, client portfolio
composition and change,
industry specialization,

Coram &
Robinson
(2017)

Partner profitsharing systems
(financial &
nonfinancial
measures)

Broberg,
Umans,
Skog, &
Theodorsson
(2018)

Performance
goals; rewards
for assignment
performance

Allocation of
resources to
business
processes

Designation of
process
owners;
measurement
of business
process
outcomes

Panel B. Audit Quality (AQ) and Audit Processes
Johansen &
Focus rewarded
Christofin performance
fersen
evaluations:
(2017)
efficiency,
client or quality
Ittonen,
Johnstone,
&
Myllymäki
(2015)

Partner tone
implied by
client
portfolios

Chang,
Choy, Lin,
& Koo
(2019)

Partner tone
implied by
client
“following”
behavior

CP of firm’s
market,
customer and
process
orientations;
process is
associated
with the EMs
Firm values
(CP) revealed
by INCs
inherent in
performance
evaluations

Economic
dependence on
the client

39

gaining new clients and audit
failures.
Firms attempt to manage the
tensions between
professionalism and
commercialism (CON)
through the type of profitsharing systems employed
(INC).

Dysfunctional behavior
(CON) is positively
(negatively) associated with a
client (quality) focus in
performance evaluations (CP
and INC); efficiency focus has
no adverse effects.
AQ (abnormal accruals; CON)
is higher for partners with
more public clients (TT),
greater ability to resist client
pressure as a result of less
dependence on any one client
(INC).
AQ (restatements; CON) is
lower for clients who follow
the engagement partner to a
new audit firm, implying the
partner’s client affinity (TT)
was a factor in the choice to
follow.

Bauer
(2015)

Reinforcement of
professional
values in
audit
methodology

Koch &
Salterio
(2017)

Implementation of a
customer
relationship
management
(CRM)
program

Hoang,
Jamal, &
Tan (2019)

Firm
leaders’
commercial
emphasis

Lisic,
Myers,
Pawlewicz,
& Seidel
(2019)
Beardsley,
Lassila, &
Omer (2019)

Performance
evaluation
focus on AQ vs.
engagement
realization rates

Relative power
of incentives
from audit vs.
consulting
services
Leaderships’
focus on
advisory
services

Auditor
expertise
(industry
specialization
)

Partners view
realization
rates as the
primary metric
for assessing
profitability
(INC)

Resources
devoted
toward
consulting vs.
audit services
Audit fee
pressure
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When auditors agree with the
client, judgment quality is
lower (CON) when client
identity is strong; impact is
reduced when professional
identity is heightened by a
reminder of professional
values (OSP).
Auditor adjustments to
aggressive client accounting
(CON) are lower when affinity
for client and explicit client
pressure are higher, subject to
a boundary condition; the
CRM program (OSP) does not
affect client affinity or
adjustments.
AQ (CON) is not reduced
under a commercial emphasis
(TT), where engagement
profitability is measured by
realization rates (INC);
profitability is associated with
the lead audit senior
manager’s technical expertise
(TR) and client satisfaction
with intangible services.
Pre-SOX, AQ (CON) is
reduced by consulting revenue
relative to total revenue (INC,
RES); post-SOX, no impact of
INC on AQ and market
perceptions of AQ.
Lower AQ (CON) results from
audit offices with increased
focus on non-audit services
(TT), resulting from audit fee
pressure (RES).

Panel C. Auditor Work Mindset and Attitudes
Picard
Partners’
(2016)
acceptance
of marketing
experts

Picard,
Durocher, &
Gendron
(2018)

Marketing
mindset
through
colonization

GuéninParacini,
Malsch, &
Paillé (2014)

Supervisors’
expectations
and
demands

Compensation
systems and
promotion
mechanisms

Lupu &
Empson
(2015)

Partners’
expectations
and
demands

Promotional
rewards for
acceding to
demanding
work schedules

Formal
review
processes
used to
maintain fear

Long hours
sometimes in
excess of the
budget

Marketing
units and
hiring of
marketers

CP of
marketization
of accountancy
resulting from
the EMs

Marketing
units

CP of firms’
market
orientation
resulting from
the EMs
Audit
procedures
that cultivate
fear; e.g., use
of “risk” in
instructions

CP of the
firm’s
demands (the
“impossible
mission”)

CP of firm
norms toward
overworking
employees
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Pervasiveness of marketing
mindset and practices (CON)
results from firms’ desire to
maintain reputational capital,
increased competition, client
demand and technology
developments. CP of
marketization has transformed
the field and reconfigured
accountants’ identity to that of
a “marketed accountant”.
Pervasiveness of marketing
mindset and practices (CON)
is associated with the
expansion of the marketing
specialization (TT and ODS)
within firms driving change in
auditors’ CP.
Auditors’ fear (CON) results
from anxiety arising from
unachievable firm demands
(CP) and EMs coded. Auditors
attempt to alleviate fear
through audit procedures, to
obtain a certain degree of
comfort. AQ can also be
affected if fear leads to
inappropriate responses to
risk.
Attitudes of feeling “helpless
and trapped” (CON) from firm
norms toward overworking
employees (CP), derived from
social/professional status
(INC) achieved for adhering
to these norms to fulfill
partners’
expectations/demands (TT).

Ladva &
Andrew
(2014)

Long-hours
culture

Rewards for
efficiency,
leading to
uncompensated
overtime

Kornberger,
Justesen, &
Mouritsen
(2011)

Leaderships’
emphasis on
partners’
entrepreneurial
activity
Work
environment
of auditing
“far from
ideal”
Partners’
and
managers’
expectations
and
demands

Incentive
system for
promotion to
partner

Caglio,
Cameran, &
Klobas
(2019)
Daoust &
Malsch
(2019)

Lack of
recognition;
undesirable
characteristics
needed to
achieve
promotion

Pressure from
tight
engagement
hours budgets

Coaching role
(mentoring &
training);
development
of “soft
skills”

Firm
overtime
policies and
time
budgeting
processes

Responsibility
for team
resource
allocation

Budget
constraints that
place undue
stress on
auditors
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Complex
organizational
network of
persons and
information
flows

CP of need to
forgo worklife balance to
build
reputation for
efficiency are
influenced by
the EMs
CP of
manager’s role
and
responsibilities
are influenced
by the EMs

Professional identity (CON) is
influenced by long-hours
culture (TT), reinforced
through lack of reward for
overtime (INC), budget
pressure (RES), and need to
build reputation for efficiency
(CP).
New manager’s identity is
destabilized toward “playing
games and politicking”
(CON), driven by developing
CP of what it means to be a
manager.
Disillusionment about
professionalism (CON) is
associated with longer
experience with AFC (TT).

CP of their
past careers as
auditors is
associated
with the EMs

Participants convey memories
of physical and emotional
exhaustion (CON) driven by
CP of conflict between self
and firm norms; more positive
feelings are conveyed from
current perspectives on
experiences impacting current
roles.

TABLE 1.2

Elements of Ethical Culture Measured in Identified Studies
Secondary
Primary Embedding Mechanisms
Embedding Mechanisms
Tone at the
Incentives
Training
Resources
Org. design Org. systems
Cultural
top (TT)
(INC)
(TR)
(RES)
& structure
&
Perception (CP)
(ODS)
procedures
(OSP)
Panel A. Perceptions of Ethical Culture
Bobek,
Leaderships’
Rewards and Ethics
Ethics
CP of ethical
Dalton,
influence on
sanctions
training
procedures,
social norms and
Daugherty,
ethical
rules and
the EMs
Hageman, & behavior
codes
mentioned load on
Radtke
a single factor
(2017)
measuring the
ethical culture
Bobek,
Leaderships’
Rewards and Ethics
Ethics
Factors affecting
Hageman, & influence on
sanctions
training
procedures,
perceptions of
Radtke
ethical
rules and
ethical culture
(2015)
behavior
codes
vary for leaders
vs. non-leaders
Panel B. Ethical Culture and Professional Skepticism (PS)
Dennis &
Partners’ or
Timing and
Fraud
Johnstone
forensic
effort spent
brainstorming
(2016)
specialists’
preparing
procedures
leadership
for and
(e.g.,
engaging in
checklists)
the fraud
session
Dennis &
Johnstone
(2018)

Partner
emphasis on
PS in
brainstorming
sessions

Fraud
training
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Key Findings
Consequences (CON)

Brainstorming quality is higher
(CON) when greater resources
(RES) are allocated to
brainstorming on high-risk
engagements; brainstorming
sessions rely less on checklists
(OSP) for public companies when
TT and inherent risk are high.
Changes in mental representation of
fraud risk and brainstorming
outcomes (CON) for seniors
improve with quality leadership
(TT); use of unpredictable
procedures (CON) increases with
fraud training (TR).

Gissel &
Johnstone
(2017)
Carpenter &
Reimers
(2013)

Partner
leadership
style
(psychological safety)
Partner
emphasis on
PS

Harding &
Trotman
(2017)

Partner
emphasis on
PS

Stevens,
Moroney, &
Webster
(2019)

Partners’
support for
task
completion

MartinovBennie &
Pflugrath
(2009)
Brink, Tang,
& Yang
(2016)

Brazel,
Jackson,
Schaefer, &
Stewart
(2016)

Presence and
reinforcement
of a code of
conduct

Partners’
obedience
pressure

Supervisors’
emphasis
during
consultation

Performance
evaluations

Consultation
with a
supervisor
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CP of team level
cohesiveness
towards
judgments and
decisions

CP of conformity
pressure from
peer auditors

Less knowledgeable fraud
brainstorming participants are more
willing to share fraud-relevant
information (CON) when the TT
encourages psychological safety.
Auditors provide higher fraud risk
assessments and more effective
audit procedures (CON) when TT is
high.
Audit judgments (CON) are
improved when the importance of
professional skepticism is
emphasized (TT).
Higher professional skepticism
(CON) when team identity salience
is high (CP) and the partner is
supportive (TT); mediated by
motivation.
Judgments of audit managers are
more conservative (CON) with the
reinforcement of an ethical code
(OSP).
Auditors judge lower risk and are
less willing to investigate a clientgenerated estimate (CON) when
there is partner pressure (TT);
judgments impacted by estimate
source when advice comes from a
peer (CP).
Subordinates are penalized (CON)
through performance evaluations
(INC) when additional investigation
does not detect a misstatement;
prior consultation with the
supervisor (TR), regardless of type
of (TT), does not mitigate this
effect.

Panel C. Quality-Threatening Behaviors
Herda,
Supervisors’
Cannon, &
emphasis on
Young
users
(2019)
Agoglia,
Hatfield, &
Lambert
(2015)

Firms’ efforts
to reduce
underreporting of
time

Variation in
incentives;
Performance
evaluation

Shafer
(2008)

Expectations
set by firm
leadership

Incentives
for career
success

Tsunogaya,
Sugahara, &
Chand
(2017)
Sweeney,
Arnold, &
Pierce
(2010)
Sweeney,
Pierce, &
Arnold
(2013)
Pierce &
Sweeney
(2010)

Partners’
obedience
pressure
Leaderships’
tone toward
unethical
behavior
Leaderships’
tone toward
unethical
behavior
Leaderships’
tone toward
unethical
behavior

Panel D. Whistleblowing
Alleyne,
Senior firm
Haniffa, &
members’
Hudaib
ethical tone
(2016)

Penalties for
unethical
behavior

Coaching of
workplace
mindfulness
Future
engagement
staffing
decisions
Compliance
with firm
policies and
procedures;
ethical code

Time
pressure

Penalties for
unethical
behavior
Penalties for
unethical
behavior

Cost of
reporting

45

CP of the firm’s
ethical culture is
driven by OSP
and INC and TT

Lower Premature sign-off (CON)
when coaching (TR) from
supervisors emphasizes (TT) the
importance of auditors’ work to
external users.
For desirable clients, managers (not
partners) encourage underreporting
of time (TT) by rewarding (INC,
RES) those who underreport and
choosing them for future
engagements (CON).
Intention to commit questionable
acts (CON) is associated with CP of
the firm’s ethical culture.

CP of conformity
pressure from
peer auditors

QTB is associated with obedience
pressure (TT); no impact of
conformity pressure (CP).

CP of unethical
pressure to engage
in dysfunctional
behaviors
CP of unethical
pressure to engage
in dysfunctional
behaviors
CP of unethical
pressure to engage
in dysfunctional
behaviors

Ethical evaluation (CON) is
influenced by TT and CP; which
influences intention to engage in
unethical behavior (CON).
The association between ethical
decision-making (CON) and ethical
culture (TT, INC and CP) is
mediated by ethical intensity.
Big 4 auditors are less likely to
engage in unethical behavior
(CON), perceive a stronger ethical
TT, facing higher costs for
unethical behavior (INC).

CP of the
“ethicality of
audit
organizations” is

Whistleblowing intentions (CON)
are associated with the ethicality of
the firm (CP) and perceived
personal costs of reporting (INC).

driven by senior
firm members
(TT)
CP of
organizational
support

Alleyne,
Hudaib, &
Haniffa
(2018)

Firms’
support of
reporting
unethical
practices

Costs of
reporting

Latan,
Jabbour, &
Lopes de
Sousa
Jabbour
(2019)
Latan,
Ringle, &
Jabbour
(2018)

Firms’
support for
reporting
unethical
practices

Financial
incentive for
reporting;
risk of being
laid off for
reporting
Costs of
reporting

CP of firm
pressure against
reporting and the
opportunity to
report, reinforced
by TT and INC
CP of
organizational
support and team
norms

Action in
response
unethical
behavior

CP of
organizational
effectiveness is
associated with
INC
CP of a caring
ethical culture
result from highquality mentoring
(TR)
CP of peers’
ethical conduct is
positively
associated with
both mentoring
styles (INC)

Firms’
support for
reporting
unethical
practices

Taylor &
Curtis
(2013)
Taylor &
Curtis
(2018)
McManus &
Subramania
m (2009)

Firms’
expectations
for efficiency

Mentor
relationship
quality
Mentoring
style; career
development
or social
support
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Internal vs. external whistleblowing
intentions (CON) are associated
with personal costs of reporting
(INC) and perceived outcomes of
reporting (TT); greater impact when
CP is high.
Whistleblowing intentions (CON)
are positively associated with INC,
opportunity to report (CP) and
rationalization; negatively
associated with pressure against
reporting (CP).
Association of whistleblowing
intentions (CON) and antecedents
(e.g., perceived outcomes of
reporting (TT) and personal costs of
reporting (INC)); moderated by
CPs.
Auditors are more likely to report
unethical behavior of peers than
supervisors (CON); more willing to
report superiors when the
organization is responsive (INC).
Whistleblowing intentions (CON)
are associated with ethical culture
(CPs) and high-quality mentoring
(TR); mediated by trust and
organizational commitment.
Higher ethical evaluations (CON)
associated with CP of peer ethical
conduct, greater career mentoring
but lower social support mentoring
(TR)
.

Robertson,
Stefaniak, &
Curtis
(2011)

Managers’
encouraging
engagement
environment

Performance
evaluation

Panel E. Auditor Work Attitudes
Cohen,
Partners’
Performance
Dalton, &
support for
evaluations
Harp (2017) skeptical
behavior
McManus &
Subramania
m (2014)

Management
does not
tolerate
unethical
behavior

Success is
influenced
by ethical
decisions

Shafer
(2009)

Expectations
set by firm
leadership

Incentives
for career
success

Shafer,
Poon, &
Tjosvold
(2013)

Expectations
set by firm
leadership

Incentives
for career
success

Herda &
Lavelle
(2011)

Firms’
support of its
employees

Scheduling
audit work
and audit
budgets

Whistleblowing
hotline

CP of the
professional
repercussions of
not reporting an
unethical act are a
stronger influence
than the impact to
INC.

Auditors are more likely to report
questionable acts (CON) of a less
likable (TT), poor performing
(INC) supervisor; more likely to
whistle-blow internally and through
non-anonymous outlets (OSP).

Promotion
policies

CP of
organizational
support is driven
by TT, INC,
RES, and OSP

Lower organizational citizenship
behavior and higher turnover
intention (CON) associated with
less partner support for skeptical
behavior (TT) and lower CP of
organizational support.
Greater organizational and
professional commitment (CON)
associated with career development
mentoring (TR) and an ethical
culture (CP); social support
mentoring (TR) results in lower
professional commitment (CON).
Organizational-professional conflict
and organizational commitment
(CON) are associated with CP of
ethical culture.

Mentoring
style; career
development
or social
support

CP of the
organization’s
ethical culture is
driven by TT and
INC
Compliance
with policies
and
procedures;
ethical code
Compliance
with policies
and
procedures;
ethical code
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CP of the
organization’s
ethical culture is
driven by OSP,
INC and TT
CP of the
organization’s
ethical culture is
driven by OSP,
INC and TT
CP of
organizational
fairness and
organizational
support,
reinforced by
leadership (TT)

Organizational-professional conflict
and organizational commitment
(CON) are associated with CP of
ethical culture; moderated by
professional commitment.
Post-employment citizenship (CON)
is influenced by organizational
commitment (CON) which in turn
affects auditors’ CP of fairness and
support.

TABLE 1.3

Summary of Studies of Learning Culture and Knowledge Sharing
Primary Embedding Mechanisms
Tone at the
Incentives
Training
Resources
top (TT)
(INC)
(TR)
(RES)

Secondary Mechanisms
Org. design Org. systems
& structure
&
(ODS)
procedures
(OSP)
Panel A. Learning from Outside the Engagement Team: Systems, Specialists, and Other Teams
Curtis &
Partner
Budget
New support
Payne
encourages
horizon
system
(2008)
implementtation
Lin & Fan
Encouraging
Electronic
(2011)
system use
knowledge
repository
(EKR)
Dowling
(2009)

Gold,
Knechel, &
Wallage
(2012)
Asare
&Wright
(2018)

Bauer &
Estep (2019)

Normative
pressure from
leaders to use
a system
appropriately

Support for
consultation
among senior
team
members
Leaders’
support of
“one team”,
vs. specialists
as a

Engagement
review
process

Restrictive
system design

Firm policy
on consulting
with fraud
experts

Costs and
delays
associated
with fraud
consultatio
n
Costs of
engaging
IT
specialists
(“budgetsuck”)

Cultural
Perceptions (CP)

Subjective norms
encompass CP of
informal rules and
expectations that
guide system use,
and TT
CP of consensus on
appropriate system
use is positively
associated with TT

CP of trust and
teamwork is
associated with a
strong TT.
Variation between
auditors and
specialists in CP of
culture as “one
team” or “two team”
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Key Findings
Consequences (CON)

Voluntary implementation (CON)
of a new system (OSP) is
positively associated with TT and
RES.
Intentions for system use (CON)
are associated with TT and CP.

Appropriate system use (CON) is
positively associated with CP, TR
and OSP.
Likelihood of consulting (CON)
is higher when firm policy
mandates consultation (OSP) and
fraud risk is high.
Effectiveness of fraud
consultation (CON) results from
effective teamwork (TT and CP),
but the specialist’s procedures
increase cost and delays (RES).
Effective team communication
and coordination (CON) requires
a strong relationship between
auditors and IT specialists (CP)
and is impacted by negative TT
and RES.

SmithLacroix,
Durocher, &
Gendron
(2012)

“necessary
evil”
Partners’ trust
in the
specialists

Griffith
(2019)

Partners’ trust
in the
specialists

Specialists
are rewarded
more for
advisory
than audit
work

Seavey
Imhoff,
Westfall,
(2018)

Partner-topartner
knowledge
sharing (KS)

Role of KS
in evaluating
partners

Beck, Gunn,
& Hallman
(2019)

Office
management
quality

Partner
compensatio
n plans

Auditors
lack
knowledge
to
understand
and question
experts
Auditors
lack of fair
value
knowledge

Costs of
employing
fair value
specialists

Large audit
firms have
guidelines on
when the use
of specialists
is required

Role of
training
sessions in
KS

Geographica
l distance
between
offices
Budget and
financial
performanc
e

Geographica
l distance
between
offices

Panel B. Learning Within the Engagement Team
Gronewold
Leadership
Error
& Donle
support for
management
(2011)
learning from
training
errors
Seckler,
Gronewold,
& Reihlen
(2017)

Supervisors’
demands/
expectations

Learning/
development
plan;
training,
review and
feedback

Organizatio
nal structure
(e.g.,
geographical
location,
service line)
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Quality and
risk
management
systems

CP of audit partner
power and role are
affected by use of
specialists which is
influenced by the
EMs mentioned

Achieving target assurance
(CON) requires greater reliance
on specialists, changing the
partner’s role to a mobilizer of
experts (CP); higher RES strain
the auditor-auditee relationship.

CP of auditors’
control
(“jurisdictional
threat) is affected by
use of specialists,
influenced by the
EMs mentioned
CP of expectation of
KS between offices
of a firm is
perceived to be
linked to TT, INC,
TR
Tendency for
partners in outlying
offices to feel
isolated (“Lone
Rangerism”)

Achieving target assurance
(CON) requires greater reliance
on specialists; yet auditors’ desire
to maintain control (CP) results in
incomplete acceptance of their
work.

CP of organizational
error climate (OEC)
is associated with
training received
from others (TR)

Better handling of own errors
(CON) is associated with a
positive error climate (CP and
TR); indirectly affecting handling
of client errors.
Resilient practices for handling
errors (CON; e.g., “cool-headed”
management of errors) is
associated with the EMs
mentioned.

Restatements and accruals (CON)
are lower for when audit offices
are closer in proximity (ODS).

Restatements and accruals (CON)
are lower when audit offices are
closer in proximity (ODS).

Gronewold,
Gold, &
Salterio
(2013)
Gold,
Gronewold,
& Salterio
(2014)
Emby, Zhao,
& Sieweke
(2019)
Stefaniak &
Robertson
(2010)
Nelson,
Proell, &
Randel
(2016)

Nelson &
Proell
(2018)
Kadous,
Proell, Rich,
& Zhou
(2019)

Leaderships’
support for
open error
management
climate
(EMC)
Leadership
signals
support for
open EMC
Seniors’
discussion of
their own
errors
Supervisors’
reaction to
prior errors
Teamoriented
leadership;
partner’s
concern for
effectiveness
vs. efficiency
Partners’
concern about
audit
effectiveness
vs. efficiency
Supervisors’
emphasis on
intrinsic vs.
extrinsic
goals

Performance
evaluations
do not
penalize for
errors
corrected
Performance
evaluations
do not
penalize for
errors
corrected

Performance
evaluation

Coaching
focuses on
learning
from errors

CP of open EMC
results from a
complex
manipulation of TT,
INC, and TR.

Belief that another auditor will
report an identified error (CON)
increases with an open EMC
(CP).

Coaching
focuses on
learning
from errors

CP of open EMC is
associated with TT,
INC, and TR
(consistent with
Gronewold et al.
2013).

Auditors’ willingness to report
their own mechanical errors and
the likelihood of reporting a
peer’s error (CON) increase with
an open EMC (CP).

Errors as a
learning tool
are
appreciated

Performance
evaluation

Subordinate thinking about errors
and communication of errors
(CON), is positively associated
with TT.
The belief that another auditor
will admit mistakes (CON) is
lower when there is a prior
negative TT.
Speaking up (CON) is more likely
when leaders are team-oriented
(TT) and issues are aligned with
supervisor’s audit effectiveness
concerns (TT).
Performance evaluation
assessments (INC) are higher for
auditors who speak up (CON),
especially when the issue aligns
with team focus (TT).
Willingness to raise issues (CON)
is associated with intrinsic
motivation and leaders who
emphasize intrinsic goals (TT).
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Panel C. Learning Through Engagement Review, Feedback and Performance Evaluation
Westermann Supervisors’
Performance Formal
Resources
, Bedard, &
espoused
evaluation
training vs.
available
Earley
norms
system does on the job
for learning
(2015)
through the
not reward
learning
&
apprenticecoaching
(OTJL);
developme
ship model
review
nt
process
Cameran,
Opportunity
Staff
Ditillo, &
for on-theallocation to
Pettinicchio
job learning
engagements
(2018)
Andiola &
Bedard
(2018)

Supervisor’s
emphasis on
learning vs.
performance
goals

Andiola,
Bedard, &
Westermann
(2019)

Supervisor’s
tone of the
review
environment

Dalton,
Davis, &
Viator
(2015)

Feedback
process
focused on
negative vs.
positive
comments
Performance
evaluation
system does
not reward
coaching

Level of
guidance
provided in
reviews

Norms and
expectations
surrounding learning
(CP) are influenced
by the EMs
mentioned

Subordinates’
perceptions of
best/worst review
quality (CP) are
influenced by the
EMs noted
Insufficient
resources
to support
good
coaching

Subordinates’
perceptions of
best/worst review
quality (CP) are
influenced by the
EMs noted
Supervisory
feedback
environment (SFE);

Effective
mentoring
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Auditors acquire technical
knowledge (CON) through OTJL
(RES), resulting from review and
coaching from supervisors in a
hierarchical process (TR).
Earnings quality (CON) is lower
when more engagement hours are
allocated to experienced staff
(OSP), due to less learning
opportunity (TR).
Attitude toward the coaching
relationship (CON) declines with
more negative feedback (TR)
when supervisors use
performance goal framing, but not
when the supervisor emphasizes
learning goals (TT).
Audit inefficiency and
ineffectiveness (CON) associated
with worst reviews.

Lower job satisfaction,
organizational commitment and
higher turnover intentions
(CONs) are associated with
unfavorable SFEs (TR),
moderated by an effective mentor
(TR).

TABLE 1.4
Summary of Main Findings and Questions for Future Research
Type of Culture

Main Findings

Proposed Research Questions

Panel A.
Professionalism/
Commercialism

• Many studies imply a dominant tone of commercialism
in auditing, driven by a marketing perspective and
reinforced through tone at the top, incentives and
budgetary control.
• The negative effect of commercialism increases with
economic incentives.
• Client focus (affinity; identification) is associated with
lower audit quality.
• Some studies imply that audit partners vary in client
affinity, with AQ consequences.
• Use of client satisfaction surveys is not found to result in
greater client affinity or lower audit quality.
• The negative impact of client focus/affinity can be
reduced by changes in the audit process and performance
evaluations.
• Auditors have a strong emotional response to EMs
imposed to support the commercial ethos (e.g., tight
budgets and requirements to work long hours).
• Some recent research suggests that commercialism can
co-exist with professional values.
• Research on commercialism in Big 4 vs. non-Big 4 firms
is mixed, with several studies noting more client or
commercial focus among Big 4 personnel, while others
imply behavior more consistent with audit quality.
• Tone at the top established by firm leadership drives
auditors’ perceptions of ethical culture.
• The tone set by partners (e.g., guidance, openness, and
support for skepticism) in fraud brainstorming affects the
quality of brainstorming session processes and outcomes,
as well as knowledge development. Partner tone has a
greater impact on less experienced auditors.
• Studies on auditing estimates show that partner support
and ethical codes increase auditor skepticism, while
partner obedience pressure and failure to reward
skeptical behavior decrease audit quality.

• Can professionalism co-exist with commercial values without
sacrificing audit quality? How should EMs be aligned to achieve
an appropriate balance between the two? How would such coexistence affect consequences such as audit quality, audit pricing,
competition, attracting and retaining talent, and the perceived and
actual value of the audit from different perspectives (e.g., client,
investors, stakeholders)?
• Is there variation in the level of professionalism and/or
commercialism within and across firms? If so, what are the EMs
associated with this variation and how does this impact audit
quality?
• Which audit firms rely on client surveys, and how are they used?
Does their use vary across firms in a network? When audit firms
use client surveys, are they optional for offices, or required?
• Studies could use public data on partners to look for patterns in
the relation between non-audit services and AQ at the individual
engagement level.
• How do differing affective responses to values of professionalism
or commercialism impact AQ?
• Some studies describe new auditors as internalizing the
commercial ethos, while others find they experience conflict and
fear. Do both reactions exist in practice, and if so, how and why?
Further, is there an association of these individual differences
with behaviors indicative of audit quality?
• Most studies measure ethical perceptions at the firm level. Future
research could consider whether and how those perceptions differ
across offices/teams within the same firm (potentially driven by
difference in tone at the top).
• When auditors perceive that ethical culture at the firm or office
level conflict with the engagement environment, which force is
stronger?
• Further research exploring the interactions of multiple EMs could
advance understanding and guide audit firms in establishing
ethical cultures.

Panel B.
Ethical Culture
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Panel C.
Culture of
Learning

• Quality-threatening behaviors are reduced with focus on
users’ needs and social responsibility, but increase with
client desirability and partner obedience pressure.
• Studies confirm that whistleblowing intention is driven
by weighing costs/benefits of reporting, informed by
perceptions of firm ethicality set by leadership, prior
actions if leaders, mentoring focused on career
development and perceived repercussions for not
reporting.
• Lower organizational commitment and higher turnover
intention are associated with tone; e.g., management’s
tolerance for unethical behavior lack of support, tight
budgets, and lack of reward for skepticism.
• Greater organizational-professional conflict results from
an egoistic culture (i.e., emphasis on auditors following
their own beliefs).
• Studies examining contingent factors show limits of the
impact (e.g., client desirability).
• Studies in our sample imply a strong role of informal
training by supervisors and mentors in instilling ethical
behavior.
• Studies comparing audit firm size find large firms have
higher perceptions of ethical culture and lower intentions
to engage in unethical behavior; but lower partner
support for skepticism.
• Leaders’ tone at the top affects learning in many ways;
e.g., appropriate use of systems, effectiveness of
consultation, turnover intention.
• Within teams, tone affects how auditors consider/report
their own and others’ errors, and whether they “voice”
knowledge.
• Some factors limit the influence of tone; e.g., power
struggles with specialists.
• Auditors benefit from consulting with peers and
specialists, yet they remain resistant in part due to their
desire to maintain control over the audit.
• Outcomes improve when auditors share knowledge of
their past experiences, and when they share knowledge
across offices.
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• Changes in the profession in the past decade (e.g., increased
regulatory risk; greater use of electronic workpaper systems)
motivate revisiting research on the incidence of various QTBs,
varying perceptions of ethicality of QTBs, and auditors’ beliefs
that QTBs will not be detected.
• Are there differences in the EMs that affect whistleblowing
intentions versus action? Future research could investigate (e.g.,
through experiential survey) what determinants and consequences
of blowing the whistle in today’s environment?
• Sample studies on ethical culture related to audit processes
consider only fraud brainstorming and skepticism, and research
on other processes prior to 2008 is dated. Future research should
examine other phases of the audit in which ethical culture might
play a role.
• While Jenkins et al. (2008) reviewed research on formal ethics
training in firms/classrooms, subsequent studies imply a strong
role of informal training by supervisors and mentors. Research
should investigate (e.g. through experiential surveys) specific
ways in which audit coaches and mentors instill ethical behavior.
• Few studies compare ethical culture by firm size during our
sample period, and results are mixed. Given changes in the
auditing environment over the past decade, further research could
explore whether ethical culture perceptions differ by firm size,
factors driving those differences, and their consequences.
• Do auditors at different ranks (staff through partner) perceive the
learning culture of their organizational units differently? If so,
what are the mechanisms driving these differences, and what are
their consequences?
• How do more structured EMs such as incentives/rewards (e.g.,
performance ratings systems) and resources interact with less
structured EMs such as partners’ praise?
• What impact have changes in the audit environment (e.g.,
distanced learning) had on firms’ learning culture?
• Firms’ quality control systems now consider firm-wide learning
from inspection outcomes. How do such programs enhance a
learning culture, or possibly harm it (e.g., from strict enforcement
or a zero-tolerance approach)?

Panel D.
Summary
Issues and
Research
Questions

• The engagement is the key learning environment yet
there remains variation in the EMs and cultural
perceptions at this level.
• Subordinates are more accepting of negative feedback
when the review process is focused on learning.
• Learning is enhanced through performance evaluation
systems that appropriately balance specialists’ work on
audits versus consulting, reward good coaching and
knowledge sharing, and do not penalize staff for
mistakes acknowledged or errors corrected.
• Few studies compare within and across the three phases
of the model; thus, inferences about the influence of
certain EMs on audit quality are limited.
• Research in the past decade increasingly focuses on the
influence of office or engagement team culture; variation
among these levels implies that organizational culture is
less than widely shared.
• Limited studies compare across multiple firms; most but
not all show better AFC for Big 4 over smaller firms.
Study of differences within firm size classes is very rare,
yet individual firms likely have differing approaches to
embedding AFC.
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• What are the driving forces behind differences in perceived
learning culture at the engagement/supervisor level? Does this
variation result from poor communication from firm leadership?
• To what extent does learning across engagements occur, and how
does it occur (formally or informally)? E.g., is it driven by
auditors who move across teams and carry over best practices?
• How do cultural differences across service lines (e.g., audit and
consulting) impact the effectiveness of the learning culture?
• Future research should use our theoretical framework to design
studies including multiple EMs and/or multiple phases of the
model, to improve understanding as to how firm leadership can
strive for a desired culture through conditions under their direct
control.
• It is unclear from extant research on how much EM “support” is
needed to ensure AQ. Some studies combine EMs together into a
single measure, and others choose a single one while not
mentioning others or holding them constant. This constrains our
ability to be able to see whether one EM matters more than
another.
• Research should continue to examine to what extent is there
significant variation in AFC between firms, within firms across
offices and across engagements. What EMs differ, why do such
differences exist, and how can audit firms promote more
alignment?
• How do firm manage how tone at the top is established at the
office and engagement levels?
• To what extent do auditors perceive that other EMs are
complementary or contradictory with tone at the top, and what is
their relative influence on AQ?

APPENDIX A
Summary of Research on Audit Firm Culture (2008-2018)

Citation

Purpose

Section

Theory/Practice Method
Framework
Agency theory
Experiment

Sample

Task or Model

Summary of Results

Agoglia,
Hatfield and
Lambert
(2015)

The impact of
underreporting
of time on
future staffing
decisions and
performance
evaluations.

5.1
Ethical Culture

100 audit
managers and
119 audit
partners.

Managers tacitly encourage
under-reporting when
agency conflicts with the
firm are high, while
partners do not

Develop a
5.1
whistle-blowing Ethical Culture
protocol for
audit firms.

Gibbins’ (1984)
psychology of
professional
judgment
propositions.

5 auditors
working in four
international
auditing
organizations.

2 X 2 design: auditor
senior time reporting
accuracy (accurate vs.
underreporting) and client
desirability (more vs.
less). Participants
evaluate the senior’s
performance and
likelihood of requesting
the senior on future
engagements.
Review and refinement of
the whistle-blowing
protocol.

Alleyne,
Haniffa and
Mohammad
(2016)

Alleyne,
Hudaib and
Haniffa
(2018)

Moderating
effects of
perceived
organizational
support on the
relationship of
individual
characteristics
with
whistleblowing
intentions.

Theory of
Questionnaire/ 226 public
planned
Survey
accountants
behavior, notion
working in
of independence,
small, medium
principled
and large firms
organizational
located in
dissent, and
Barbados.
organizational
support theory.

5.1
Ethical Culture

Interview
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Construct a five-step
whistle-blowing protocol
that can be used within
audit organizations. A
component within that
protocol relates to the
“ethicality of the audit
organization”.
Questionnaire presents a Internal whistle-blowing
hypothetical illegal act.
intentions are significantly
Measure participants’
influenced by individual
whistleblowing intentions antecedents (e.g.,
(internally and
independence
externally), attitudes,
commitment,); greater
perceived behavioral
impact when the level of
control, independence
perceived organizational
commitment, personal
support is high. Participants
responsibility for
are more likely to reach out
reporting and personal
externally when
cost of reporting.
organizational support is
weak.

Asare and
Wright
(2018)

Antecedents of 5.3
Prior literature
consultation
Learning Culture on auditing and
that impact
teamwork.
forensic
specialists’
work and
auditors’
evaluation of its
effectiveness.

Field Survey

Bobek,
Dalton,
Daugherty,
Hageman,
and Radtke
(2017)

Perceptions of
ethical
environments in
auditing firms
vs. industry,
Big 4 vs. nonBig 4.
Factors
associated with
ethical
environment
perceptions.

Bobek,
Hageman,
and Radtke
(2015)

86 experienced
auditors from
three of the Big
4 firms.

5.1
Ethical Culture

Knowledge
sharing

Questionnaire/ 904 CPAs
Survey
working in
public
accounting or
industry.

5.1
Ethical Culture

Prior literature
and
organizational
behavior
theories.

Questionnaire/ 139 accounting
Survey
professionals,
most at an
international
CPA firm.
Participants are
spread across
audit and tax.
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First survey asks about
the consultation process:
antecedents, work done
and outcomes. Second
survey asks questions
regarding taskwork and
costs of consulting in an
engagement where the
participant consulted with
a forensic specialist.

Specialists’ understanding
of the client’s business and
engagement objectives
results in greater
consultation effectiveness.
Involving the specialist
early is associated with
improved teamwork and
risk responsiveness.
Consultation is most
effective when it is targeted
to specific circumstances,
clarifies fraud schemes,
identifies idiosyncratic risk,
and brings a different
perspective, with limited
perceived costs.
Ethical environment scale CPAs in auditing perceive a
measuring perceived
stronger ethical
social norms, social
environment than those in
practices, and outcomes
industry; those in Big 4
in response to unethical
firms perceive a stronger
behavior (i.e., rewards
ethical environment than
and sanctions).
Non-Big 4 firms.
Measures perceptions of Participants perceive a
the ethical environment,
strong ethical environment;
role in influencing the
stronger among firm
environment,
leaders, especially when
identification with
they identify more with the
serving the public
public interest and have had
interest, organizational
a strong mentoring
fit, socialization with
relationship. For non-firm
various levels within the leaders, perceived ethical
firm, presence of
environments are higher
mentoring, leadership
when they play a role in
position, idealism and
shaping and maintaining the
relativism.
ethical environment and/or
have a strong organizational
fit.

Brazel,
Jackson,
Schaefer, and
Stewart
(2016)

Is there an
outcome effect
in supervisors’
evaluations of
skeptical
behavior?

5.3
Psychology
Learning Culture theories on
outcome effects.

Experiment

96 audit seniors
from an
international
accounting firm.
Perform two
other
experiments
using corporate
managers and
students but
results are not
discussed.

Brink, Tang
and Yang
(2016)

Impact of
estimate source
and social
pressure on
auditors’
judgments of
fair value
estimates.

5.1
Ethical Culture

Experiment

101 Chinese
auditors; 82 Big
4 firms and 19
non-Big 4 firms.

Source
credibility and
obedience to
authority
theories.
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2 X 3 design: staff’s
investigation outcome
(misstatement/no
misstatement) and
consultation (no
consultation with
supervisor; consulted but
was told to use
professional judgments;
staff consulted and the
additional investigation
was approved). Measure
participants’ performance
rating of the staff auditor.
2 X 2 design: fair value
estimate source (external
consultant vs. internally
developed by the client)
and type of social
pressure (obedience vs.
conformity pressure).
Measure auditors’
judgements related to the
fair value estimate (risk
assessment and additional
time and effort to further
investigate the estimate).

Performance is evaluated as
lower when a misstatement
is not found; i.e., when
there is no benefit of the
additional effort evaluators
perceive the additional
effort to be lost time as
opposed to a normal cost of
the audit. Consulting with
the supervisor is not found
to mitigate the outcome
effect in the auditor’s
evaluation.
Auditors assess the fair
value estimate as less risky
and are less likely to
investigate the estimate
further when the model is
generated by an external
consultant rather than the
client. Auditors are less
likely to engage in further
investigation when a
superior recommends the
use of the more subjective
estimate. When advice
comes from a peer,
auditors’ judgments are
impacted by the estimate’s
source.

Broberg,
Umans, Skog
and
Theodorsson
(2018)

The influence
5.2
of professional Professionalism/
and
Commercialism
organizational
identities on
commercializati
on within audit
firms.

Prior literature
on professional
and
organizational
identities.

Questionnaire/ 374 participants
Survey
from Big 4 and
Non-Big 4 firms
in Sweden, with
a range of
experience levels

Carpenter
and Reimers
(2013)

Impact of the
5.1
partner's tone
Ethical Culture
towards
professional
skepticism on
auditors’
identification of
fraud risk and
applicable
testing
procedures.

SAS No. 99
Model of
Professional
Skepticism adapted from
Nelson (2009).

Experiment
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80 audit
managers from
Big 4 firms.

Measure participants’
professional and
organizational identities
as well as perceptions of
the market, customer and
process orientations of
their firms.

Perceived
commercialization in nonBig 4 firms is driven by
both professional and
organizational identities,
irrespective of dimension of
commercialization (i.e.,
market, customer and/or
firm process). In Big 4
firms only, this association
is driven by organizational
identity. Professional
identity is positively
associated with all three
aspects of
commercialization (market,
customer and firm process)
in non-Big 4 firms, but only
with the firm’s process
orientation in Big 4 firms.
2 X 2 design: the
When partner tone is high,
partner’s level of
auditors provide higher
emphasis on professional fraud risk assessments at
skepticism (high/low) and both levels of fraud
the level of fraud
indicators, and are more
indicators (strong/weak). effective at identifying
Participants are asked to
relevant audit procedures.
identify fraud risk factors, When partner tone is low
assess the risk of fraud
(focus on efficiency) there
and determine relevant
is no difference in the
audit procedures in
number of relevant fraud
response to the fraud
risk factors or relevant audit
risks.
procedures identified
between the two levels of
fraud indicators.

Carter and
Spence
(2014)

Cohen,
Dalton, and
Harp (2017)

Coram and
Robinson
(2017)

What does it
5.2
mean to be a
Professionalism/
successful
Commercialism
professional in
the Big 4 firms
(i.e., who
makes partner)?

Bourdieu (1996)
theory of how
privilege and
status are
produced and
reproduced in
modern society.

Interview

As individuals progress, the
focus shifts from technical
expertise to commercialism.
The partner’s role is
focused on the economic
growth of the firm, but the
study does not identify
conflict with professional
values (e.g., independence).
Impact of
5.1
Organization
Questionnaire/ 176 auditing
Measures level of
Relative to neutral skeptics,
auditors’
Ethical Culture
support theory
Survey
professionals in professional skepticism,
presumptive doubt skeptics
professional
and social
Big 4, national, interpersonal trust,
report lower levels of
skepticism (PS)
exchange theory.
regional and
perceived partner support partner support and
on
local firms,
for professional
organizational citizenship
organizational
across
skepticism and perceived behaviors, and are less
citizenship
experience
organizational support
likely to remain within the
behaviors,
levels.
(use pre-existing scales
auditing profession. These
turnover
where available).
perceptions are influenced
intentions and
by demanding schedules
perceived
and tight audit budgets,
partner support
which auditors note make it
for PS.
difficult to exhibit PS, and a
lack of rewards for PS in
large firms.
Accounting
5.2
Prior literature
Interviews
Nine partners
Interview questions focus Big 4 firms have increased
firms’ structure Professionalism/ on managing
from Big 4 firms on understanding the
focus on performance-based
of profitCommercialism performance in
and mid-tier
profit-sharing structures
partner remuneration; midsharing
accounting and
accounting firms and performance
tier firms are moving
schemes and
auditing firms
in Australia.
incentives of the
toward a more commercial
performance
and
participant’s firm.
approach. Firms try to
incentives and
professionalism/
manage the tension between
the impact on
commercialism.
professionalism and
values of
commercialism through the
professionalism
types of metrics employed,
and
which include financial and
commercialism.
non-financial measures.
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Interviews with
32 Big 4
accounting
professionals at
varied
experience levels
in Canada and
the UK.

Interview questions focus
on
attributes/characteristics
considered necessary to
be a partner, changes over
time, and factors
associated with success.

Curtis and
Factors
5.3
Payne (2008) influencing the Learning Culture
decision to
implement new
technology on
an engagement.

Technology
acceptance and
budgeting
theories.

Dalton,
The impact of
Davis, and
unfavorable
Viator (2015) supervisory
feedback
environments
(SFEs) on
auditors’ work
attitudes.

5.3
Leader-member
Learning Culture exchange theory

Dennis and
Johnstone
(2016)

5.1
Ethical Culture

Examine fraud
brainstorming
practices.

Prior literature
on fraud
brainstorming.

Experiment

Auditors are more likely to
use new audit technology in
the three-year budget period
and when the partner is
supportive. Those who
perceive greater budget
pressure are more likely to
adopt the new technology
when there is partner
support. In the absence of
firm interventions,
individual level
characteristics such as risk
aversion influence intended
use.
Questionnaire/ 421 public
Measure job satisfaction, Unfavorable SFEs are
Survey
accounting
organizational
associated with lower job
professionals
commitment, role clarity, satisfaction and role clarity,
ranging across
turnover intentions,
and in turn with lower
firm type, line of mentoring support and
organizational commitment
service, age,
SFE, all relative to their
and higher turnover
experience and
current job.
intentions; external
position.
mentoring moderates the
negative effects of SFEs for
both role clarity and job
satisfaction.
Field Survey
Study of live
Measure audit team
There are many elements of
brainstorming
characteristics, attendance fraud brainstorming
sessions for 77
and communication,
sessions, some of which are
continuing audit brainstorming structure,
similar to those reported in
engagements
timing and effort, and
earlier field studies. Find
across three
brainstorming quality.
that greater resources are
firms; two Big 4
deployed to high risk
firms and one
clients, resulting in higher
large
brainstorming quality.
international
firm.
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139 in-charge
auditors from
one Big 4
accounting firm.

2 X 2 design: budget
period (one-year
engagement-byengagement basis vs.
three-year basis) and
influence from supervisor
(encourage
implementation vs. no
information). Measure
perceptions of the budget
pressure,
recommendation to
implement the software
and intention to use it.

Dennis and
Johnstone
(2018)

The impact of
partners’
leadership and
subordinates’
knowledge on
fraud
brainstorming
processes and
outcomes.

5.1
Ethical Culture

Dowling
(2009)

Factors that
5.3
influence
Learning Culture
auditors’
intentions to
use audit
support systems
appropriately.

Shared mental
model

Field
Experiment

Adaptive
Structuration
Theory, Theory
of Planned
Behavior

Survey
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Study of live
brainstorming
sessions for 77
continuing audit
engagements
across three
firms; two Big 4
firms and one
large
international
firm.

Partner leadership is
manipulated; in the
“quality-differentiated”
leader condition, partners
deliver general and
targeted prompts
regarding fraud, vs. no
prompts in the normal
leader condition. One
manager and one senior
on each engagement
asked to recall
information about the
client, audit team and
brainstorming session
569 auditors
Collect data prior to busy
employed in the season on auditors’
Australian
intentions to use a newly
offices of the six employed audit support
largest
system. Post busy season,
international
collect data on the
audit firms.
intention to appropriately
use the technology
deployed.

Quality-differentiated
leadership improves the
mental representations of
fraud risk for seniors but
not managers, suggesting
that knowledge moderates
the effect of promoted
leadership.

Firm, team and individual
level factors are associated
with appropriate system
use. Team and firm level
consensus on appropriate
use is an antecedent of
perceived normative
pressures which in turn
influences the intent to use
the system. External control
(audit support system
restrictiveness and
effectiveness of the review
process) is an antecedent to
appropriate use of the
system.

Gendron and
Spira (2009)

Gissel and
Johnstone
(2017)

Gold,
Gronewold
and Salterio
(2014)

Presents views
of former
Arthur
Andersen (AA)
employees on
abilities of
public
accounting
firms vs.
regulators to
control
financial audits.
The impact of
partner
leadership on
subordinates’
willingness to
share privately
known, fraudrelevant
information.

5.2
Prior literatures
Professionalism/ on market,
Commercialism bureaucratic and
clan controls;
boundaries of
controllability.
influence.

Interviews

25 former AA
partners/employ
ees (most in
Canada and the
UK).

5.1
Ethical Culture

Develop a
theoretical
model on the
influence of
psychological
safety on
behavior.

Experiment

71 audit
subordinates
from three audit
firms (a regional
firm, an
international
firm, and a Big 4
firm).

How error
management
culture impacts
an auditor’s
willingness to
report errors.

5.3
Error
Learning Culture management
climate theory

Experiment
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Interview questions focus
on AA's organizational
culture and controls,
reasons and consequences
of the firm's failure,
regulatory initiatives, and
the impact of the collapse
on the interviewee's
views on control
mechanisms.

Most believe that audit
quality is controllable by
organizations, through
bureaucratic and clan
controls (only four suggest
outside regulation is
necessary). Highlights
limited confidence in the
role of regulatory
intervention.

Manipulate psychological
safety by varying how the
partner communicates to
auditors within a
simulated brainstorming
session. Participants are
provided fraud risk
information known only
to them, and willingness
to share this private
information is measured.
190 German
2 X 2 X 2 design: office
auditors from a
level error management
Big 4 firm,
climate (blame vs. open),
ranging across
error type (mechanical vs.
experience level. conceptual) and error
originator (own vs. peer).
Measure auditors’
likelihood of reporting an
error.

Less knowledgeable
auditors are more likely to
share privately known,
fraud-relevant information
when they perceive higher
psychological safety (as
exhibited by the partner).
No impact for more
knowledgeable auditors.
An open climate increases
auditors’ willingness to
report their own mechanical
errors and brings the
likelihood of reporting a
peer’s error to the same
level as a self-committed
error.

Gold,
Knechel, and
Wallage
(2012)

The impact of
the strictness of
consultation
requirements,
client fraud
risk, and
deadline
pressure on
auditors’
propensity to
consult.

5.3
Prior literature
Learning Culture on consultation,
fraud risks and
deadline
pressure.

Gronewold
and Donle
(2011)

The impact of
error
management
climate (EMC)
on auditors’
predisposition
toward handling
of their own
errors and client
errors.
The impact of
EMC on
auditors’ beliefs
about other
members and
their
willingness to
report errors.

5.3
Error
Learning Culture management
theory

Gronewold,
Gold and
Salterio
(2013)

Experiment

2 experiments with 2 X 2
designs. Both manipulate
the strictness of the
consultation requirement
(mandatory vs. lenient).
Experiment 1 manipulates
client fraud risk (high/
low) and Experiment 2
manipulates deadline
pressure (high/ low).
Measure auditors’
propensity to consult.
Questionnaire/ 284 total
Adapted measures of
Survey
participants:
organizational EMC and
external (83),
predisposition toward the
internal (108)
handling of own errors
and public sector from developed scales.
(93) auditors in Construct a measure for
Germany.
auditors' predisposition
toward handling client
errors.

5.3
EMC theory and Experiment
Learning Culture prior literature
on the review
process and selfmonitoring.
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163 Dutch audit
managers and
partners from
three Big 4
firms.

176 German
auditors from
two Big 4 firms
and three
regional audit
firms, ranging
across
experience level.

2 X 2 design: EMC (error
averse vs. high error
management) and error
type (mechanical vs.
conceptual). Measure
auditor’s belief about
another auditor’s
willingness to report their
own identified error.

When fraud risk is high,
mandatory consultation is
associated with a higher
likelihood of consulting.
Deadline pressure results in
a marginally greater
propensity to consult in
response to mandatory
consultation.

A positive EMC (supportive
of errors identified) is
associated with better
handling of an auditor’s
own errors and has an
indirect effect on the
handling of client errors.

Auditors in a high EMC are
more likely to believe that
another auditor will report
an identified error as
compared to an adverse
error-management climate;
this effect is stronger for
conceptual errors as
compared to calculation
errors.

GuéninParacini,
Malsch and
Paillé (2014)

The roles of
fear and risk in
the audit
process.

5.2
Psychodynamics Ethnography
Professionalism/ of work which
Commercialism provides insight
into the
interaction
between fear and
work activity
(Dejours 1993).

Herda and
Lavelle
(2011)

Factors
5.1
influencing how Ethical Culture
Big 4 alumni
behave toward
their former
employer.

Draws on social Questionnaire/ 303 former
exchange theory Survey
employees of a
and the
Big 4 firm from
organizational
offices in the
justice literature.
United States.

Hudaib and
Haniffa
(2009)

Examines the
5.2
meaning of
Professionalism/
auditor
Commercialism
independence in
Saudi Arabia; a
less studied
context with
cultural
differences.

Draws on the
Ethnography
Chicago School
of Symbolic
Interactionism to
explore how
Saudi
accountants
construct
independence.
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Seven audit
teams, including
44 auditors
(ranging across
levels) from one
Big 4 French
firm.

Use mass media
texts, academic
sources and
archival data,
and interviews
with 12 auditors
at various levels
in two audit
firms in Saudi
Arabia.

The authors began the
research by becoming
familiar with the audit
methodology, standards
of documentation and
roles within the firm.
They then observed the
audit process, including
examining work papers,
informal discussions and
semi-structured
interviews.

Fear is a component of the
audit process; auditors can
attempt to alleviate fear
through audit procedures,
but fear can prevent rational
response to audit risks.
Firms’ formal procedures
and controls can increase
anxiety. This study
“emotionalizes” the audit
process that prior research
considers to be cognitive
and technical.
Measures the following
Perceived organizational
constructs: organizational fairness is associated with
fairness, organizational
greater perceived
justice, perceived
organizational support, and
organizational support,
in turn greater
organizational
organizational commitment
commitment, and postand employee citizenship.
employment citizenship. Perceived organizational
Draws on prior literature support and organizational
for development of the
commitment partially
scale measures.
mediate the relationship
between organizational
fairness and postemployment citizenship.
Multiple methods
Auditor independence
including document
within Saudi Arabia is the
analysis, personal
result of the interaction of
professional experiences, three levels: micro
observations and
(personal self-reflexivity),
interviews, which focus
meso (organizational
on how participants
culture), and macro
define and perceive
(political and socioauditor independence.
economic structure).

Johansen and The association
Christofferse between
n (2017)
dysfunctional
auditor
behavior and
various foci of
performance
evaluation.

5.2
Prior literature
Questionnaire/ 196 auditors in
Professionalism/ on performance Survey
Denmark,
Commercialism evaluations and
varying across
dysfunctional
firm type (Big 4
behavior in audit
and non-Big 4
firms.
firms) and
experience level.

Knechel,
Niemi and
Zerni (2013)

Determinants
(e.g., size,
clientele, and
culture) of
partners'
compensation
within Big 4
firms.

5.2
Prior literature
Professionalism/ on partner
Commercialism compensation.

Kornberger,
Justisen &
Mouritsen
(2011)

Understanding 5.2
the roles of
Professionalism/
newly promoted Commercialism
managers in
navigating the
complex
organizational
network of a
Big 4 Firm.

Prior literature
on socialization
through
organizational
power and
discipline,
professionalism/
commercialism.

Archival

Data from
Sweden on
compensation
for 1,659
partner-year
observations
from 287
individual Big 4
audit partners.

Ethnography

Ethnographic
study of one Big
4 firm; including
semi-structured
interviews with
17 auditors at
various ranks
and 12 senior
executives.
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Measure focus of
performance evaluations
(efficiency, client or
quality focus),
dysfunction behavior
(e.g., skipping required
audit procedures) and
organizational
commitment.
The authors crossreference partner data to
client information, to
assess factors associated
with individual partner
compensation.

Data collected from
several different sources
including public sources
(e.g., firm websites),
internal firm documents,
observations of
employees and semistructed interviews.

Client (quality) focus is
positively (negatively)
associated with
dysfunctional behavior;
both are more prevalent in
lower level staff. No
association is found for an
efficiency focus.
Partner compensation varies
considerably; positively
associated with client size,
number of publicly traded
clients, industry
specialization and (in some
firms) gaining new clients;
negatively associated with
audit failures and (in one
firm) loss of existing
clients.
The auditor’s identity
changes because of new
roles and responsibilities
acquired in the transition to
manager. The reidentification process
includes an adjustment to a
complex network. While
seemingly a rational agent
of the firm, managers must
subvert it to deal with
relationships and
unexpected contingencies.

Latan,
Jabbour and
de Sousa
Jabbour
(2018)

How pressure, 5.1
financial
Ethical Culture
incentives,
opportunity and
rationalization
influence
whistleblowing
intentions.

Latan, Ringle Moderating
and Jabbour effects of
(2018)
organizational
support, team
norms and
moral intensity
on the
relationship of
individual
characteristics
with
whistleblowing
intentions.
Lin and Fan
(2011)

5.1
Ethical Culture

Theories on
organizational
justice, planned
behavior,
disengagement
and cognitive
dissonance.

Questionnaire/ 223 public
Survey
accountants from
affiliated Big 4
and non-Big 4
(non-affiliated)
audit firms in
Indonesia.

In a hypothetical audit
situation with an illegal
act, measure
whistleblowing intentions
(internally and externally)
and the pressure, financial
incentive, opportunity and
rationalization
experienced when
discovering wrongdoing.

Pressure, financial
incentives, opportunity and
rationalization are all
associated with
whistleblowing intentions.
Pressure has a negative
impact while financial
incentives, opportunity and
rationalization have a
positive impact. Financial
incentives are the most
significant predictor.

Theories on
organizational
justice, planned
behavior,
expectation, and
organizational
support.

Questionnaire/ 223 public
Survey
accountants from
affiliated Big 4
and non-Big 4
(non-affiliated)
audit firms in
Indonesia.

In a hypothetical audit
situation representing an
illegal act, measure
whistleblowing attitudes
and intentions, perceived
behavioral control,
independence
commitment, personal
responsibility for
reporting, personal cost of
reporting, perceived
organizational support,
team norms and perceived
moral intensity.
Measure perceived
usefulness, general use,
experience using, norms
and expectations of use,
satisfaction, and intention
to use the EKR system.

Individual-level antecedents
(e.g., perceived behavioral
control and personal cost of
reporting), increase
auditors’ intentions to
whistleblow both internally
and externally. Perceived
organizational support,
team norms, and perceived
moral intensity partially
improve this relationship.

The use of
5.3
Expectationelectronic
Learning Culture confirmation
knowledge
theory
repositories
(EKR) in public
accounting
firms.

Questionnaire/ 230 accountants
Survey
from 4 large
public
accounting
firms; 2 Big 4
firms and 2 nonBig 4 firms.
Participants
range across
work function
(189 auditors).
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Perceived usefulness and
subjective norms are
positively associated with
behavioral intentions. The
relationship between
satisfaction and intention is
stronger for Big 4
participants.

Lupu and
Empson
(2015)

Experienced
accountants’
compliance
with
organizational
pressure to
overwork.

5.2
Bourdieu and
Interviews
Professionalism/ Wacwuant,
Commercialism 1992) concept of
“illuso”; i.e.,
being "taken in
and by the
game", resulting
in continued
behavior in line
with rules.

MartinovBennie and
Pflugrath
(2009)

Impact of a
5.1
firm's ethical
Ethical Culture
environment on
the quality of
auditors’
judgments
across different
levels of audit
experience.

Prior literature
Experiment
on ethical
environment and
auditor
competency.
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36 experienced
accounting
professions in
France; Big 4
and non-Big 4
firms.

86 audit
managers and
audit seniors
from one Big 4
accounting firm
in the Sydney
and Melbourne
offices.

Semi-structured
interviews with
accounting professionals
in France in the context of
a broader research project
exploring identity
construction and
work/life balance.

Participants continue to be
overworked, describing
themselves as feeling
"helpless and trapped" in
the cultural norms of the
organization which are
positively reinforced by the
organization through
rewards and success for
exhibiting this type of
behavior.
Employ a 2 X 2 design:
They find that the writemanipulate strength of the down judgments of audit
firm’s ethical
managers are larger in
environment (measured
response to reinforcement
as presence and
of the ethical code but those
reinforcement of a code
of seniors are not,
of conduct), and
suggesting that familiarity
experience (audit
with ethical codes leads to
managers and seniors).
greater internalization of
Measure judgments with their meaning.
respect to an inventory
write-down.

McManus
and
Subramaniam
(2009)

Impact of
5.1
mentoring
Ethical Culture
support, peer
influence and
individual-level
attributes on
accountants’
ethical
evaluations and
behavioral
intentions.

McManus
and
Subramaniam
(2014)

Impact of
mentoring and
organizational
ethical climate
on
organizational
and
professional
commitment.

5.1
Ethical Culture

Prior literature
on mentoring
support, peer
influence and
individual
attributes
(ethical
orientation and
ethical
education).

Questionnaire/ 86 early career
Survey
accountants from
Big 4 and nonBig 4 firms in
Australia.

Perceptions of greater
seriousness of the ethical
conflict are positively
associated with perceived
ethical behavior of peers,
personal ethical orientation,
ethical education, and
females. However,
perceived ethical conduct of
peers is not associated with
ethical behavioral
intentions. Greater
mentoring support increases
ethical evaluations of senior
colleagues but it is
negatively associated with
perceived seriousness of the
ethical conflict and the
likelihood that participants
will call an accounting body
for advice.
Theories on
Questionnaire/ 93 early career
Measure mentor support, Perceived ethical climates
organizational
Survey
accountants from perception of the firm’s
and a career development
socialization,
Big 4 and nonethical climate,
mentoring style are
mentoring and
Big 4 firms in
organizational
associated with greater
ethical behavior.
Australia.
commitment and
organizational and
professional commitment. professional commitment.
However, a social support
style mentoring relationship
results in lower professional
commitment.
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Present a case scenario
where the participant
discovers an accounting
error. Measure mentoring
styles, perceived ethical
behavior, ethical
behavioral intentions, and
individual attributes.

Nelson and
Audit leaders’
Proell (2018) reactions, both
in the moment
and later, to
subordinates
who speak up
about potential
audit issues.

5.3
Prior literature
Learning Culture on leaders’
reactions to
employee voice.

Nelson,
Proell, and
Randel
(2016)

5.3
Prior literature
Learning Culture on employee
voice and
motivated
reasoning.

The impact of
leadership on
auditors’
willingness to
raise audit
issues.

Questionnaire/ Survey: matched
Survey and
sample of 143
Experiment
staff and 42
supervisors that
work together
from two
international
accounting
firms.
Experiments:
347 auditors
from two Big 4
firms and one
national
accounting firm.

Measures audit staffs’
self-reported willingness
to speak up and their
supervisors’ actual
performance assessment.
Three experiments.
manipulating various
combinations of audit
issue, supervisor concern,
budgetary concerns, and
whether a material
misstatement is identified.
Measure auditors’
performance evaluations
and assessed irritation
with subordinates.
Questionnaire/ Survey: 197 staff Measure auditors’
Survey and
auditors from
perception of teamExperiment
two large public oriented leadership and
accounting firms willingness to speak up.
(92 seniors and
Four experiments,
105 supporting
manipulating various
staff).
combinations of audit
Experiments:
issue, supervisor concern
144 audit seniors and team-oriented
from a Big 4
leadership. Participants
accounting firm, are asked whether a
118 auditors
typical senior or they
from two firms
themselves would speak
and 72 staff
up about the issue. The
auditors.
final experiment
measures three potential
mediators; (1) leader
commitment, (2) concern
for consequences and (3)
team identification.
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Audit leaders express
greater irritation in the
moment when speaking up
occurs. However, overall
audit leaders encourage
speaking up through higher
performance ratings
specifically when the issues
raised align with the
supervisor’s concern.
Supervisors react with more
irritation when the issue
raised results in increased
audit effort
Auditors are more willing to
speak up to leaders who are
considered team-oriented,
about issues that are aligned
with their direct
supervisors’ concerns, and
are more impacted when the
issue is one related to
effectiveness. An auditor’s
willingness to speak up is
mediated by commitment to
the team leader and, to a
lesser extent, identification
with the team. Female
auditors are more sensitive
to leadership.

Picard,
Durocher and
Gendron
(2018)

The impact of
marketing
ideology on
auditing.

5.2
Develop a
Professionalism/ conceptual
Commercialism framework
related to the
“marketization”
of public
accounting.

Pierce and
Sweeney
(2010)

The impact of
5.1
variables such
Ethical Culture
as firm size on
ethical
intentions,
ethical
judgments,
perceived
ethical intensity
and perceived
ethical culture.

Ethical
Reasoning
Process (Rest,
1979, 1994)

Pruijssers,
Heugens, and
Oosterhout
(2018)

The impact of
perceived
tournament
promotion
incentives on
auditors’
behavior.

Tournament
theory

5.1
Ethical Culture

Archival and
Interviews

Highlights the importance
that marketization plays in
the shift from
professionalism to
commercialism;
accountants are drawing
upon other disciplines (e.g.,
finance and marketing) in
their daily operations. The
collaborative effort between
marketers and accountants
to preserve the business can
result in threats to the
professionalism of the
accountant.
Questionnaire/ 463 accountants Questionnaires feature
Big4 firms have higher
Survey
in Ireland
four types of time
ethical views and lower
ranging across
pressure-induced auditor intention of engaging in
work area (audit dysfunctional behaviors; unethical behavior.
and non-audit),
measure ethical intention, Auditors report higher
experience level ethical judgment,
ethical judgments than nonand firm type
perceived ethical intensity audit. Women indicate
(Big 4 and non- and perceived ethical
lower intentions of
Big 4 firms).
culture.
engaging in unethical
behaviors, higher ethical
judgments and higher
ethical culture.
Questionnaire/ 405 auditors
Measure perceptions of
Greater pay breadth has a
Survey
from 115 audit
pay spread between
negative impact on audit
firms in
partners’ and others’
quality, as it is associated
Germany, the
compensation, and pay
with lower perceived
Netherlands, and breadth (the level of
cooperation, lower skeptical
Belgium.
competition to make
judgments, and a higher
partner). Measure selflikelihood of qualityinterested behavior by
reducing behavior
asking participants to rate Perceived pay spread is
the frequency of
associated with higher
behaviors such as
cooperation and more
“accepting weak client
skeptical judgments.
explanations”.
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20 interviews
with experienced
auditors (former
and current) and
marketing
specialists from
the U.K. and
Canada.
Analysis of
relevant firm
publications
(e.g.,
promotional
brochures).

Interview questions focus
on participants’ use of
marketing practices and
perceived changes to
marketing initiatives over
time.

Robertson,
Stefaniak,
and Curtis
(2011)

Wrongdoers
5.1
reputation on
Ethical Culture
fellow auditors’
willingness to
report their
questionable
acts.

Summary of
prior literature
on auditor
whistleblowing
and reputation
(performance
and liability).

Experiment

Seckler,
Gronewold
and Reihlen
(2017)

The impact of
5.3
organizational
Learning Culture
structure, team
procedures and
practices, and
individual
cognitions and
emotions on
how audit errors
are managed.

Error
management
theory and prior
archival,
behavioral and
social research
on audit quality.

Ethnography
(observation
and
interviews)
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181 auditors of
varying firm
sizes (local,
regional,
national and Big
4) and ranks
(intern to
partner).

2 X 2 design: level of
likeability reputation
(more/less) and
performance reputation
(good/ poor). Measure
willingness to report
questionable acts of their
audit manager,
professional costs of
whistleblowing
(professional
repercussions and effects
on performance
evaluations) and personal
costs (social
repercussions).
Observation of
An in-depth case study of
individuals and
a Big 4 firm in Germany,
teams in a Big 4 using participant
accounting firm observations within audit
in Germany. 38 teams, semi-structured
interviews with interviews, and review of
auditors and
documents from the
consultants from firm’s global internal
12 offices across database to understand
10 countries.
how teams respond to,
and cope with, audit
errors.

Auditors are more likely to
take action when the
wrongdoer has a poor
reputation and is less
likeable. Professional
repercussions are the most
influential perceived cost in
regards to reporting, as
compared to performance
evaluations and social
repercussions.

Develop a multi-level
model of error management,
based on influence at the
organizational level (e.g.,
quality and risk
management system), team
level (e.g., work paper
reviews and practices on the
handling of errors), and
individual level (error
anticipation and error
coping).

Shafer (2008) The ethical
5.1
culture in
Ethical Culture
Chinese CPA
firms and its
impact on
personal ethical
orientations and
decisionmaking.

Theoretical
climate types
(Victor and
Cullen 1988)

Questionnaire/ 128 seniors and
Survey
managers
(auditing, tax,
consulting and
other) employed
by local and
international
public
accounting firms
operating in
Shenzhen,
Shanghai and
Beijing.

Participants complete a
series of auditing
vignettes that elicit ethical
judgments and behavior
intentions. These address
a variety of issues
encountered in audit
practice. Also, measure
the participants’ views
about their current job’s
ethical culture and their
ethical position.

Shafer (2009) Impact of the
firm’s ethical
culture
perception on
organizationalprofessional
conflict (OPC)
and affective
organizational
commitment
(OC).

5.1
Ethical Culture

Theoretical
climate types
(Victor and
Cullen 1988)

Participants complete the
ethical culture
questionnaire, OPC scale
(i.e., the conflict between
doing what is right for the
company and doing what
is in the public’s best
interest), OC scale,
impression management
scale and demographic
questionnaire.

Shafer, Poon, The influence
5.1
and Tjosvold of professional Ethical Culture
(2013)
commitment on
the associations
among ethical
culture,
organizationprofessional
conflict (OPC)
and
organizational
commitment
(OC).

Theoretical
climate types
(Victor and
Cullen 1988)

Questionnaire/ 167 professional
Survey
auditors (seniors
and mangers)
employed by
local and
international
public
accounting firms
operating in the
People's
Republic of
China.
Questionnaire/ 248 employees
Survey
(auditing, tax,
consulting and
accounting) of
one Singapore
office of an
international
accounting firm,
range of
experience and
specializations.
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Ethical culture significantly
impacts intentions to
commit ethically
questionable acts. Perceived
ethical climate does not
differ between local and
international firms, but local
Chinese firms judge
questionable actions as
more ethical.

No difference in the
perceived ethical cultures of
local and international CPA
firms. Perceived egotistic
culture is positively
associated with OPC and
negatively associated with
OC. Negative association
between OPC and OC.
These associations are
reversed for benevolent and
principled ethical cultures.
Questionnaire includes
Significant associations
ethical culture questions, between ethical culture,
OPC scale, measures of
OPC and OC.
affective and normative
Professionally committed
OC and affective
employees note less conflict
professional commitment. and greater commitment
when the firm places greater
emphasis on the public's
interest. These associations
are not present in
employees with lower
professional commitment.

SmithLacroix,
Durocher and
Gendron
(2012)

The impact of
fair or market
value
accounting on
auditing.

5.3
Giddens’ (1990,
Learning Culture 1991) work on
expert systems
and trust in late
modernity.

Stefaniak and Staff auditors'
5.3
Robertson
response to
Learning Culture
(2010)
errors in light of
errors
significance and
their superiors'
historical
reaction to
mistake
admissions.

Psychology and
organizational
behavior
research:
individuals will
try to avoid
consequences of
mistakes by
justification,
scapegoating, or
misrepresentatio
n.

Interview

18 current and
former Canadian
partners and
managers from
the Big 4 firms,
one national
accounting firm
and government
audit offices.

Questions ask about the
increased prevalence of
fair value accounting and
its impact on
engagements,
participants’ professional
networks, the audit
process and how auditors
attempt to get
comfortable with fair
value standards.

Experiment

95 graduate and
upper-level
undergraduate
accounting
students and 42
professional
auditors (staff,
seniors and
managers) from
Big 4 and nonBig 4 firms.

Participants read a
scenario about a staff
auditor’s error;
manipulate how the
superior had handled
previously identified
errors.
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The prevalence of fair value
estimates is changing how
auditors approach their
tasks, with greater reliance
and trust being placed on
experts resulting in auditors
being reduced to being a
mobilizer of experts who
mediate discrepancies in
their judgments, instead of a
decision-maker. Unintended
consequences include
increased audit work and
increased audit fees as well
as increased strain on clientauditor relations.
Staff auditors are more
likely to judge that others
will admit an error when
their superiors’ prior
reaction was positive,
regardless of the error’s
significance. However,
auditors are least likely to
judge that others will admit
mistakes when error
significance is low and the
supervisor’s prior reaction
was negative. Results imply
that supervisors can
mitigate sensitivity to
reporting errors through
positive reinforcement.

Suddaby,
Gendron and
Lam (2009)

The impact of
change in the
organizational
context, content
and
location of
professional
work on
variation in
attitudes toward
professional
ideology
and institutions.
Sweeney and Audit seniors’
McGarry
perceptions
(2011)
about the goals
of the audit
firms and audit
partners.

5.2
Non-traditional Questionnaire/ Online survey,
Professionalism/ work setting Survey
approximately
Commercialism Wallace (1995)
1,200 Canadian
two competing
chartered
theories:
accountants in
"proletarianizati
public practice,
on" thesis vs. the
government and
"adaptation"
private industry.
view

5.2
Commercial
Professionalism/ versus
Commercialism professional
logics of action.

Interviews
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Semi-structured
interviews of 16
audit seniors
from all Big 4
firms in Ireland.

Measure commitment to
the organization,
profession, and client;
acceptance of
independence as a core
professional value and
value of the CA
designation. Compare
audit firms to other
organizations, auditing to
non-traditional work, firm
size, work specialization
and position.
Questions focus on
perceived goals of the
practice and of the audit
partners, as well as
perceptions of the goals
espoused by the firm
externally.

Most accounting
professionals remain
committed to the
profession, despite
profound changes in work.
The strongest deviation
from core professional
values is observed in public
accounting, especially in the
Big 4 where professionals
have the lowest levels of
commitment to their
organization and to clients.
Perceptions of firm goals
differ between external
parties, internal parties and
new/ potential staff. Audit
seniors view partners as
being concerned with
profitability and client
satisfaction, while
externally the image
espoused is audit quality,
client satisfaction and staff
satisfaction goals.

Sweeney,
How pressure to 5.1
Arnold and
engage in
Ethical Culture
Pierce (2010) dysfunctional
behaviors and
unethical tone
at the top
influence
perceptions of
the ethical
environment
and intention to
engage in
unethical
behaviors.

Ethical
Reasoning
Process (Rest,
1979, 1994)

Questionnaire/ 441 experienced
Survey
pre-manager
level auditors in
Ireland and 114
in the US across
several different
firms (Big 4 and
non-Big 4).

Sweeney,
Pierce, and
Arnold
(2013)

Ethical
Reasoning
Process (Rest,
1979, 1994)

Questionnaire/ 441 experienced
Survey
pre-manager
level auditors in
Ireland and 114
in the US across
several different
firms (Big 4 and
non-Big 4).

Does ethical
intensity
mediate the
relationship
between a
firm’s ethical
culture and
quality
threatening
behaviors
(QTBs)?

5.1
Ethical Culture

Taylor and
The factors
5.1
Curtis (2013) influencing an
Ethical Culture
auditor’s
willingness to
report unethical
behavior.

Expectancy
Experiment
theory (report if
expect to
achieve a desired
outcome); justice
theory (firm’s
response on
espoused ethics
policies)
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106 senior-level
auditors from
one Big 4 firm.

Questionnaire presents
hypothetical audit
situations representing
dysfunctional behavior
that could be easily
concealed. Measure
participants’ ethical
evaluations of the cases,
intention to act and the
perceived ethical culture
of the firm where they
were employed.

Perceived unethical
pressure and unethical tone
influence auditors’ ethical
evaluation however, only
perceived unethical pressure
influences an auditor’s
intention to engage in the
behavior. Big 4 auditors
report higher ethical
evaluations and lower
intention to over-rely on
client work. US auditors
report higher ethical
evaluations and lower
intentions of engaging in
quality threatening
behavior.
Questionnaire presents
Find a direct relationship
hypothetical audit
between ethical intensity
situations representing
and ethical decision-making
QTBs that could be easily regarding QTBs. Perceived
concealed. Measure
ethical intensity fully
participants’ ethical
mediates the relationship
evaluation of the cases,
between ethical culture and
intention to act,
ethical decision-making.
perceptions of ethical
culture of the firm and
ethical intensity.
Manipulate firm as
responsive/ unresponsive
and wrongdoer as peer/
supervisor. Case involves
the participant observing
either a manager or a peer
throwing away review
notes; participants
indicate perception of the
ethical dilemma and
anticipated action.

Auditors are influenced by
power distance (i.e., more
likely to report unethical
behavior of a peer); less
(more) willing to report
supervisor (peer) unethical
behavior when prior firm
response is weak. Also find
that men are less sensitive
to power distance than
women.

Taylor and
The impact of
5.1
Curtis (2016) mentoring on
Ethical Culture
prosocial
behaviors (i.e.,
organizational
citizenship)
directly and
indirectly
through its
influence on
perceptions of a
caring ethical
climate.

Prior literature
and theories on
prosocial
behavior, social
influence, social
learning and
social exchange.

Questionnaire/ 120 U.S public
Survey
accountants
spread across
firm level and
firm types (Big 4
and non-Big 4
firms).

Tsunogaya,
Sugahara,
and Chand
(2017)

Prior literature
on social
influence and
professional/
organizational
commitment.

Experiment

Impact of
obedience and
conformity
pressure on
dysfunctional
audit behavior
in Japan.

5.1
Ethical Culture
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208 Japanese
CPAs (205 are
from Big 4
firms).
Participants
ranged from
partner to staff
level.

Ask participants to
imagine they witnessed a
superior engaging in
fraud and indicate how
likely they are to disclose
their observations and
how serious they view
this act. Also measure
perceptions of various
organizational and
individual attributes (i.e.,
trust, organizational
commitment, mentor
relationship quality and
ethical climate).
Manipulate social
pressure at three levels:
obedience pressure from
the partner, conformity
pressure for colleague
auditors, and no social
pressure. Measure
participants professional
and organizational
commitment, individual
personality and judgment
related to a questionable
client asset.

Find that quality mentoring
relationships are associated
with perceptions of a caring
ethical climate, and that
mentoring and ethical
climate are associated with
behaviors that encourage
and enable internal
reporting of fraud; trust and
commitment mediate these
effects.

Find that obedience
pressure results in quality
threatening behavior.
Conformity pressure is not
found to have a significant
impact. High levels of
affective and normative
commitment mitigate the
consequence of obedience
pressure.

Westermann, The creation
Bedard and
and
Earley (2015) reinforcement
of technical
knowledge in
the everyday
audit practice
(i.e., on-the-job
learning;
OTJL).

5.3
Creation of
Interviews
Learning Culture legitimacy in the
practice and
development of
appropriate
values, norms
and behaviors
that substantiate
these practices.
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Semi-structured
interviews with
30 audit partners
at a U.S. Big 4
accounting
firm;14
experienced and
16 newer
partners.

Specific questions related
to current and past on the
job learning experiences
were developed based on
prior literature.

The apprenticeship model
of OTJL still applies, but
partner concerns include
less investment of time and
effort by today’s incoming
auditors, their unreasonable
expectations for work-life
balance, and greater
resistance to conformity.
Formal new hire training is
shorter and use of
technology diminishes
development of appropriate
behaviors (e.g., critical
thinking).

APPENDIX B
Articles Identified, by Journal and Method

Behavioral Research in
Accounting
Accounting, Organizations and
Society
The Accounting Review
Contemporary Accounting
Research
Journal of Business Ethics
International Journal of Auditing
Auditing: A Journal of Practice
& Theory
Accounting Auditing &
Accountability Journal
European Accounting Review
Accounting & Finance
Accounting Horizons
Critical Perspectives on
Accounting
Accounting and Business
Research
International Journal of
Accounting Information
Systems
Journal of Accounting Research
Journal of Accounting and
Economics
Journal of International
Accounting Research
Total

ABDC
rating
A

Total

Survey

Experiment

11

7

4

A*

10

4

2

4

A*
A*

9
8

3
1

7
1

1
5

1
2

A
A
A*

8
6
5

6
2
1

2
2
2

2
2

2

A

5

3

A*
A
A
A

4
2
2
2

1
2
1

A

1

1

A

1

A*
A*

1
1

A

1
77

Interview/
Ethnographic

Archival
Empirical

2
3
1
2

1

1

1
1

20

8

1

1
32

25

Notes: This table presents articles on audit firm culture identified by our search procedures as
outlined in the Method section. We also searched the following journals but found no articles there
that meet our criteria: Abacus, British Accounting Review, Foundations and Trends in Accounting,
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Journal of Accounting Auditing & Finance, Journal of
Business Finance & Accounting, Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, Review of
Accounting Studies, and The International Journal of Accounting. The count shown within each
method sums to greater than 100 percent of the number of studies identified, as some use multiple
methods (e.g., survey and experiment).
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APPENDIX C
Competing Cultural Influences: Macro-Cultures and Sub-Cultures
Macro-cultures (i.e., national, professional, and global network firm (GNF) cultures) are
important, as “organizational cultures reflect the societies in which they are embedded” (House,
Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004, p. 37). In auditing, Nolder and Riley (2014) review
research showing that national culture affects auditor behavior (e.g., O’Donnell & Prather-Kinsey,
2010). These differences are a key factor affecting quality of group audits involving multiple
national firms (Sunderland & Trompeter, 2017). Bik and Hooghiemstra (2018) provide evidence
of differences across national firms within GNFs; i.e., national cultures with greater collectivism
and societal trust induce more compliance with global firm policies and methodologies.
Second, the professional culture of auditing may jointly shape firm-specific quality
controls (Jonnergård, 2012). Belal, Spence, Carter, and Zhu (2017) find that local professional
societies influence accountants’ work. Third, cultural roots of GNFs may influence auditor
behavior. 18 GNFs implement a common set of policies and procedures to foster consistency across
their multiple networked firms (FRC, 2018); however, some autonomy is retained at local firms
(Lenz & James, 2007). While research comparing across GNFs is valuable, few studies do so. For
instance, Dowling (2009) finds that electronic work systems of large firms vary in restrictiveness
(suggesting cultural differences), yet auditors’ intention to use systems appropriately are also
influenced by local team consensus. In sum, research shows that national, GNF, and professional
cultures interact with AFC, influencing or even hampering the effectiveness of firms’ EMs in
controlling behavior of their professionals.
Some studies in our sample examine subcultures (i.e., shared ideologies differing from the
organization’s core culture; Trice, 1993) based on gender, age, and ethnicity. Regarding gender,
Haynes (2013) describes the masculine culture of her audit firm that left her feeling marginalized

For example, Pratt, Mohrweis, Beaulieu (1993) conclude that there are not only cultural differences among
auditors of different nationalities, but also among auditors of the same nationalities working in different audit
firms with global firm cultures strong enough to attract and socialize auditors with similar values.

18
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and excluded. Taylor and Curtis (2013) and Nelson, Proell, and Randel (2016) show that men and
women vary in their sensitivity to AFC. In addition, research examines firms’ external portrayals:
Edgley, Sharma, and Anderson-Gough (2016), Durocher, Bujaki, and Brouard (2016), and Picard,
Durocher, and Gendron (2018) show firms marketing their efforts to improve gender equality. 19
Yet, both Carter and Spence (2014) and Kornberger, Justesen, and Mouritsen (2011) find a dramatic
drop in the proportion of women at the manager level.
Another line of research concerns alternative work arrangements (AWAs), a topic related
to gender and age that Jenkins at al. (2008) note needs further research. Kornberger, Carter, and
Ross-Smith (2010) find that while an AWA was intended to improve career progression and
retention of women, it actually reinforced gender barriers. However, Buchheit, Dalton, Harp, and
Hollingsworth (2016) find that auditors’ perceptions of organizational support for AWAs are
associated with less work-family conflict. Durocher et al. (2016) find that firms are adapting the
workplace as well as public depictions of priorities and values in response to differing expectations
of millennials for work-life balance. Yet, Johnson, Lowe, and Reckers (2008) find that firm leaders
view AWAs as inconsistent with the traditional audit workplace culture, resulting in less favorable
performance evaluations for participants.
Finally, a few studies distinguish subcultures based on auditor ethnicity. Edgley et al.
(2016) show increasing attention to the value of diversity in the audit workplace, but describe this
as relating more to commercial logics than social justice. Carter and Spence (2014) provide
consistent evidence, finding considerable barriers to entry and promotion for ethnic minorities.
Collectively, these studies show that gender and ethnicity continue to matter for work attitudes and
career progression in the auditing profession.

Gender discrimination is not perceived uniformly across firms. Dalton, Cohen, Harp, and McMillan (2014)
find that female auditors perceive greater discrimination in firms with fewer female partners, weaker ethical
climates, less supportive of alternative work arrangements and lower tone at the top in support of employees’
personal well-being.

19
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“Whether we want one or not, we are going to have a culture, and so why don't we as a
leadership team start to think about how do we influence that culture.” (Audit Partner,
September 2020)
1. INTRODUCTION
Organizational culture is a system of values, beliefs, and assumptions that are
learned and validated by a group as it works to solve problems of external adaption and
internal integration (Hofstede 1984; Schein 2017). Culture serves as the “DNA” of an
organization, based on accumulated shared learning of the group that occurs over time
(Schein 2017). Yet, crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic act as an exogenous shock,
which in turn can result in a metamorphosis of such cultural “DNA.” More specifically,
given the heightened emotional response during periods of disruption, organizational
members engage in new learning at a greater intensity, in turn creating new norms, values,
and working procedures (Schein 2017). We know that the COVID-19 pandemic is
disrupting business operations throughout the world, including the working procedures of
audit professionals (Luo and Malsch 2020). Thus, a central premise of this study is that
what audit engagement leaders’ (i.e., partners, directors, senior managers, and managers)
say and do in responses to such disruption can illicit changes to existing organizational
mechanisms that embed and transmit culture (Schein 2017). In that spirit, the purpose of
this study is to examine current and changing audit firm culture, as it is conveyed through
audit engagement leaders’ experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic.
COVID-19 (also “the pandemic”), a severe respiratory virus impacting countries
across the world (World Health Organization 2020), including the United States (U.S.), is
disrupting both individuals and organizations alike. More specifically, organizations are
changing the way that they operate to adhere to restrictions on travel and in-person
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gatherings. For example, business facilities have closed, and employees have worked
almost exclusively from home during the pandemic (Power 2020). Early anecdotal and
empirical evidence suggests that auditors are substantially adapting their existing practices
in response to the pandemic (Luo and Malsch 2020; Bauer, Humphreys, and Trotman 2022;
Albitar, Gerged, Kikhia, and Hussainey 2021). This includes changing the way that they
interact with one another and their clients (e.g., increased use of communication platforms
like Zoom), as well as how they engage in specific audit procedures (e.g., virtual inventory
observations; Luo and Malsch 2020; Bauer et al. 2022). Further, current work practices
such as the ability to work remotely are likely to continue, at least to some extent, well into
the future (e.g., PwC announced a remote work policy; McCabe 2021).
Organizational leaders play a critical role in helping organizations effectively
manage changes arising from crises (Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia 1987; Pearson and
Mitroff 1993; Bundy, Pfarrer, Short, and Coombs 2017), such as the pandemic. Schein
(2017) proports that what leaders say and do (i.e., their tone) in response to disruption is a
powerful mechanism through which underlying cultural assumptions are conveyed to
organizational members; i.e., a cultural embedding mechanism. Relatedly, crises give rise
to new learning as members attempt to minimize the stress and anxiety resulting from such
events (Schein 2017). Thus, the pandemic provides an opportunity to observe current and
changing organizational culture.
As it relates to auditing, since prior literature finds that audit firm culture influences
auditors’ cultural perceptions, behaviors, and ultimately audit outcomes (Alberti, Bedard,
Bik, and Vanstraelen 2022a), audit firms, standard setters, and oversight bodies continue
to emphasize the importance of embedding a culture oriented toward high audit quality
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(IAASB 2014). Thus, it is critically important to examine the pandemic’s impact on audit
firm culture given its effect on auditors’ judgments and decisions and ultimately audit
outcomes. In this study, we leverage the theoretical model developed by Schein (2017) and
reinforced by the IAASB (2014) to address two primary research questions. First, what are
the greatest challenges that audit engagement leaders describe facing during the pandemic?
Second, how is audit engagement leaders’ response to these challenges impacting audit
firm culture?
To address these questions, we conduct semi-structured interviews during the
pandemic (i.e., August to October 2020) with 18 U.S. audit engagement leaders (i.e., audit
partners, directors, senior managers, and managers), working across each of the Big 4 firms
and two large international accounting firms. We selected audit engagement leaders given
that they are responsible for managing the daily challenges arising from the pandemic for
the audit teams that they oversee. 20 Additionally, interviews allow us to understand audit
engagement leaders’ experiences during the pandemic, shedding light on their response to
arising challenges and changes.
In their responses, audit engagement leaders’ note that facilitating collaboration
among audit team members in a fully remote working environment is one of the challenges
that they are facing during the pandemic. They acknowledge that while the pandemic has
led to important innovations across the audit process (e.g., greater use of technology), it is

Within audit firms, auditors are assigned to audit teams which are structured around the firm’s audit clients.
Furthermore, within each team, there is a hierarchical structure based on experience, with the highest-level
being engagement partner and proceeding down to director, experienced senior manager, manager, senior
associate, and associate (experienced and new). The hierarchical, fluid structure of audit teams is different
from most business structures and results in audit engagement team leaders playing a critical role in the
oversight of audit teams. They are typically the individuals that are “on the ground” with audit teams assisting
in the day-to-day challenges ensuing from the pandemic. Thus, we focus on these individuals in
understanding how the pandemic was managed.
20
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limiting the informal interactions that occur among auditors, and between auditors and their
audit clients, in turn making it more challenging to develop and maintain relationships. In
response, audit engagement leaders describe paying close attention to their audit team
members and audit processes in order to maintain audit quality, and minimize affective
consequences (e.g., stress) arising from a weakened collaborative team culture. Relatedly,
the pandemic is changing the learning culture of audit firms, making it more difficult for
auditors to learn on-the-job, which is a critical component of how they develop
(Westermann, Bedard, and Earley 2015). In contrast, due to lower perceived geographical
barriers, audit engagement leaders describe a more inclusive learning culture, where they
are able to readily obtain knowledge from resources outside of the immediate audit team
(e.g., consultation with specialists and use of auditors from other firm office locations), a
benefit that they see as persisting in the future.
Respondents emphasize that it is the relationships among the firm’s people that is
an important component of audit firm culture. The described changes to such relationships
during the pandemic will likely have long-term consequences on organizational
commitment and turnover, with potential downstream impacts to audit quality. Thus, while
engagement leaders are continuing to ensure that the overall audit process lends itself to
the achievement of high audit quality, an auditor’s role is becoming more focused on audit
task execution, as opposed to the long-term development and cohesion of the team. Further,
while greater workplace flexibility is desired among auditors in the future, respondents
describe that working exclusively from home gives rise to feelings of isolation, lower
motivation, and burnout, all of which may be contributing to the resource challenges (i.e.,
finding and retaining qualified staff) that audit firms are currently facing (AICPA 2021).
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Taken together, the findings of this study contribute to both research and practice
by providing early insight into the pandemic’s current and potential long-term impact on
audit firm culture. We contribute directly to early research that identifies changes in
organizational culture that have occurred as a result of the pandemic. To our knowledge,
this is the first qualitative study of U.S. audit engagement leaders’ experiences during the
pandemic that provides direct evidence with regard to the changes to audit firm culture in
response to this crisis. Specifically, we find that consistent with the organizational culture
changes identified by Brown et al. (2021), the pandemic placed greater emphasis on certain
cultural elements such as flexibility and supportiveness. Yet, in addition to the values
identified by Brown et al. (2021), the pandemic is disrupting the relational systems that
exist within audit teams, making salient the importance of existing cultural values of
collaboration and communication. Relatedly, while prior research examines how a crisis
can impact organizational culture (Schein 2017; Bundy et al. 2017), we find evidence that
audit engagement leaders are embracing innovation across the audit process, in part in an
attempt to maintain the collaborative audit firm culture that existed before the pandemic.
Finally, since audit teams have a hierarchical structure, which is different from most
business structures, understanding the pandemic’s impact on audit firm culture lends
insight into the impact of a crisis on organizations with disaggregated leadership
structures. 21
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. In section II, we discuss the
background and theoretical framework on which this research was developed. In section

Other professional services contexts (e.g., consulting, medicine, and law) feature short-term task-oriented
teams in which individuals work with different people. Therefore, the insights obtained from the auditing
context could yield broader application to firms such as those.
21

86

III, we describe the method used, including the design of the instruments, the study’s
participants, data collection and data analysis. In section IV, we present insights obtained
from the interviews. This discussion follows an analysis of the team collaboration
challenges that audit engagement leaders are facing, and how their response is impacting
the cultural embedding mechanisms that affect the firm’s people and audit processes. In
section V, we discuss the potential long-term impact and in section VI, we offer limitations
and conclude.
2. BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. Managing the Pandemic Crisis: Insights into Audit Firm Culture
Building on the work of Pearson and Clair (1998), Bundy et al. (2017, 1662)
provide an overview of the crisis management literature, defining a crisis as “an event
perceived by managers and stakeholders as highly salient, unexpected, and potentially
disruptive [that] can threaten an organization’s goals and have profound implications for
its relationships with stakeholders.” The pandemic aligns with this definition, disrupting
businesses unexpectedly, and causing the need for rapid change in an attempt to minimize
internal (e.g., employees) and external (e.g., investors, client) stakeholder losses. Prior
literature on crisis management is extensive and finds that leadership plays a critical role
in helping organizations effectively manage such events (Mitroff et al. 1987; Shrivastava
1993; Pearson and Mitroff 1993; King 2002). 22 Specifically, organizational leaders must

Much of the organizational literature to date examines large-scale crises that have originated from within
the organization; e.g., the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger is the result of an internal miscalculation
(Esser and Lindoerfer 1989; Vaughan 1990; Pearson and Clair 1998). However, the pandemic is more closely
related to research on crises resulting from external forces such as natural disasters, financial crises, or
terrorist attacks (Sanchez, Korbin, and Viscarra 1995; Argenti 2002; Schoen 2017). While there is not as an
extensive body of literature on externally imposed crises, we reference the overall crisis management
literature to better understand responses taken by organizational leadership in an attempt to minimize the
impact of, and recover from, such events.

22
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consider the challenges ensuing from the crisis, and effectively respond to those
challenges. 23
Early empirical and anecdotal evidence finds that the pandemic is impacting the
audit process (Luo and Malsch 2020; Bauer et al. 2022). For example, it has placed
restrictions on how auditors interact with one another and their clients, resulting in the need
for auditors to find alternative means of communication, such as through the use of video
conferencing technologies like Zoom (e.g., virtual inventory observations; Luo and Malsch
2020; Bauer et al. 2022). Additionally, the AICPA (2020) describe a number of potential
auditing challenges resulting from the pandemic including: scope limitations due to the
inability of auditors to engage in certain audit procedures such as physical inventory
observations and difficulty assessing client records virtually. Thus, we pose our first
research question:
RQ1: What challenges do audit engagement leaders describe facing during the
pandemic?
Not surprisingly, much of the literature to date finds that measures taken by leaders
in response to challenges helps to minimize the immediate and long-term impacts resulting
from a crisis, and affects organizational outcomes such as performance (James, Wooten,
and Dushek 2011; Bundy et al. 2017). For example, when leaders react emotionally to a
crisis they are often constrained in their response (James and Wooten 2011; Bundy et al.
2017). Yet leaders that view crises as opportunities are able to be more adaptive in their
response. As a result, leaderships’ response to challenges during a crisis sends important
signals about how organizational members should “perceive, think, feel, and behave”

Pearson and Clair (1998, p.61) note that such effective crisis management is evidenced when “potential
crises are averted or when key stakeholders believe that the success outcomes of short- and long-range
impacts of crises outweigh the failure outcomes.”
23
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(Schein 2017, 183), which in turn impacts the organization’s ability to successfully
navigate disruptions that arise both from an operational and relational perspective (Kahn,
Barton, and Fellows 2013; Bundy et al. 2017). Relatedly, Schein (2017, 191) notes that “no
better opportunity exists for leaders to send signals about their own assumptions about
human nature and relationships than when they themselves are challenged.” Thus, crises
provide an opportunity for leaders to critically reexamine pre-existing working practices;
implement new practices in response to arising challenges; and in turn, change underlying
values, beliefs, and assumptions (Spicer 2020).
Further, audit engagement leaders’ tone in response to challenges arising during the
pandemic lends insight into changes in the mechanisms (e.g., training and development)
that convey underlying organizational values and assumptions and can result in the creation
of new norms, values, and working procedures that contribute to organizational culture
(Schein 2017). More specifically, leaderships’ behavior during a crisis is a powerful
mechanism used to embed and transmit organizational values, norms, assumptions, and
working practices (Pearson and Clair 1998; Schein 2017). Schein (2017) identifies “visible
artifacts” through which underlying organizational values and assumptions (i.e., cultural
cues) are espoused. Recently, these visible manifestations of organizational culture were
echoed by the IAASB (2014) in their description of the key attributes of a culture of high
audit quality. Such embedding mechanisms are the basis of the theoretical framework
presented by Alberti et al. (2022a) in their review of prior literature on audit firm culture.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the first few cultural embedding mechanisms described within
Schein’s (2017, 183) theoretical framework relate to “what leaders pay attention to,
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measure, and control,” and “how they “react to organizational crises;” i.e., leaderships’
tone.
In addition to what leaders pay attention to and how they react to disruption, there
are other “powerful daily behavioral things that leaders do” that also convey organizational
culture (Schein 2017, 183). These additional cultural embedding mechanisms are as
follows. First, training and development relates to leaderships’ “deliberate role modeling,
teaching, and coaching” and more formalized training methods. Second, incentives and
rewards include the criteria that is used for monetary rewards (pay increases, bonuses) and
promotion decisions, as well as the availability of incentives like employee benefits (e.g.,
employee well-being benefits and resources). Third, allocation of firm resources refers to
the way in which leaders allocate resources within engagement teams (e.g., staffing
decisions, allotted time allocated to audit tasks), taking into consideration financial
conditions (e.g., budgets). More specifically, it includes decisions regarding how (e.g., who
performs the audit work) and when (e.g., timing of when the work is done) resources are
allocated within the engagement team. Finally, a consultation culture is associated with
how the firm and its leaders promote a culture of consulting with members outside of the
immediate audit team on complex issues and difficult decisions. 24 It is through these
cultural embedding mechanisms that leaders send important signals regarding the expected
behaviors of organizational members (Schein 2017), in turn conveying organizational

A culture of consultation was described by the IAASB (2014) as part of their identification of key attributes
that contribute to a culture of audit quality. We include it as a separate cultural embedding mechanisms given
the important role that we expect consultations to have among audit professionals in light of the pandemic’s
impact on audit risks.

24
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culture. 25 Refer to Figure 2.1 for a depiction of the cultural embedding mechanisms used
as the theoretical basis for examining current and changing audit firm culture.
[Insert Figure 2.1 Here]
Prior audit research finds that each of these mechanisms affects auditors’
perceptions of audit firm culture, and in turn their behaviors and decisions (Alberti et al.
2021). For example, prior research finds that audit engagement team leaders’ tone
influences auditors’ decision outcomes during periods of high stress and uncertainty (e.g.,
busy season). When audit engagement leaders (both partners and senior associates)
emphasize the importance of meeting budgeted hours, auditors respond by underreporting
hours worked (i.e., allocation of resources; Pickerd, Summers, and Wood 2015). This is
despite acknowledgement within the auditing profession that such behavior is unethical
and has detrimental downstream effects; i.e., auditors are unable to accurately budget for
current audits if historical budgeted data is misleading (Sweeney and Pierce 2006). In
contrast, audit engagement leaders’ tone can also illicit positive outcomes. For example,
when audit partners encourage psychological safety within their team, auditors are more
willing to share known fraud-relevant information (Gissel and Johnstone 2017). 26
While we are not aware of any research that examines the pandemic’s impact on
audit firm culture directly, there is limited research (Luo and Malsch 2020; Heltzer and

Schein (2017, 183) differentiates between what he calls primary embedding mechanisms and secondary
reinforcement and stabilizing mechanisms, noting that such primary mechanisms (e.g., leaderships’ role
modeling and coaching) are the “daily behavioral things that leaders do,” and are more powerful than the
secondary mechanisms (e.g., organizational design and structure) that “reinforce the primary messages). For
purposes of this study, we focus on the primary embedding mechanisms given our interest in understanding
what leaders are systematically paying attention to during their response to the pandemic.
26
While prior audit research finds that audit leaders send important cues about expected behavior during
periods of increased stress and uncertainty (Gendron and Spira 2010; Pickerd et al. 2015), impacting auditors
judgments and decisions (Alberti et al. 2022a); this research focuses on the cultural implications resulting
from leaderships’ tone.
25
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Mindak 2021) and anecdotal evidence (Bauer et al. 2022) that identifies the pandemic’s
impact on audit work processes. For example, while anecdotal evidence notes that the
pandemic has resulted in a shift in underlying organizational values and assumptions,
moving from “exploration and creativity towards safety and resilience” (Spicer 2020,
1731), early empirical audit evidence finds that the pandemic has led to the adoption of
innovative work practices (Luo and Malsch 2020). More specifically, how auditors
collaborate with one another is changing, impacting existing knowledge sharing processes
(Ditillo 2004; Vera-Munoz, Ho, and Chow 2006). Additionally, auditors are facing new
and emerging auditing challenges, such as having to perform required inventory
observations (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 2010, AS 2510.01) virtually
(AICPA 2020), among other challenges. Thus, new and evolving firm resources (e.g.,
templates and technology resources) are likely needed to facilitate auditors’ response in the
field.
Yet, despite these likely challenges and changes, there is limited research to date
that examines how such disruptions can impact an organization’s culture, with much of the
prior literature focusing on the role that culture plays in contributing to a crisis (Bundy et
al. 2017). 27 This is despite the fact that Kahn et al. (2013, 377) note that there are often
“relational disturbances within organizations left in the wake of a crisis.” For example, this
includes disturbances to group cohesion and communication. Additionally, to date there is
no known research that examines the impact of the pandemic on audit firm culture. As
For example, organizational cultures that are accepting of misconduct as a means of achieving desired
outcomes (e.g., stakeholders’ expectations) are more likely to see employee behavior that results in
misconduct or corruption (Ashforth and Anand 2003; Greve, Palmer, and Pozner 2010). Relatedly, prior
audit research finds that Arthur Anderson’s increased emphasis on commercialistic values resulted in
auditors’ decision outcomes that undermined their professionalism, contributing to the firm’s demise and
giving rise to changes in existing regulation and oversight of the audit profession (Gendron and Spira 2009;
Kelly and Earley 2009).
27
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such, our second research question seeks to identify how audit engagement leaders’
response to challenges arising during the pandemic impacts audit firm culture. Specifically,
we do this through an evaluation of how audit engagement leaders’ response in light of the
described cultural embedding mechanisms; i.e., training/development, incentives/rewards,
allocation of resources, and culture of consultation. Thus, our second research question is:
RQ2: How is audit engagement leaders’ response to these challenges impacting
audit firm culture?
3. METHOD
This section describes the survey and interview instruments, participants, data
collection, and data analysis. We elect to engage in interviews given our desire to
understand audit engagement leaders’ experiences auditing during the pandemic. Doing so
best enables us to be able to address our research questions of what are the challenges that
audit engagement leaders describe facing? And, how is leaderships’ response to those
challenges impacting audit firm culture? Relatedly, we seek to examine audit firm culture,
as is conveyed by auditors that have firsthand experience with such culture, acknowledging
that espoused values of culture that are used for external marketing purposes may differ
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2015; Graham, Grennan, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2016).
Thus, given our desire to understand audit firm culture from the perspective of audit
engagement leaders, we leverage prior qualitative studies in the accounting literature (e.g.,
Dowling and Leech 2014; Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous 2015; Bills, Hayne, Stein,
and Hatfield 2021) as well as guidance on engaging in qualitative research (Golden-Biddle
and Locke 2007; Power and Gendron 2015; Malsch and Salterio 2016; Yin 2017) to inform
this study’s design and analysis.
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3.1 Instrument
We develop the research instruments based on a review of the crisis management
literature (Shrivastava 1993; Pearson and Clair 1998; Bundy et al. 2017), publicly available
information from the accounting profession (e.g., the Journal of Accountancy, Center of
Audit Quality, PCOAB and Big 4 Firm websites), and through an informal discussion with
one experienced Big 4 auditor. The pre-interview questionnaire contains 17 questions (see
Appendix D) and is designed to overlap with the questions outlined in the interview
protocol; this overlap is intended to facilitate more in depth and rich data collection during
the interviews. 28
We select the interview methodology because we are interested in gaining an
understanding of audit engagement leaders’ experiences during the pandemic. Interviews
allow for the exploration of these experiences in greater depth than can be achieved through
survey or archival methods. In addition, semi-structured interviews allow for greater
flexibility. By using an interview protocol, the interviewer is able to define interview
questions in advance of the interview, while also allowing the interviewee to talk about
subject matter that they determine is most important without the interviewer providing too
much guidance or interruption (Malsch and Salterio 2016; Power and Gendron 2015;
Kenno, McCracken, and Salterio 2017). We pilot the interview protocol with one Big 4
Director. Following the pilot, we modify the interview questions to add additional
questions based on topics arising during that conversation.

28
While the pre-interview questionnaire helps to prime participants about the topics that will be discussed
during the interview, it also allows the interviewer the opportunity to better prepare for the interview i.e., we
use the questionnaire responses to get an understanding of the types of things that the interviewee is likely to
discuss during the interview, providing us with the opportunity to think about potential follow-up questions
in advance.

94

Consistent with other qualitative studies, we also revise the instrument over the
course of the interviews (e.g., Trompeter and Wright 2010; Westermann et al. 2015;
Griffith et al. 2015). After each series of interviews (approximately four), we re-examine
the instrument, adding follow-up questions based on additional topics that arose during the
interviews. The final version of the interview instrument in Appendix E includes six semistructured questions about auditing during the pandemic. The instrument poses openended, neutrally formatted questions (Patton 2014), in an attempt to minimize researcher
intrusion (Lillis 1999).
3.2 Participants
We conduct interviews with 18 practicing auditors working in each of the Big 4
firms and two large international firms. 29 Six participants hold the rank of partner, ten
directors/senior managers, and two managers. Participants have an average of 15 years of
experience ranging across the following industry specializations: finance, insurance, and
real estate; healthcare and life sciences; technology, media, telecom, and software;
manufacturing; transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services; and
construction. Sixty-one percent of participants are male. Table 2.1 reports a summary of
the interviewees’ demographic information, including rank, years of experience, firm type,
and primary industry.
[Insert Table 2.1: Participant Demographics Here]
We elect to interview auditors with extensive experience (i.e., manager or above)
given our interest in understanding the pandemic’s impact from the perspective of

We conduct interviews with participants until we reach saturation; i.e., the later interviewees provide
consistent information as was provided by the prior interviewees, with no new information being learned
(e.g., Malsch and Salterio 2016; Morse 1995).
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individuals who hold leadership positions within their respective audit teams (i.e., audit
engagement leaders). Prior literature emphasizes crisis leadership as a key component of
crisis management (e.g., Pearson and Mitroff 1993; James and Wooten 2005; Bundy et al.
2017). Audit engagement leaders are likely the ones responsible for assessing the impact
of the pandemic, and for establishing an initial plan of response within the audit teams that
they oversee. As such, these auditors provide valuable insight into the pandemic’s impact
on auditing. Further, leaders have many mechanisms available to them to convey
organizational culture (Schein 2017). Thus, understanding the challenges that leadership is
facing, and how they are responding to the pandemic provides insight into changes to the
underlying cultural embedding mechanisms that give rise to audit firm culture and possible
changes to such culture. We identify initial interviewees through personal and professional
contacts and networks. We then deploy a snowball strategy (Atkinson and Flint 2001) to
connect with the remainder of the respondents. 30
3.3 Data Collection
We held interviews during August through October 2020, with each interview
averaging approximately 54 minutes in length (ranging from 44 to 61 minutes). All
participants completed the pre-interview questionnaire through Qualtrics prior to the
interview. All interviews were conducted remotely via Zoom. Two authors were present
during each interview. To ensure a consistent approach, one of the authors served as the
lead interviewer, primarily responsible for asking questions during each interview while
the other author took detailed notes and asked follow-up questions as needed. We first
established rapport with participants by explaining the objective of the study, and then by
Snowball sampling is used as a way to connect with difficult to obtain target populations (Atkinson and
Flint 2001).
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reminding participants that their identities would remain confidential, and that the
information included in the manuscript would not contain any identifying information
about themselves or their firm. 31 All participants provided consent to being recorded;
recordings were subsequently transcribed by a third party. 32
3.3 Data Analysis
The objective of this study is to explore the challenges that audit engagement
leaders describe facing during the pandemic, and the impact on current and changing
manifestations of audit firm culture as are conveyed through leaderships’ response too such
challenges. We approach the study with an understanding of the organizational crisis
management literature, organizational and audit firm culture research, and related
theoretical lenses that can “provide potential explanations of the patterns observed”
(Malsch and Salterio 2016, 5). We draw on the organizational crisis management literature
and organizational and audit firm culture literature more broadly as a way of drawing out
the “patterns found in the data” (Malsch and Salterio 2016, 5).
The research questions have evolved from the time that the initial instrument
(shown in Appendix E) was developed. 33 In our iterative initial analysis of interviewees’
responses, we find that the discussion of their experiences performing audits during the
pandemic provides insight into current and changing mechanisms of audit firm culture

We obtain approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for Human Participants at the University
to which the authors are affiliated with when the study was completed. To protect interviewees identities, we
replace the participant’s names and the respective firm’s name with an identifier (e.g., A1).
32
We engage a third-party transcription service to transcribe each interview recording. These transcriptions
are reviewed for accuracy before using them to facilitate data analysis.
33
At the time that the instrument was developed, we were examining the following research questions: what
are the challenges that audit engagement leaders are facing as a result of the pandemic, and how are they
responding to those challenges; how do audit engagement leaders perceived the impact of the pandemic on
audit risk, and how do they respond; how do audit engagement leaders perceive the impact of the pandemic
on audit quality, and how do they respond.
31
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(e.g., how leaders engage in role modeling, teaching, and coaching). Thus, in light of the
evolved theoretical foundation, our analysis focuses on identifying challenges that audit
engagement leaders face during the pandemic and its perceived impact on audit firm
culture. Qualitative research allows for such progression, and thus our study follows this
research methodology (Malsch and Salterio 2016). 34
Consistent with the approach outlined within the qualitative methodology literature
(Malsch and Salterio 2016; Yin 2017), we take a positivist approach to analyzing our data.
More specifically, we analyze interviews iteratively by evaluating, reflecting, and engaging
in reanalysis. Through this process we construct and continue to evolve the first stage
coding scheme until two final coding schemes emerge: respondents’ description of the
challenges arising during the pandemic, and current and changing cultural embedding
mechanisms. More specifically, we construct a first order (Van Maanen 1979) interview
coding protocol using the crisis management literature (Shrivastava 1993; Pearson and
Clair 1998; Bundy et al. 2017) to identify eight challenges that audit engagement leaders
describe facing during the pandemic (Appendix F, Panel A): i.e., within team collaboration;
client collaboration; business development; internship experience; onboarding of new
staff; inefficiencies and timing; inability to disconnect; and flexibility. Additionally, using
Schein (1984) and the IAASB’s (2014) theoretical framework, we identify five primary
cultural embedding mechanisms (Appendix F, Panel B) i.e., tone at the top; training and
development, incentives and rewards, allocation of firm resources, culture of consultation.

Malsch and Salterio (2016, 5) note that “an important caution applies here in that field researchers must be
wary that they do not see in their field observations only what their adopted theory suggests they should see
in the field.” Thus, when analyzing the data, researchers should maintain an open mind, and not be
constrained by their initial expectations.

34

98

We conduct our analysis using NVivo to code the interview transcripts and to help
facilitate the identification of interviewee quotes. One author and one PhD student with
experience in auditing code all interviews (Patton 2014), comparing and refining the coding
scheme during this process. An inter-coder agreement on the coding of the challenges is
90 percent. Cohen’s Kappa, a measure of interrater agreement beyond that predicted by
random chance, was .75 (p < .01), indicating a “good” level of initial agreement. An intercoder agreement on cultural embedding mechanisms is 92 percent. Cohen’s Kappa was .59
(p < .01), indicating a “moderate” level of initial agreement. For both coding schemes, the
two coders discuss and reconcile all identified differences.
We review all coded quotations, and select quotes for the upcoming discussion and
analysis section of the paper. In so doing, we identify those quotes that we feel best
represent the experience that audit engagement leaders describe having, while also
enhancing the richness of the described experience (Malsch and Salterio 2016).
Additionally, to further verify the trustworthiness of our key findings, we provide a draft
of this paper to two additional engagement leaders who were not a part of our participant
pool, and we requested that they provide us with feedback (i.e., “member checking”). 35
Their feedback largely confirms our findings and there are no major concerns that arise
during the trustworthiness checks.

For our trustworthiness check, we received feedback from a manager from one of the Big 4 firms and a
partner from one of the large international firms that we interviewed participants from. The two individuals
are not part of our sample of 18 audit engagement leaders.
35
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4. FINDINGS
4.1. Challenges Impacting Audit Firm Culture (Research Question 1)
In addressing research question one, we find that all of our participants describe
difficulties engaging in “within-team” collaboration. 36 Specifically, respondents
acknowledge that being unable to work together in person has made this collaborative
effort more challenging. For example, one manager notes that; “working in teams, sitting
in conference rooms at our clients, working together, is core to how we execute our audits
and so that has been really challenging” (A14). Further, while auditors are continuing to
interact with one another through video conferencing platforms, prior research finds that
such electronic communication mechanisms constrain observable non-verbal cues (e.g.,
emotional reactions) that are often thought to add to the meaning of the communication
being had (Short, Williams, and Christie 1976; Bordia 1997; Walther and Parks 2002).
Thus, one senior manager describes that not being together in person makes it more
difficult for him to observe, and respond to, audit team members’ non-verbal cues (e.g.,
emotional cues such as distress).
“I'll use a random example. Someone can burst into tears in the audit room and you
know that they are stressed because you have seen them crying, and that might cue up
a conversation or coffee or something to say ‘how are you doing and how can we
help?’. You don't see that now. When the interaction is through IM or email, there are
no optics. When the interaction is through Zoom, it is planned. Someone would have
time to compose themselves and put on their ‘Zoom face’, if you will” (A10, Senior
Manager)

Additionally, while the use of technology allows auditors to recreate some of the
typical interactions that occur among audit team members, it is lacking in its ability to

Consistent with prior qualitative literature (e.g., Westermann et al. 2015), we use the terms “most,” “many,”
and “a majority of,” when discussing participant response that were greater than 60%. We use the terms
“about half” when referring to responses between 41 to 60 percent, “some” when referring to response
between 21 to 40 percent, and “few” or “limited” when referring to responses less than 20 percent.
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recreate the informal interactions that are an important part of the within-team
collaboration process e.g., listening to the conversations being had between other audit
team members. Such effective collaboration among audit team members is an important
part of the audit process because of the way that audit firms are structured (Maister 1982;
Cameran, Ditillo, and Pettinicchio 2018). Similar to a sports team, auditing is centered
around a team of auditors (i.e., the audit team), with each member playing a key, albeit
different role in the process. Auditors need to be able to work together throughout the audit
process in order to capitalize on the knowledge of each team member (Ditillo 2004; VeraMunoz et al. 2006). One partner describes her frustration stating, “It's hard on
everyone…because ‘Audit is a team sport.’ And that interaction is not to be undervalued”
(A2).
Relatedly, there are fewer opportunities for auditors to interact with one another
socially (e.g., coffee breaks), which can hinder the strength of the relationships that auditors
have with their team members, and others outside of their immediate audit team. This lack
of socialization is something that Bailey, Dalton, L Harp, and Phillips Jr. (2022) finds has
been particularly challenging among incoming accounting professionals during COVID19. For example, it is more difficult for auditors to establish mentoring relationships (i.e.,
a role model) with individuals outside of their immediate audit team, something that prior
research finds is perceived as a positive aspect of working in public accounting (Daoust
and Malsch 2019), and can help to minimize turnover intentions (Hall and Smith 2009).
One senior manager describes trying to facilitate social gatherings virtually but notes that:
“Having a Zoom call, you can be social, but it is adding a call. There's no drink. There's no
coffee. There's no treat. It's just words, which is still important, but I can see a difference
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between the two.” Another audit partner discusses the importance of remaining connected
with one another to foster learning opportunities (e.g., sharing of best practices).
“Some of the longer hours that you work in public accounting, sometimes it's lonely to
do it alone, and there is some camaraderie to taking a break for dinner and
commiserating a little bit about some of the challenges. There are learning
opportunities as well. So, I do think that there is thirst to get together.” (A3, Partner)

Participants also describe the pandemic’s impact on the relational systems (e.g.,
cohesion, communication; Kahn et al. 2013) that exist within audit teams, noting that while
they continue to find innovative ways to conduct the audit, they are struggling to maintain
the same level of connectedness among auditors that existed before the pandemic.
Something that one manager notes is a critical component of their culture: “One of the
things that this firm prides itself on … is the culture and the sense of togetherness” (A12).
We summarize this theme in response to research question one within Table 2.2, panel A.
[Insert Table 2.2 Panel A: Interview Themes Here]
This sentiment of the pandemic’s impact on the collaborative culture of audit firms
is one that continues to emerge throughout our analysis. Thus, we continue our discussion
by drawing on the proposed theoretical framework to further examine audit engagement
leaders’ tone in response to the pandemic, and the impact that it is having on the visible
organizational mechanisms that embed and transmit audit firm culture, addressing research
question two.
4.2 Audit Engagement Leaders’ Response (Research Question 2)
In response to the pandemic, audit engagement leaders are paying close attention
to audit quality, establishing an overall tone that focuses on maintaining high audit quality
by providing auditors the resources and support that they need. Specifically, respondents
emphasize the importance of continuing to facilitate collaboration and communication
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amongst their audit teams, doing so by focusing on their people and audit processes, both
of which prior research finds are associated with audit quality (Francis 2011). For example,
“It's something that our firm will say from the moment you wake up until you go to
bed … ‘our firm is our people’. Our people help create the reputation that we have, and
without our people we don't have that. So, there is always that focus [on people]. You
could look at it from another angle. If you have people whose mental health is
deteriorating, the quality is going to go. You need to make sure that this [people’s
mental health] is sharp in order for the quality to continue forward. So beyond personal
well-being, but also from an operational standpoint you need people that are capable.”
(A10, Senior Manager)

Relatedly, given engagement leaders’ emphasis on their people and processes, a
majority of respondents perceive that audit quality has not been negatively impacted during
the pandemic: “From an actual audit quality perspective, I don't think that we have seen a
difference there at all. We are still able to do what we need to do” (A18, Senior Manager).
This sentiment is echoed by a senior manager who states that audit quality to too important
for it to be negatively impacted.
“As we sit here, it is not like “oh man, it’s getting real fast and loose out there.” It [the
audit process] still goes through what it needs to go through. Audit quality is the biggest
thing for us [the firm] ... it is just too much risk to not have those kinds of controls
[review and supervision] in place to make sure that your quality is up to par. It is really
a hit on the efficiency [takes more time] more than anything.” (A13, Senior Manager).

Thus, while auditors are continuing to focus on maintaining high audit quality, the
process of doing so is changing, in turn shifting what audit engagement leaders are focusing
on (tone), and the underlying cultural embedding mechanisms used to convey leaderships’
tone (e.g., training and development). In further addressing research question two, we
structure the subsequent narrative to reflect audit engagement leaders’ discussion of the
changing cultural embedding mechanisms via their impact on the firm’s people and audit
processes. We focus on these two themes given that respondents emphasize them as being
critical to the achievement of high audit-quality. We present a summary of these themes in
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response to research question two within Table 2, Panel B. We discuss these in greater
detail in the following subsections.
[Insert Table 2.2 Panel B: Interview Themes Here]
4.2.1. Focusing on the firm’s people
Audit engagement leaders are paying close attention to the mental health and wellbeing of audit team members. Specifically, most respondents stress the importance of
checking in with audit team members virtually, or if possible, in person in a socially
distanced setting such as golfing. They describe doing this in part to ensure that auditors
continue to feel supported throughout the pandemic, and to remain connected with their
team members. One senior manager describes that “the role [of a team leader] has always
been to make sure that our people are doing okay. The means by doing that has changed in
this environment.” For example, respondents describe being more intentional about
checking in with team members, something that before the pandemic occurred informally
when auditors were together in person.
“I would say the biggest thing is that everybody has to be more intentional about setting
aside the time to coach. Before, if someone had a question, they would just see if I was
in my office and if my door was open, and then they would stop in. And so, it is not as
easy to do that anymore… we all [partners, senior managers, managers, and seniors]
have to be more intentional about making sure that we are covering our bases by talking
to everyone… And honestly, from a morale perspective, I need to know that everyone
on my team has some connection points.” (A18, Senior Manager)

Yet, despite audit engagement leaders’ increased emphasis on connecting with
audit team members, auditors remain isolated as a result of working primarily from home,
resulting in lower motivation to remain engaged at work: “Even myself, I have started
attending counseling because I never leave the house. It is very hard to stay focused and to
stay motivated. Honestly, motivation is the hardest part, and it is a very common issue”
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(A16, Senior Manager). Additionally, despite greater intentionality on the part of audit
engagement leaders to remain connected with their team members, auditors express
difficultly engaging in relationship building activities.
“Some of the stuff that I love the most about the firm is that after work [I say] … "Hey,
we're going next door. We're getting lunch. Or we're going to go grab a beer. Come
join." That is lost in this virtual environment, unless you are intentional about it ... and
there is something that is less casual, less carefree about that when it is intentional. And
so, it either feels like more of a commitment and people don't want to do that, or it is
just hard to get people involved…. I think that lack of connection is challenging
because that is the best offset to the hard work.” (A13, Senior Manager)

In response, audit firms are providing auditors with additional resources (e.g.,
money for virtual events) and incentives including greater access to mental health support,
child-care support, and the availability of extended leave programs, which are all aimed at
helping to alleviate stress and facilitate better engagement at work: “We have always had
a complement of mental health services and childcare benefits as part of our benefit
package, but we have enhanced those as a result of the pandemic… that is likely something
that will continue after [the pandemic]. It will become part of the normal benefit package”
(A2, Partner). Some respondents also discuss the use of a COVID time charge code which
is an additional resource that auditors can assign time too for inefficient work hours, or in
the event that they are unable to work due to personal issues. This code is not allocated to
the client in that it does not impact the economics of the audit e.g.,
“They have a charge code that you can use if you were unable to get to your chargeable
hours, and you were not able to flex the time because of having a working spouse.
Personally, I did have to use that code some. It is crazy how much harder it is to hit
eight chargeable hours when you are spending a decent chunk of your day with your
kids, and just the mental shift back and forth from being a mom to being a senior
manager.” (A18, Senior Manager)
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Yet, in contrast to the improved incentives that focus on helping to ensure that auditors are
able to remain engaged at work, the COVID time charge code signals that firms recognize
that there may be inefficiencies that arise during the pandemic (e.g., needing to take care
of a sick relative). Thus, leaderships’ tone emphasizes that, “you take care of yourselves
and your people first. And then obviously, we support our clients and do what needs to be
done” (A5, Managing Director).
However, despite audit firms’ efforts to minimize auditors’ stress and facilitate
better collaboration and engagement at work, some respondents feel that firms could have
done more for their people at the height of the pandemic e.g., better use of firm resources
to incentivize and reward employees. Actions speak louder than words, and while
leadership’ tone continues to emphasize that their employees’ well-being is their top
priority, respondents note that audit firms could have done something more tangible during
the pandemic to embed a people-focused culture.
“I feel very supported by the people in my office, but I have honestly been a little bit
frustrated. It is easy to say, "Go do yoga." but I think that there are things that these
Big Four firms could do and none of them are doing, that could ease peoples' mental
health and still get an audit done. But I have not seen anything like that so far if I'm
being honest. I wish that the firms would do something more tangible for their people
during this [the pandemic] … We struggled to retain people before this, and I think we
are going to struggle even more [now]. I was really hoping for cutting back on busy
season hour requirements. Maybe instead of 55 [hours a week], it is 45. Something
tangible that you can say the firm is doing to make people feel better or to prioritize
them. I do think that my firm does a great job. I know that they care, but a lot of it is
talk. If you are not willing to give up the bottom line, then it is just talk.” (A16, Senior
Manager)

Overall, audit engagement leaders’ tone focuses on the support of their people, with
the goal of continuing to embed a collaborative audit team culture. Yet, despite audit
engagement leaders paying close attention toward facilitating interactions with and among
their team members, auditors continue to struggle with motivation and engagement.
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Additionally, while firms are providing auditors with additional incentives (e.g., childcare
benefits) and resources (e.g., COVID charge code, money for virtual events) in an effort to
alleviate their stress and better engage at work, respondents note that their firms could have
done more for their people during the pandemic e.g., additional monetary incentives,
reduction in expected work hours. Thus, while the consensus is that leadership continues
to emphasize a people focused culture, more needs to be done in the future in order to
embed and transmit that type of culture beyond leaderships’ tone.
4.2.2. Supporting the audit process
Much of what is learned by auditors is learned on the job, as opposed to in the
classroom or through formal training (Westermann et al. 2015). Auditors learn by
collaborating with more experienced auditors (i.e., an apprenticeship model), and by
observing the interactions among other audit team members and with the audit client
(Westermann et al. 2015; Dierynck, Kadous, and Peters 2021), in turn impacting the
learning culture of audit firms (Bauer et al. 2022; Alberti et al. 2022a). Thus, given that
there are fewer opportunities to engage in informal interactions and observations, auditors
are struggling to maintain and facilitate relationships with one another, something that
lends itself to knowledge transfer. One partner describes paying close attention to this issue
on her teams: “how do you get some of that [connectedness] back in this current remote
working environment” (A2). Further, while audit engagement leaders describe doing their
best to recreate an environment that facilitates on-the-job learning, virtual collaborations
impede on this process.
“The biggest change was internally not being together. That does change, not from my
world so much, but I would say more for the seniors and the managers who sit in the
audit room. And the staff that, just through osmosis, learn so many things. Listening to
conversations between, whether I come in or the senior manager comes in, or the
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manager sits there and talks to the senior and just asks questions. So, there was
definitely something lost.” (A11, Partner)

In response, all respondents convey a tone that focuses on trying to facilitate virtual
learning opportunities throughout the audit process. In a discussion about the
communication being had with audit team members, one audit manager notes that, “I think
that the change has been that we have to be a lot more intentional” (A17). This
intentionality includes making sure that engagement leaders are thinking critically about
how best to involve audit team members.
“A conversation between myself and the manager that is overheard by the senior is a
learning experience for them. But I don't necessarily have to be purposeful about that.
It is happening. Now [during the pandemic] I need to really be thinking about what is
the experience that those staff auditors are getting at this point, and how do I give them
a little bit more of that interaction during the course of any day, week, or month as they
go through [the audit process]. It is really being purposeful about those types of
interactions to make sure that they [staff auditors] get as much of that [on-the-job
learning] as possible. It is a little bit less natural…” (A6, Partner)

Thus, while engagement leaders continue to focus on facilitating learning opportunities on
their audit engagements through more intentional communication and collaboration, a few
respondents acknowledge that the current environment is not conducive to the effective
coaching of staff auditors in the testing of complex audit areas. Thus, those areas are being
tested by a more experienced auditor in order to ensure that high quality audit outcomes
are achieved.
“If we were not working from home but there were still things going on creating this
additional work, it might be something that we would give to a senior or an experienced
staff. Because of the environment that we are in [working remotely], I think managers
and senior managers are holding on tight to it [higher risk audit areas] as much as they
can. Just to keep that, again, bring that tackler and blocker on. This is not going to be
a great environment to coach you on this brand new, complex, risky area.” (A17,
Manager)
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As a result, audit engagement leaders express a tone of significant concern in
relation to the changing learning culture of their firm, noting that even with the measures
that they are taking to facilitate within-team collaboration throughout the pandemic (e.g.,
being more intentional with their communication to staff auditors), auditors are likely not
receiving the same type of on-the-job training that they would have received in person.
Further, some engagement leaders express concern that the fewer learning opportunities
that are occurring virtually may result in long-term developmental consequences for staff
auditors: “We have to make sure that we don't leave a generation behind” (A8, Partner).
Another partner goes on to note that: “If we under-train people, say, for the next six months
or a year or what have you, there will be ramifications of that over a much longer time”
(A3). Thus, being together in person is necessary to some extent to embed the desired onthe-job learning culture, particularly among incoming auditors: “Because it is not fair to a
first- or second-year auditor to be basically swimming in an ocean with big waves, without
a life raft. That will continue to happen, time and time again, if we don’t have a culture, if
we don’t have face-to-face meetings” (A9, Partner).
Yet, workplace flexibility is likely going to remain to some extent in the future, a
sentiment that has been recently echoed by several audit firms (Deloitte 2021;
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2021). Additionally, such flexibility results in a greater openness
towards new ways of conducting the audit. While prior research finds that the learning
culture of audit firms encourages auditors to “acquire and use knowledge from sources
outside of the engagement team,” which includes the use of electronic support systems,
specialists, and auditors residing in other office locations (Alberti et al. 2022a, 30); auditors
rely on leaderships’ tone in order to establish team norms that encourage the use of such
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resources (Dowling 2009; Lin and Fan 2011). While many of these audit resources existed
before the pandemic (e.g., data analysis tools like Tableau), a majority of engagement
leaders are embracing the use of additional resources in order to conduct the audit process
virtually, signaling a more innovative culture. For example, one audit partner
acknowledges that embracing the use of technology has been an adjustment: “And trust
me, I like the way I used to do things. No one likes change but we have to” (A11). Yet he
goes on to say that he will continue to use this technology in the future: “I still think the
onus on technology will continue. we are going to get better when it comes to technology…
people don't want... to come out of school and be data entry people anymore.”
Relatedly, firms’ leadership, along with audit engagement leaders, emphasize a
tone that focuses on encouraging auditors to leverage resources outside of the immediate
audit engagement team in order to conduct a high-quality audit. Prior research finds that
while audit firm culture encourages the use of resources outside of the immediate audit
engagement team (Alberti et al. 2022a), auditors’ desire to maintain control of the audit
process can impede on their ability to trust others outside of the immediate audit team (e.g.,
specialists; Griffith 2020). However, given respondents’ desire to maintain high audit
quality, many emphasize a greater willingness to consult with specialists throughout the
audit process: “There has been a lot more discussion, specifically on my teams…about
reaching out to internal specialists, national office and things like that, to talk through
things that maybe we would not have done in the past” (A10, Senior Manager). This in turn
facilitates a more inclusive learning culture whereby auditors benefit from knowledge
sharing that occurs with members outside of the immediate audit team e.g., emphasizing a
culture of consultations with specialists to assist auditors with the testing of more complex
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audit areas.
Further, beyond the use of specialists, auditors benefit from knowledge sharing that
occurs among auditors across different geographical locations (Downey and Westermann
2021). Prior research finds that increased knowledge sharing across offices improves audit
quality (Seavey, Imhof, and Westfall 2018; Beck, Gunn, and Hallman 2019). Thus,
auditors’ ability to engage in the audit process virtually provides some evidence that the
geographical distance between offices is less of a constraint of the knowledge sharing
process. Thus, some audit engagement leaders emphasize an openness to the use of
resources from other firm office locations.
“There has been a lot more resource sharing… on my biggest job, we now have two
auditors from another city that are helping out and have large roles. We also have
people that are working on jobs in another office because they are very short on staff.
I think there is a lot more sharing happening than there was before [the pandemic].”
(A16, Senior Manager)

Yet, a greater emphasis on the use of human resources outside of the immediate audit team
is likely to further contribute to a lack of cohesion among local audit team members
because the geographical boundary of that team is blurred. Thus, such geographical
dispersion among audit team members can lend to a focus on the audit task as opposed to
the audit team, something that could present long-term consequences (e.g., lower team
commitment).
Overall, the pandemic makes salient the need for audit firms to continue to pay
close attention to the balance of greater workplace flexibility in the future. On the one hand,
engaging in a remote audit may have negative consequences, such as the inability to
facilitate an effective on-the-job learning culture. On the other hand, the benefits derived
from greater virtual collaboration that is occurring between auditors and resources outside
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of the immediate audit team (e.g., a culture of consultation with specialists) or audit office
(e.g., auditors from other office locations) may lend itself to a more inclusive learning
culture going forward. Yet, balancing these two cultural changes is likely important in
ensuring that audit team members continue to feel valued, and connected with their teams
to deliver high audit quality.
5. LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES TO AUDIT FIRM CULTURE
While this study was conducted in the midst of the pandemic, audit engagement
leaders describe numerous changes to existing cultural embedding mechanisms that they
believe will persist well into the future. As such, in this section, we seek to draw out the
pandemic’s potential long-term consequences on audit firm culture to help to inform
practice and offer opportunities for future research.
First, while audit engagement leaders express a change in tone as it relates to the
greater acceptance of workplace flexibility (e.g., working from home), they do so with
caution. The pandemic has shown that auditors are able to work effectively from remote
locations, challenging prior assumptions that doing so would result in negative
consequences such as reduced audit quality. Thus, audit firm culture is likely to embrace
at least some level of workplace flexibility well into the future, as has recently been
announced by PricewaterhouseCoopers (McCabe 2021) and other firms. Yet, audit
engagement leaders express concern regarding potential unintended consequences of such
flexibility, including the loss of within-team collaboration, and concern about the
effectiveness of a virtual on-the-job learning culture. Additionally, the reduced barriers
between work and home make it more difficult for auditors to disconnect, embedding an
undesired “continuous work” culture, which results in increased feelings of burnout. The
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pandemic gave rise to an increase in employees who elected to voluntarily leave their jobs
(termed as “the great resignation” or “the bit quit”; Cohen 2021). Thus, organizations,
including audit firms, will need to pay close attention to the post-pandemic work practices,
including workplace flexibility, that result in the attraction and retention of skilled
employees.
Additionally, given that auditors are able to effectively engage in the audit process
while working remotely, at least without initial concern of a negative impact to audit
quality, audit engagement leaders note a greater willingness to use audit resources from
other geographical locations to assist with future audits. This includes a greater willingness
to engage specialists as a result of it being easier to do so virtually e.g., there is no longer
the need to incur travel costs for specialists. This is likely to lend itself to a more inclusive
learning culture in the future, whereby audit firms benefit from greater knowledge sharing
occurring across geographical distances, something that prior research finds has not always
been effectively done within audit firms (Alberti et al. 2022a). Yet, engagement leaders
need to continue to pay close attention to the balance of using resources outside of the
immediate audit team, ensuring that team members continue to feel connected to one
another. Without team cohesion, auditing is likely to become more focused on the audit
task, as opposed to the audit team, which may in turn have consequences such a greater
turnover. As a result of the described potential long-term consequences to audit firm
culture, there are ample opportunities for future research to examine the impact that these
changes are having (will have) on auditors’ judgments and decisions, and ultimately audit
quality. We summarize future research opportunities within Table 2.3, and provide a
detailed discussion of them within Appendix G.
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[Insert Table 2.3: Future Research Opportunities Here]
6. CONCLUSION
This study uses semi-structured interviews with 18 highly experienced audit
engagement leaders to examine current and changing audit firm culture, as it is conveyed
through audit engagement leaders’ experiences auditing during the pandemic. We find that
respondents express concern about consequences arising from not being together face-toface as a team. While the pandemic has led to innovation across the auditing process (e.g.,
greater use of technology, increased use of resources from dispersed geographical
locations), working remotely makes it more challenging for auditors to build and maintain
relationships with one another. Thus, while respondents describe placing emphasis on the
facilitation of a collaborative firm culture, the pandemic has impacted critical mechanisms
used to embed and transmit such culture.
Additionally, in an attempt to maintain audit quality and minimize potential
affective consequences such as increased stress and lower employee engagement,
engagement leaders describe paying close attention to supporting their people and audit
processes, in part through an increased focus on relational systems (e.g., communication).
Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that working remotely makes it more difficult to
facilitate the informal interactions that lead to both socialization and learning opportunities.
Thus, moving forward, audit firms need to carefully consider the right level of workplace
flexibility which will result in the proper balance of on-the-job learning, improved access
to knowledge and expertise from other office locations, and the need to foster within-team
collaboration.
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This study makes important contributions to both research and practice.
Specifically, we contribute to research on organizational and audit firm culture by
examining the cultural embedding mechanisms that leadership places emphasis on during
a period of immense disruption, and how organizational culture is changing in response.
Using Schein (2017)’s theoretical model, reinforced by the IAASB (2014), we uncover the
organizational manifestations of culture that audit engagement leaders describe in their
response to the challenges and changes resulting from the pandemic, thereby providing
early insight into the pandemic’s impact on audit firm culture. Further, we contribute to
existing research on organizational culture. Specifically, while prior research examines
how crisis can disrupt organizational culture (Schein 2017; Bundy et al. 2017), we find that
the pandemic has weakened the collaborative culture of audit firms that existed before the
pandemic despite audit engagement leaders’ attempt to maintain such culture.
Finally, we offer audit practitioners an evaluation of the current state of audit firm
culture. We identify the cultural embedding mechanisms that audit engagement leaders are
placing emphasis on during the pandemic (e.g., use of additional firm resources such as
technology tools and specialists), and those that the firm and its leaders would benefit from
paying closer attention to in the future (e.g., putting forth greater incentives and resources
that make clear that the firm’s culture is oriented toward the well-being and support of its
people). Further, the PCAOB (Munter 2017) and IAASB (2014) continue to emphasize the
need for audit firms to embed and transmit a culture that is oriented toward audit quality.
Thus, this research provides evidence regarding how firms are effectively doing so in light
of immense disruption.
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There are several limitations of this study that give rise to opportunities for future
research. This study uses semi-structured interviews with highly experienced audit
engagement leaders. While interviews allow for greater depth and a rich dataset, this
approach has inherent limitations in that it limits our ability to generalize results more
broadly (Malsch and Salterio 2016; Power and Gendron 2015). While interviews were
conducted with audit engagement leaders from both Big 4 firms and large international
firms, the goal of this study is not to empirically generalize the results to all firms and all
experience levels within those firms. As a result, future research could examine the impact
of the pandemic on audit firm culture from the perspective of other hierarchical levels
within the audit team e.g., audit staff and audit seniors. In addition, we capture
interviewees’ perspective on the pandemic during the latter half of 2020. It is likely that
such perspective may continue to evolve later in the pandemic, or post-pandemic. While
we elected to interview participants during this time to capture their perspectives on the
pandemic’s impact on audit firm culture in the midst of planning for the December 31st
2020 year end audits, future research can complement this study by examining if and how
these findings continue to evolve in the future.
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FIGURE 2.1
Cultural Embedding Mechanisms (adapted from Schein 2017, IAASB 2014, and Alberti et al. 2022)

Tone at the Top
• What leaders pay attention to,
measure, and control
• How leaders react to crisis

Culture of Consultation
• Promotion of a culture of
consultation on complex issues

Audit Firm
Culture

Allocation of Resources
• Allocation of resources, taking
into consideration financial
conditions

Training and
Development
• Deliberate role modeling,
teaching, and coaching
• Formal training methods

Incentives and Rewards
• Criteria used to allocate monetary
rewards and make promotional
decisions
• Availability of incentives, such as
employee benefits
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TABLE 2.1
Participant Demographics (n = 18)
n
Gender
Male
Female
Total

Percent of the
Total Sample

11
7
18

61%
39%
100%

Years of Experience
5-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years
Over 20 years
Total

7
6
1
4
18

39%
33%
6%
22%
100%

Firm Type
Big-4
Large International Firm
Total

12
6
18

67%
33%
100%

6
4
3
2
1
1

33%
22%
17%
11%
6%
6%

1
18

6%
100%

Primary Industry
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Healthcare and Life Sciences
Technology, Software, Media, and Telecom
Manufacturing
Construction
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas,
and Sanitary Services
Technology and Life Sciences
Total
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TABLE 2.2
Interview Themes
Panel A: Themes Related to RQ1 – The greatest challenge that audit engagement leaders
are facing during the pandemic that impacts audit firm culture.
Theme
Number of Participants Who
Mention Theme
Within team collaboration – difficulty collaborating and
18
working together with other audit team members.
Panel B: Themes Related to RQ2 – Audit engagement leaders’ tone in response to the
pandemic and its impact on cultural embedding mechanisms.
Theme
Number of
Cultural
Participants
Embedding
Who Mention
Mechanisms
Theme
Impacted
An emphasis on maintaining audit quality – Audit
Tone
16
engagement leaders continue to focus on ensuring
high audit quality, despite the arising challenges
and changes resulting from the pandemic.
Embedding a people focused culture
Emphasis on the importance of communicating and
checking in with audit team members
Emphasis on existing employee benefits, as well as
providing auditors with additional employee
benefits (e.g., childcare support)
Creation of a COVID-19 charge code that
employees can allocate inefficient work hours too
Insufficient additional incentives and rewards to
support a tone at top that emphasizes the value of
the firm’s people
Facilitating an effective learning culture

13

Tone

11

Tone
Incentives/rewards

4

Tone
Resource allocation
Tone
Incentives/rewards

Emphasis on the importance of facilitating on-thejob learning opportunities virtually, doing so by
having frequent check-ins with audit team
members; i.e., facilitating collaboration
Concern about the long-term development of staff
auditors, particularly new staff

18

Tone
Training/developme
nt

5

Embracing the use of additional firm resources
throughout the audit process (e.g., electronic
support systems, checklists)
Willingness to engage in consultations with
specialists

17

Tone
Training/developme
nt
Tone
Resource allocation

Willingness to use human resources from other
office locations (including use of the firm's
delivery services)

5
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6

14

Tone
Culture of
consultation
Tone
Resource Allocation

TABLE 2.3
Future Research Opportunities
Finding
Audit engagement leaders express
greater acceptance of workplace
flexibility now and in the future
(e.g., more opportunities to work
from home).

Audit engagement leaders
continue to emphasize the
importance of facilitating an
effective learning culture. They
express concern regarding the
effectiveness of the learning and
development that new staff
auditors are receiving during the
pandemic

While audit firms continue to
embed a people focused culture,
audit engagement leaders express
some concern that the firms need
to continue to do more for their
people in order to be able to
attract and retain high performing
individuals.

Future Research Opportunities
How does the variation in remote work practices (e.g.,
fully remote vs. hybrid work model) impact audit team
work processes (e.g., knowledge sharing), and in turn
auditors’ judgments and decisions?
What audit processes are most affected when completed
virtually as compared to face-to-face? For example, are
there some audit processes like the testing of complex
accounting estimates or inventory observations that result
in lower quality outcomes when they are done virtually as
compared to face-to-face?
What impact is greater workplace flexibility having on the
use of resources outside of the central audit team? For
example, are auditor more willing to use auditors from
other firm office locations, and if so, how does the use of
those resources impact audit quality?
Are auditors’ judgments and decisions negatively
impacted by variation in the way in which they engage in
on-the-job learning? For example, when supervisors coach
a staff auditor on how to conduct an audit testing
procedure virtually as compared to face-to-face, how is
the quality of that testing impacted?
What, if any, resources (e.g., technology tools, coaching
guidance) can firms provide to auditors to help to facilitate
effective virtual trainings?
What are the long-term learning and development
consequences for staff auditors, arising from the
pandemic? Are staff auditors that started with the firm
during the pandemic undertrained as compared to those
that will start with the firm in post-pandemic periods?
Are there additional incentives or resources that firms can
provide to employees to improve work productivity, and
reduce turnover intentions?
How does auditors’ mental health and wellbeing impact
decision quality? What can firms do to mitigate the
consequences of any negative effects?
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APPENDIX D

Pre-Interview Questionnaire

Thank you for participating in our research study. We appreciate you taking the time to
complete this pre-interview survey. Your candid responses are vital to helping us learn
about the present impact of COVID-19 (hereafter referred to as “the pandemic”) on
Public Accounting Firms.
The pandemic referred to within this study relates to the virus that was first identified in
Wuhan, China in December 2019, and spread to the United States in early 2020.
To help guide us during the interview, we request that you answer the following
questions regarding your background and general views about the pandemic.
Following is information on the backgrounds of the research team.
Cristina T. Alberti (formerly Thomas), CPA, has over six years of audit experience. She
previously worked at a large public accounting firm both in Hartford, CT and Boston,
MA. She is currently pursuing her PhD in Accounting at Bentley University. This
research constitutes one part of her dissertation.
Jay C. Thibodeau is the Director of PhD Programs and the Rae D. Anderson Professor of
Accountancy at Bentley University. Dr. Thibodeau is a co-author of two books and he
has written over sixty articles and book chapters for both academics and practitioners. Dr.
Thibodeau served as the President of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting
Association in 2014/2015.
If you have questions, please contact us by phone or email:
Cristina Alberti [redacted]
Jay Thibodeau [redacted]
Bentley University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) has reviewed and finalized
approval related to this study. The IRB determined that this study fulfills the human
research subject protections obligations required by state and federal law and university
policies. The records of this study will be kept private. In any sort of report that we might
publish based on this study, we will not include any information that will make it possible
to identify a subject. Research records will be stored securely and only the research team
will have access to the records. If you have any questions, concerns, or reports regarding
your rights as a participant of research, please contact us at calberti@bentley.edu or
contact Susan Richman, Bentley's IRB Chair at srichman@bentley.edu.
Assigned Participant Code (in the email with the link to the survey): ________________
1. Gender (circle one that applies):
• Female
• Male
• Prefer to self describe as _______
• Prefer not to answer
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2.
3.
4.
5.

Current title (e.g., partner, director, manager): _____________
Primary office location (e.g., Boston, MA) _____________
Primary line of service that you serve (e.g., audit, tax, advisory)? _____________
Number of years serving in your current role (e.g., number of years serving as
partner): _______
6. Total number of years of experience: _____________
7. Educational Background (e.g., degrees; circle all that apply):
• Bachelor’s Degree
• Coursework Beyond Bachelor’s Degree
• Master’s Degree
• Coursework Beyond Master’s Degree
• Other _____________
8. Professional Certifications (circle all that apply):
• Certified Internal Auditor
• Certified Public Accountant
• Certified Information Systems Auditor
• Certified Management Accountant
• Certified Financial Planner
• Other _____________
9. Your primary industry specialization:
• Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing
• Mining
• Construction
• Manufacturing
• Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services
• Wholesale Trade
• Retail Trade
• Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
• Services
• Government/Nonprofit
• Other _____________
10. Over the past two years, what is the approximate percentage of your time spent on
clients that are (amounts entered should total 100%):
Accelerated filers:
____________________
Non-accelerated filers:
____________________
Privately held for-profit:

____________________

Government/nonprofit:

____________________

Other:

____________________

Total:

_______100%________
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11. If you are an auditor, have you completed a year-end busy season for one or more
of your clients during the pandemic?
• Yes
• No
• Other _____________
12. Describe the three greatest challenges that your firm is experiencing as a result of
the pandemic?
13. How are these challenges impacting you in your current role (e.g., partner,
manager) at the firm?
14. In what ways has your firm’s leadership responded to the pandemic?
15. How has the pandemic impacted audit risk on your engagements?
16. How has the pandemic impacted audit quality on your engagements?
17. What are the changes that your firm has made during the Pandemic that you expect
to continue after the pandemic?
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APPENDIX E
Interview Instrument

1. Can you provide a description of your role as a [insert level of interviewee (e.g.,
partner, senior manager, manager)] in the firm?
2. In the pre-interview questionnaire, we asked you to think about what you perceive
to be the three greatest challenge that your firm is experiencing as a result of the
pandemic?
a. Could you first describe what those challenges are?
b. How have these challenges impacted you in your role of [insert level of
interviewee (e.g., partner, senior manager, manager)]?
c. How have these challenges impacted how you manage your engagement
teams?
d. How have these challenges impacted how you manage current or
perspective clients?
e. Were there any firm level policies, processes, and/or practices that existed
before the pandemic that have impacted how you have managed these
challenges?
f. Are there any changes that have been made to firm level policies, processes,
and/or practices that have impacted how you have managed these
challenges?
g. Have there been other things that the firm, your office, your teams, or you
yourself have done to try to better manage these challenges?
3. In the pre-interview questionnaire, we asked you to think about in what way your
firm’s leadership has responded to the pandemic.
a. Can you first describe leaderships overall response to the pandemic?
b. Has your firm’s leadership helped you successfully navigate challenges
experienced during the pandemic?
c. Has your firm’s leadership contributed to the challenges that you have
experienced during the pandemic?
4. In the pre-interview questionnaire, we asked you to think about how the pandemic
has impacted audit risk and audit quality on your engagements?
a. Can you first discuss whether audit risk on your engagements has changed
during the pandemic?
b. Has fraud risk on your engagements changed during the pandemic?
c. Has audit quality on your engagements changed during the pandemic?
5. In the pre-interview questionnaire, we asked you to think about whether any of the
changes that your firm has made during the pandemic will continue after the
pandemic?
6. Is there anything else that you would like to share about the impact that the
pandemic has had on your firm?
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Panel A – Challenges Coding Scheme
First Level Code
Coding Scheme
Within team
collaboration

APPENDIX F
First-Level Coding Scheme
Definition

Coaching, learning
and development,
communication
challenges, meeting
fatigue, socialization
Working remotely,
client communication
and socialization

Challenges working with others in their firm. Such challenges include things
like difficulty collaborating with other audit team members, including
difficulties in engaging in on-the-job learning (i.e., learning by doing, the
apprenticeship model).

Business development

New clients, new
business with existing
clients

Difficulty perusing new clients as a result of limited opportunities to interact
socially. Difficulty staying connected with existing clients in a way that gives
rise to new business opportunities.

Internship experience

Virtual internships,
interns

Difficulty recreating the internship experience virtually.

Onboarding new staff

New hires, new staff,
onboarding, hiring

Difficulty acclimating new staff into the audit team environment virtually.

Inefficiencies and
Timing

Inefficiencies and
timing

Potential inefficiencies resulting from additional review, client delays, and the
need for more people included on calls. Timing challenges resulting from
changes in audit procedures and how the audit work is being completed.

Inability to disconnect

Combination of home
and office, vacations

Flexibility

Working remotely,
flexible

Challenges brought on by individual's home and office being in the same
location, resulting in difficulties disconnecting. In addition, the inability to
disconnect during vacation time or not taking vacation at all due to canceled
travel plans.
Challenges arising from the flexibility that is brought about due to working
remotely; e.g., having to manage childcare responsibilities while also working

Client collaboration

Challenges working with the client. Such challenges include things like
difficulty remaining connected with the client both formally and informally.
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Panel B - Cultural Embedding Mechanisms Coding Scheme
First Level Code
Coding Scheme
Definition
Tone at the top
Tone, leaders,
The governance arrangements that establish the appropriate “tone at the top”
leadership
which is further reinforced through audit engagement team leaders’ reaction
and response to critical incidents and crises. Such governance arrangements
include, but are not limited to, firm leaderships’ messaging on changing
auditing practices and audit risks (e.g., “webcasts,” “thought leadership’), as
well as messaging on overall firm performance.
Incentives/rewards
Incentive, reward,
The criteria through which the firm and its leaders allocate rewards and
promote, bonus, pay,
promote auditors following the measurement of their performance.
benefits, raise
Additionally, access to incentives such as employee health and well-being
benefits.
Training/development
Train, learn, develop,
How the firm and its leaders train and develop auditors through deliberate role
coach, teach, role
modeling, teaching and coaching. As well as more formalized training
model
methods.
Allocation of resources Resource, budget, time The criteria through which the firm and its leaders allocate resources (e.g.,
staffing decisions), taking into consideration financial pressures (e.g., budget
and time pressures). This includes consideration of how (e.g., who is
performing the audit work) and when (e.g., the timing of the audit work)
resources are allocated within the audit team.
Culture of consultation Consultation, national, How the firm and its leaders promote a culture of consultation on difficult
specialist
issues.
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APPENDIX G
Future Research Opportunities
First, given the greater acceptance of workplace flexibility, there is likely to be
some variation with regard to how audit teams work together in the future. For example,
some teams may elect to return to predominately face-to-face working environments postpandemic, whereas other teams may elect to engage in some variation of in-person and
remote work. Thus, future research should examine what mix of workplace flexibility
among audit teams lends itself to high quality outcomes. Relatedly, are there some audit
processes that are best performed in-person as opposed to virtually? For example, does the
testing of accounting estimates in person result in greater professional skepticism, and in
turn, higher quality judgments and decisions?
Second, audit engagement leaders continue to emphasize the importance of
facilitating an effective learning culture. This includes paying close attention to on-the-job
learning opportunities, and engaging in the use of resources outside of their immediate
audit team in order to facilitate the audit process. Thus, there are ample opportunities for
future research to continue to examine how these processes evolve in the future. For
example, are there effective on-the-job learning processes that can be done virtually as
opposed to face-to-face? Are there additional resources that firms can provide to auditors
to assist them in the execution of virtual learning? Relatedly, what is the long-term impact
on staff auditors learning and development as a result of the virtually training received
during the pandemic; i.e., is there a learning gaps among new staff auditors?
Third, audit engagement leaders continue to focus on the wellbeing and social
support of their people, and firms are providing auditors additional incentives in an attempt
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to mitigate feelings of stress and anxiety (e.g., increased well-being support systems). Yet,
respondents express concern that firms’ need to do more in order to continue to be able to
attract and retain high performing individuals. Thus, future research should examine what
additional firm incentives and resources can help to improve work productivity, and reduce
turnover intentions, both of which come at a cost to firms. Additionally, to date there is
limited research that examines the impact that mental health has on the quality of audit
outcomes. Thus, future research can examine this, as well as identify what can firms do to
mitigate identified negative consequences.
Taken together, audit engagement leaders describe numerous ways in which the
pandemic is impacting audit firm culture both now, and in the future, giving rise to ample
future research opportunities as are described within.

128

Part III: PCAOB Inspection Results: Insights into Audit Quality During COVID-19
Cristina T. Alberti
Bentley University
calberti@bentley.edu

129

1. INTRODUCTION
COVID-19 is disrupting pre-existing audit practices, both formal (e.g., inventory
observation audit procedures) and informal (e.g., coaching and development), resulting in
the need for swift changes across the audit process (Alberti, Thibodeau, and Zhou 2022b;
Luo and Malsch 2020). In response, auditors are relying more on advanced technologies,
such as video conferencing, to help overcome arising challenges (Alberti et al. 2022b).
Early qualitative research finds that such improvisations only partially mitigate disruption
to the audit process (Luo and Malsch 2020). Yet, to date, there is limited evidence on
COVID-19’s impact on audit quality. Thus, the purpose of this study is to analyze Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports for audits completed
during 2018-2020, inclusive of the initial year impacted by COVID-19 (i.e., 2020), to shed
light on this important matter.
A key external stakeholder in the assessment of audit quality, is the audit
profession’s regulator, the PCAOB. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 established
the PCAOB, providing the organization with regulatory power over public accounting
firms. One of the PCAOB’s responsibilities is the annual inspection of audits of publiclytraded companies. These inspections focus on the audit firm’s compliance with PCAOB
auditing standards and other applicable regulatory and professional requirements (PCAOB
2022). Additionally, the PCAOB’s inspection process includes a review of audit work
papers, as well as interviews with audit engagement personal (PCAOB 2022). These
reviews allow for an in-depth, independent, assessment of the audit process. Further, during
the PCAOB’s inspection, they identify a broad range of deficiencies from those that result
in the restatement of the company’s financial statements and related audit opinion, to those
that arise from insufficient audit documentation. Thus, the inspection report that is made
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publicly available is a detailed assessment of the quality of the audit process, and allows
for a “systematic means” to assess potential audit quality implications (Church and
Shefchik 2012, 44). Additionally, despite disruptions arising from the COVID-19
pandemic, the PCAOB continues to engage in inspections virtually. 37
While the effectiveness of the PCAOB’s inspection process is something that
continues to be debated among accounting academics and audit professional alike, these
inspections do allow for an independent assessment of the quality of the audit process, and
thus can serve as a measure of audit quality. 38 Further, there is evidence to suggest that
inspection findings change firm behavior (Gramling, Krishnan, and Zhang 2011; Aobdia
2018), and are associated with other measures of audit quality (Gunny and Zhang 2013).
Yet, despite this, there is limited research that examines the content of recent PCAOB
inspection reports, and the related implications for audit quality (e.g., see Gramling et al.
2011; Church and Shefchik 2012; Gunny and Zhang 2013; Mascha, Lamboy-Ruiz, and
Janvrin 2018 for research in this area).
Additionally, as a result of COVID-19’s disruption to public accounting firms, and
more specifically, to parts of the audit process that, before COVID-19, had primarily been
performed in-person (e.g., on-the-job learning; Westermann et al. 2015); auditors are
having to improvise existing auditing procedures (Luo and Malsch 2020), inclusive of
informal team collaboration practices (Alberti et al. 2022b). At present, the impact of these
changes on audit quality is unknown, with early evidence finding differences in audit
quality, but only among those companies that took advantage of the SEC’s 45-day filing

The PCAOB granted audit firms a 45-day relief period from inspections. As a result, inspections were
paused beginning on March 23, 2020 and resumed on May 11, 2020 (PCAOB 2020a).
38
For a discussion of how auditors experience the inspection process, including unintended consequences,
see Westermann, Cohen, and Trompeter (2019).
37
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extension for the 2020 annual reports (Morris, Hoitash, and Hoitash 2022). Thus, it is
unclear what impact, if any, COVID-19 is having on audit quality, and whether that impact
varies across firm size (i.e., Big 4 firms compared to next-tier firms).
On the one hand, changes to the audit process during COVID-19 may result in
lower audit quality given that auditors are having to respond quickly, with limited guidance
from external regulators regarding the appropriateness of changes to existing practices.
Further, COVID-19 is not only impacting how auditors conduct the audit (e.g., how they
engage in remote inventory observations), but it is also affecting business operations, and
in turn, related audit risks. For example, given the rise in pressure on management to
maintain business performance, and the opportunity to engage in fraud as a result of
weakened and/or changing internal financial reporting control processes, there may be an
increase in the risk of fraud (Doher and Mayes 2020). Such changes to existing audit risks,
if not appropriately identified and responded to by auditors, can negatively impact audit
quality. In contrast, auditors are increasingly aware that investors and regulators are paying
close attention to their response during this time, resulting in additional time being spent
to ensure that high audit quality is maintained (Alberti et al. 2022b). Evidence from
interviews conducted with both U.S. and Chinese experienced auditors reinforces this
sentiment, with a majority of interviewees indicating that they do not perceive that COVID19 is negatively impacting audit quality (Alberti et al. 2022b; Luo and Malsch 2020).
Thus, using the PCAOB inspection findings as a proxy for audit quality, I examine
changes in the nature, severity, and affected audit area of inspection deficiencies for audits
performed during the three-year period from 2018-2020, inclusive of the initial year of
COVID-19’s impact (2020). More specifically, I analyze inspection reports made publicly
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available from 2020-2022 for audit inspection years 2018-2020 39, comprising a total of 22
reports across the top eight largest audit firms: Deloitte, Ernst & Young (EY), KPMG,
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Grant Thornton (GT), BDO, RSM, and Crowe Howath. 40
Drawing on prior literature that has evaluated the content of PCAOB inspection reports
(e.g., Mascha et al. 2018; Church and Shefchik 2012), I code each deficiency based on its
severity (e.g., restatement, error, and insufficient testing), nature (i.e., impacted auditing
standard (AS); e.g., using the work of specialists, AS1210), and affected audit area (e.g.,
revenue, fair-value (FV) measurement, and fraud). I summarize the results for each coding
category, analyzing the data across inspection period (2018-2020) and firm size (i.e., Big
4 vs. next-tier firms).
I find that in total, the PCAOB reviewed 884 audits of individual issuers (hereafter
referred to as audits) across the three-year period, of which 201 audits have at least one
deficiency; i.e., 23 percent of audits reviewed have at least one inspection finding. In
examining the trend in inspection findings by year, I fail to observe any changes in audit
quality from 2018 to 2019 based on the total number and proportion of deficiencies.
However, consistent with an improvement in audit quality, both the total number of
deficiencies, as well as the proportion of deficiencies relative to the total number of audits
reviewed, declines from 2019 to 2020. This decrease is driven by a decline in the average
number of deficiencies per audit (approximately one less deficiency per issuer) for Big 4

I examine the PCAOB inspection reports for audits conducted during 2018, 2019 and 2020 to allow for a
comparison across the three-year period. I do so with the intent of identifying changes in deficiencies yearover-year, lending insight into COVID-19’s impact on audit quality. Additionally, there is a lag between
when the audit is performed and when the PCAOB conducts its inspection. For example, once selected by
the PCAOB, an audit performed during 2018 is typically reviewed by the PCAOB during 2019. However,
the results of that inspection are not made publicly available until the following year; 2020.
40
As of the date of the current version of this paper, the inspection reports for the 2020-year ends reviews of
RSM and Crowe Howath, are not yet publicly available. As such, they are not included in my population of
firms for the 2020 inspection period.
39
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firms, although the difference is not significant. Examining the severity of the deficiencies,
I find some, albeit limited, evidence of a decline in audit quality from 2018 to 2019 driven
by a statistically significant increase in the proportion of severe material weakness
deficiencies from 2018 to 2019. In contrast, when comparing 2019 (pre-COVID-19) to
2020 (COVID-19), I find a significant decline in the proportion of material weakness
deficiencies, suggesting an improvement in audit quality. However, in the aggregate, a
majority of the deficiencies received across all three-years, and for both Big 4 firms and
next-tier firms, are less severe in nature (e.g., failing to performing a specific testing
procedure and/or insufficient testing), suggesting overall high audit quality.
Finally, when examining the nature and the affected audit area of deficiencies, I
observe a downward trend in the proportion of business combination deficiencies from
2018 to 2020. Additionally, I observe a downward trend in the proportion of deficiencies
from 2019 to 2020 for FV measurement and accounting estimates. Surprisingly, there were
no deficiencies in 2020 impacting auditors’ assessment of, and response to, issuers’ going
concern and fraud risk. This is despite the PCAOB’s initial assessment that these specific
audit areas may result in higher risks due to the impact of COVID-19 (PCAOB 2020c),
thus signaling that firms heeded to these concerns. Further, Big 4 firms receive significantly
fewer deficiencies impacting the auditing of internal controls over revenue, as compared
to next-tier firms, implying higher audit quality.
Overall, I find mixed evidence regarding changes in audit quality across the threeyear period, and between Big 4 firms and next-tier firms. My analysis does provide some
evidence that despite COVID-19’s disruption, the majority of deficiencies continue to be
less severe in nature. In contrast, I find that audit firms continue to experience challenges

134

auditing revenue and fair value measurements. More specifically, among these audit areas,
I find that the most common types of deficiencies relate to insufficient substantive testing
procedures (i.e., insufficient testing of underlying data used in the testing of an
account/transaction), and internal controls testing (i.e., insufficient testing of the design
and/or operating eﬀectiveness of controls). Thus, a continued emphasis on these audit areas
is needed in order to support higher audit quality in the future. Surprisingly, there are far
fewer deficiencies across these audit areas that impact other procedures such as the use of
the work of specialists (e.g., Hux 2017; Bauer and Estep 2019; Griffith 2020).
This study contributes to both research and practice. First, given the pervasive
impact that COVID-19 is having on the audit process (Alberti et al. 2022b; Luo and Malsch
2020; Bauer et al. 2022), this study contributes to early research on its impact on audit
quality. At the time of this writing, this is the first textual analysis of recent PCAOB
inspection findings, inclusive of the initial year of COVID-19’s impact. Second, I
contribute to existing auditing research by examining a less widely used measure of audit
quality; i.e., PCAOB inspection deficiencies. Third, while I do not find systematic evidence
of differences in audit quality across the three-year period or between Big 4 firms and nexttier firms, I contribute to practice by providing a summary of the severity, nature, and
affected audit area of the most commonly identified audit deficiencies across the eight
largest audit firms. Finally, I find some evidence that the additional time and effort exerted
by auditors during COVID-19 seems effective, as is observed in the downward trend in the
proportion of severe deficiencies from 2019 to 2020, as well as in the lack of deficiencies
found among audit areas expected to be impacted by COVID-19; i.e., the audit areas of
going concern and fraud.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the
PCAOB inspection process, and describes COVID-19’s impact on audit quality. Section
three provides an overview of the methodology that I use, including a description of how I
code deficiencies. Section four discusses the results of my analysis, followed by concluding
remarks in section five.
2. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
2.1 PCAOB Inspection Process
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 established the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PACOB), making them responsible for overseeing, regulating, and
inspecting public accounting firms (Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 2002). The PCAOB’s
inspection process is comprised of two review elements: a review of individual audit
engagements (e.g., an inspection of PwC’s audit of Tesla’s annual financial statements),
and a review of the audit firms’ quality control systems (e.g., a review of PwC's personnel
management and engagement performance; Aobdia 2018; PCAOB 2022). The PCAOB,
through the inspection process, assess public accounting firm’s compliance with PCAOB
standards and rules, as well as other applicable regulatory and professional requirements
(PCAOB 2022). Such inspections are conducted annually for large audit firms, and triannually for smaller firms that engage in the audits of publicly-traded companies (PCAOB
2022; Löhlein 2016). While both components of the inspection process are critical to the
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oversight of public accounting firms, this paper, and the subsequent discussion of the
inspection process, focuses on the review of individual audit engagements. 41
The PCAOB inspection of individual audit engagements begins with the selection
of audits (e.g., PwC’s audit of Tesla’s annual financial statements) that will be reviewed.
The PCOAB uses both a random and risk-based selection method, with the audit firm
having no ability to influence this process (PCAOB 2022). Across all financial statement
issuers (hereafter “issuer”) selected for inspection, the PCAOB then focuses their review
on high-risk and complex areas of the selected audit engagement (e.g., revenue, business
combinations; Church and Shefchik 2012; PCAOB 2022). Additionally, the PCAOB
selects to review the most recently completed audit of the selected issuer (e.g., PwC’s audit
of Tesla’s most recently issued financial statements), with reviews typically taking about a
week to complete (Riley Jr., Jenkins, Roush, and Thibodeau 2008; Aobdia 2018), and
involving an inspection of audit work papers and interviews with audit engagement
personal (PCAOB 2022).
At the conclusion of the review of an audit engagement, the PCAOB prepares an
inspection report which details the deficiencies identified that were of “such significance
that the Board believes that the firm, at the time it issued its audit report, had not obtained
sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support its opinion on the issuer’s financial
statements and /or internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR)” (PCAOB 2022, 2).

Given that I am interested in the inspection of individual audit engagements, and any changes to audit
quality during COVID-19, I focus on the PCAOB’s process for reviewing selected firms’ audit work; i.e.,
Part I of the inspection reports. However, in addition to a review of selected firms’ audit work, the PCAOB
also engages in a review of the audit firm’s quality control policies and procedures. Such reviews encompass
the following elements: independence, integrity, and objectivity; personnel management; acceptance and
continuance of issuer audit engagements; engagement performance; and monitoring (PCAOB 2022). The
results of this component of the inspection process are included in Part II of the PCAOB’s inspection report,
which is made publicly available only if the audit firm fails to address the criticisms within 12 months after
the issuance of the inspection report (PCAOB 2022).
41
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These inspection findings are first provided to the audit firm before being included within
Part I of the publicly available inspection report. I include an example of an inspection
report within Appendix H. Additionally, in Part I of the report, the name of the issuer is
not disclosed. Rather, a unique identifier (e.g., Issuer A) is used to denote each individual
audit engagement that has been reviewed.
[Insert Figure 3.1: Inspection Process Timeline Here]
Figure 3.1, an adaptation of the figure presented by Aobdia (2018, 56), visually
depicts the typical timeline of an inspection. Given that all inspection findings are
communicated to the audit firm prior to being made publicly available, there is a lag
between the time when the PCAOB conducts their inspection, and when the inspection
report is released to the public. For example, for an inspection of the audit of an issuer’s
December 31, 2020 annual financial statements, the PCAOB will engage in a review of
that audit during 2021, and will typically release the inspection report to the public in the
subsequent year; i.e., 2022. Further, in light of the disruption of COVID-19, the PCAOB
granted audit firms a 45-day relief period from inspections (PCAOB 2020a). Thus,
inspections were paused beginning on March 23, 2020, and resumed on May 11, 2020
(PCAOB 2020a). All 2020 inspections conducted subsequent to May 11th were performed
remotely (PCAOB 2020b).
While the intent of the PCAOB inspection process is to enhance audit quality, there
is conflicting research on its perceived effectiveness (Löhlein 2016; Glover, Prawitt, and
Taylor 2009). On the one hand there is evidence to suggest that inspections change firm
behavior (Gramling et al. 2011; Aobdia 2018), and are associated with other measures of
audit quality (Gunny and Zhang 2013), including perceptions of audit quality (Westermann
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et al. 2019). However, Johnson, Keune, and Winchel (2019) find that auditors comply with
the PCAOB due to the fear of enforcement penalties (i.e., they perceive the PCAOB to
have high coercive power), but that they do not always agree with the PCAOB’s views on
audit quality. Relatedly, Westermann et al. (2019) find that this compliance comes at a
cost, leading to increased focus on audit documentation as opposed to substance (e.g.,
“critical thinking”). Yet, despite this conflicting evidence, the PCAOB’s inspection reports
influence auditors’ behavior, and help to provide insight into the quality of the work
performed by auditors. As a result, an examination of PCAOB inspection reports “provides
a systematic means to gauge the potential implications for audit quality” (Church and
Shefchik 2012, 44).
2.2 Impact of COVID- 19 on Audit Quality
COVID-19 is disrupting businesses across industries, including public accounting
firms. Auditors are having to improvise in their audit processes, particularly those audit
procedures that were historically performed in person; e.g., inventory observations (Luo
and Malsch 2020). COVID-19 is also disrupting informal audit processes such as coaching
and on-the-job learning and development (Alberti et al. 2022b), both of which are critical
to the quality of auditors’ judgments and decisions, and in turn, audit quality (Bauer et al.
2022; Alberti et al. 2022a). For example, one of the greatest challenges that auditors
describe facing during COVID-19 is how to effectively collaborate with other audit team
members (Alberti et al. 2022b). While greater dependence on more advanced technologies,
such as video conferencing, can help to facilitate team interactions, it only partially
mitigates the disruption (Alberti et al. 2022b).
Yet, despite early empirical and anecdotal evidence of COVID-19’s immense
impact across the audit process, including its impact on both formal and informal audit
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processes (Luo and Malsch 2020; Bauer et al. 2022; Alberti et al. 2022b), there is limited
early evidence examining its impact on audit outcomes; i.e., audit quality. One early study
finds a decline in audit quality, but only among those issuers that took advantage of the
SEC’s 45-day extension to file the 2020 audited annual reports (Morris et al. 2022). Thus,
it is unclear whether the disruption to existing audit processes during COVID-19 will come
at a cost to audit quality.
From one perspective, changes to existing audit processes may result in lower audit
quality, particularly given that auditors are having to respond quickly, with limited
guidance from external regulators on whether such changes adhere to existing auditing
standards. Additionally, a key characteristic of audit quality is the audit risk assessment
process (Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik, and Velury 2013). It is therefore
incumbent on the auditor to evaluate and effectively respond to identified audit risks. Yet,
it is likely that the COVID-19 pandemic is impacting the nature of these audit risks. For
example, the pandemic’s economic turbulence is having a negative impact on the financial
performance of some companies (Bloom, Fletcher, and Yeh 2021; Greenwood, Iverson,
and Thesmar 2020). Such economic downturn may impact auditors’ assessment of the risk
that a company is able to continue as a going concern (KPMG 2020). Further, given the
rise in pressure on management to maintain business performance, and the opportunity to
engage in fraud as a result of weakened and/or changing internal financial reporting control
processes, there may be an increase in the risk of fraud (Doher and Mayes 2020). Other
risks that may be impacted by COVID-19 include: estimation risk due to uncertainty
surrounding future financial information, and the impairment of goodwill and intangible
assets (Doher and Mayes 2020; Murphy 2020). Thus, these audit risk changes impact the
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audit process (i.e., auditors’ response to those risks), and could in turn have downstream
effects on audit quality if auditors fail to appropriately identify and respond to such risks.
From another perspective, COVID-19 has placed a spotlight on the audit process.
More specifically, given that auditors are aware that investors and regulators are paying
close attention to their response during this time, auditors may exert additional time and
effort to ensure audit quality is not negatively impacted. Evidence from interviews
conducted with U.S. audit engagement leaders (e.g., partners, senior managers, managers)
find that a majority of audit engagement leaders do not perceive that audit quality has been
negatively impacted as a result of COVID-19 (Alberti et al. 2022b), a sentiment that was
echoed by experienced auditors (e.g., senior managers and managers) based in China (Luo
and Malsch 2020).
Further, in an attempt to be more transparent during this period of disruption, the
PCAOB engaged in a review of the 2020 interim financial information of public companies
and selected auditors of public companies with an off-calendar year end (PCAOB 2020c).
Through this interim inspection process, the PCAOB provided audit firms initial feedback
regarding their response during COVID-19. While the overall sentiment of that interim
inspection report was positive, suggesting that audit firms are responding well to the
evolving challenges arising from COVID-19 (PCAOB 2020c), the report also details audits
areas that firms need to pay close attention to during the 2020 year-end audits (e.g., risk of
management override of controls). 42 This information is likely to prove useful to audit
The emphasis of those inspections was a need for audit firms to continue to pay close attention to COVID
related circumstance that could give rise to changes in audit risks; such as changes to the risk of management
override of internal controls over financial reporting (fraud risk) and the assessment of a company’s ability
to continue as a going concern (going concern risk) (PCAOB 2020c). Additionally, these findings are likely
to shed light on the risker areas of the audit process; i.e., where the PCAOB is likely to focus their attention
during their annual review process. Thus, I consider these interim findings when establishing my coding
protocol, as is further detailed in the method section of this paper.

42
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firms as they establish new processes in response to arising disruptions, in turn helping to
facilitate high audit quality.
Early anecdotal and empirical evidence on the impact of COVID-19 on audit
quality is limited, giving rise to the question of what, if any, impact is COVID-19 having
on audit quality, and more specifically, what audit areas, if any, are most affected. For
example, is there an increase in inspection findings surrounding auditors’ response to fraud
risks? Thus, using the PCAOB inspection findings as a proxy for audit quality, I seek to
examine how the severity, nature, and impacted audit area of these findings has changed
over the past three years, inclusive of the initial year of COVID-19’s impact on audits (i.e.,
PCAOB inspections of the 2020 year-end audits). 43 Additionally, next-tier public
accounting firms may be experiencing different challenges as compared to those
experienced by Big 4 firms. For example, it is likely that the larger accounting firms have
access to more resources; e.g., technology and national office support, which may in turn
impact the quality of their response. Thus, I also seek to examine how the severity, nature,
and impacted audit areas of inspection findings differ between Big 4 firms and next-tier
firms, focusing on any changes in those findings across years. I propose the following
research questions:
RQ1: How does the severity, nature, and audit area of audit deficiencies vary
across inspection period, inclusive of the initial year of COVID-19’s impact (i.e.,
2018, 2019 and 2020)?
RQ2: How does the severity, nature, and audit area of audit deficiencies vary by
firm size (i.e., Big 4 firms as compared to next-tier firms)? And, what differences,
if any, relate to the initial year of COVID-19’s impact (i.e., 2020)?

To date, given the lag in time between when inspections are conducted and when the reports are released
to the public, only the first year of audit inspections performed during COVID-19 are available.
43
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3. METHOD
This study examines PCAOB inspection reports issued from 2020-2022 for
inspection years 2018-2020, comprising a total of 22 reports. The inspection reports are for
the top eight largest audit firms based on U.S. revenue. These firms are as follows: Deloitte,
Ernst & Young (EY), KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Grant Thornton (GT),
BDO, RSM, and Crowe Howath. I download these reports directly from the PCAOB’s
website. The total population of 22 inspection reports across the three-year inspection
period (2018-2020) is comprised of 12 Big 4 firm inspection reports and ten next-tier firm
inspection reports. 44 As an example, I include an abbreviated version of RSM’s 2019
PCAOB inspection report, and Part I of that report, within Appendix H.
Using content analysis (Loughran and McDonald 2016), I summarize the most
frequently identified Part I.A audit deficiencies, and categorize the characteristics of those
deficiencies based on severity of the deficiency, nature (i.e., type) of the deficiency, and
audit area of the deficiency. 45 To do this, I conduct iterative stepwise procedures, as done
in prior literature (Church and Shefchik 2012; Mascha et al. 2018), which I depict in Figure
3.2. Additionally, I leverage the coding methodology employed by Church and Shefchik
(2012) in their examination of PCAOB inspection reports issued from 2005 to 2010.
[Insert Figure 3.2: Textual Analysis Process Here]

As of the date of the current version of this paper, the inspection reports for the 2020-year ends reviews of
RSM and Crowe Howath, are not yet publicly available. As such, they are not included in my population of
firms for the 2020 inspection period.
45
Part I.B of the inspection report includes a description of other instances of non-compliance with PCAOB
standards or rules. Such findings are focused on findings that do not relate directly to the sufficiency or
appropriateness of evidence the firm obtained to support its opinion. Rather, these include audit deficiencies
related to things such the audit committee’s pre-approval of certain tax services. Given the intent of this
study, I focus on Part I.A inspection findings, as they relate to the audit of accounts and transactions.
44
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As is depicted in Figure 3.2 step 1, I first manually review each inspection report,
using the summary section of the report to accumulate Part I.A findings within excel. Doing
so allows me to review each report before beginning my coding analysis. It also allows me
to identify any preliminary trends in findings across audit area (e.g., revenue/accounts
receivable, inventory, and business combinations) and type (i.e., affected auditing
standard; e.g., AS 1105 audit evidence). Next, I extract out Part I.A from the full inspection
report and upload it into NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software program that can be
used for content analysis (Mascha et al. 2018; Siccama and Penna 2008).
Using NVivo, I first hand code each identified audit deficiency by the severity of
the deficiency; e.g., restatement, error, and insufficient testing (step 2). Next, I code each
identified audit deficiency by the nature (type) of the deficiency; e.g., using the work of
specialists, AS1210 (step 3). Finally, I code each identified audit deficiency by the
impacted audit area; e.g., revenue/receivables and business combinations (step 4). I
describe each of these coding categorizations in further detail in the subsections below. I
include a table of this coding scheme in Appendix I. Finally, I summarize a count of the
coding results within excel; i.e., the total number of individual audits deficiencies for each
code (step 5). I do this so that I can compare the identified audit deficiencies and the key
characteristics of those deficiencies across inspection year and firm size. 46
3.1 Severity of the Deficiency
I adapt the coding of the severity of the deficiency from Church and Shefchik
(2012). Consistent with their coding methodology, I first categorize each audit deficiency
as a severe or less severe deficiency. I consider severe deficiencies to be those that result

Using NVIVO allows me to see the inter-relationship between each of the identified categorizes; i.e., what
are the most common severe types of audit deficiencies identified for business combinations.
46
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in an incorrect audit opinion on the financial statements and/or internal controls over
financial reporting (ICFR). I include a separate code for restatements related to the
financial statements (RESTATE-FS), and a code for restatements resulting from a material
weakness (RESTATE-ICFR). Additionally, I also include as a severe deficiency those
audit deficiencies where the accounting firm failed to identify and appropriately address a
departure from GAAP (NON-GAAP), as well as those audit deficiencies where the
accounting firm failed to identify and appropriately address an accounting error, inclusive
of failures related to the sufficiency, accuracy, and completeness of the issuer’s financial
statement disclosures (ERROR). While NON-GAAP and ERROR audit deficiencies are
less severe than those that result in a restatement (RESTATE-FS and RESTATE-ICFR), I
consider them severe given that they result in departures from GAAP, or give rise to a
known error, although not significant enough to result in a restatement.
I code less severe deficiencies into one of four categories: 1) the accounting firm
failed to test an account, transaction, and/or internal control (NO-TEST); 2) the accounting
firm failed to adequately or properly evaluate an accounting issue and/or whether the
accounting treatment was appropriate (NO-EVAL–GAAP) 47; 3) the accounting firm failed
to adequately or properly evaluate the design of the issuer’s internal controls over financial
reporting (NO-EVAL-ICFR); and 4) the accounting firm failed to perform and/or
document sufficient procedures when engaging in either substantive or internal control
testing, or both (NO-SUFF). Consistent with Church and Shefchik (2012), I determine that
NO-TEST is the most severe deficiency in this group because it indicates a failure to
perform testing over a relevant account or transaction. I determine that NO-EVAL-GAPP

47

This includes audit deficiencies related to the evaluation of the issuer’s financial statement disclosures.
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is the next most severe deficiency in this group, followed by NO-EVAL-ICFR, given that
both relate to the failure to evaluate the implications of a specific accounting treatment,
financial statement disclosure, or internal control. I determine that NO-SUFF is the lest
severe deficiency of this group given that these audit deficiencies are indicative of
insufficient audit support (e.g., insufficient sample size used in the testing of an account or
transaction), but were testing was still performed. I include the coding definition for each
severity code within Appendix I. Examples of each severity code are included in Table 3.1
[Insert Table 3.1: Examples of Severity of Deficiencies Here]
3.2 Nature of the Deficiency
For the nature of the audit deficiency, I code each audit deficiency based on the
auditing standard that it relates to, as is disclosed within the inspection report. I elect to
code the audit deficiencies based on the relevant auditing standard given that the
inspections themselves are driven by the failures of audit firms’ to adhere to such
standards. 48 While I use a full listing of the auditing standards included on the PCAOB’s
website, I include in the coding definitions, as is shown in Appendix I, only those auditing
standards where there was at least one identified audit deficiency. 49 Thus, I code the nature
of each audit deficiency into one of the following 50: independence (AS 1005); using the
work of specialists (AS 1210); audit planning (AS 2101); considerations of materiality (AS
2105); identifying and assessing risks of material misstatement (AS 2110); audit of ICFR

48
While I elect to use the standards as the basis of my coding, the general themes identified using this coding
scheme align to the themes identified by Church and Shefchik (2012) in their coding of the secondary nature
of the audit deficiencies for the inspection years 2004-2009.
49
I elect to do this for brevity.
50
“AS” denotes the applicable auditing standard.
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(AS 2201) 51; auditors’ response to risk of material misstatement (AS 2301) 52; substantive
analytical procedures (AS 2305); confirmation process (AS 2310); audit sampling (AS
2315); consideration of internal audit (AS 2605); and evaluating audit results (AS 2810). 53
Examples of the nature of audit deficiencies for each of the above auditing standards are
included in Table 3.2. 54
[Insert Table 3.2: Examples of Nature of Deficiencies Here]
Additionally, the PCAOB in their review of interim financial information and
audits conducted during 2020, identify key takeaways that auditors should keep in mind as
they continue to conduct audits under COVID-19 restrictions. Such takeaways include
increased emphasis on, and awareness of, the following: risk assessment and materiality
judgments (e.g., the impact of the current economic environment on auditors assessment
of the risk of error or fraud); ICFR (e.g., changes to the issuer’s operation of relevant
controls); accounting estimates (e.g., methods, data, and assumptions being used, and the
impact of current economic uncertainties); auditor independence (e.g., challenges in the
current economic environment that could threaten auditor independence, such as unpaid

I also include as part of this coding, failures to design and perform audit procedures to obtain sufficient
appropriate audit evidence related to an issuer’s internal controls (AS 11105).
52
I also include as part of this coding, failures to design and perform audit procedures to obtain sufficient
appropriate audit evidence related to substantive testing procedures (AS 11105). Further, I include failures
to adhere to specific audit guidance regarding the evaluation of fraud (AS 2401), going concern (AS 2415),
estimates, including fair value measurement (AS 2501), and inventories (AS 2510). I elect to include all of
these deficiencies into the code of auditors’ response to risk of material misstatement as they all relate to
auditors’ failure to appropriately response to specific audit risks in these areas; e.g., auditors’ response to the
risk of fraud.
53
There were no Part I.A audit deficiencies identified for independence (AS 1005), consideration of
materiality (AS 2105), or identifying and assessing risks of material misstatement (AS 2110). However, I
include it as part of the coding definitions given that it is one of the areas the PCAOB emphasized in their
2020 interim inspection report.
54
An audit deficiency may relate to more than auditing standard; i.e., it may be associated with more than
one nature code. For example, insufficient sample size to test a specific account or transaction represents a
failure related to audit sampling AS 2315), and an insufficient response to a risk of material misstatement
(AS 2301). In this instance, the deficiency is coded as both audit sampling and risk of material misstatement.
As such, these codes are not mutually exclusive.
51
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professional fees); and other information (i.e., additional COVID-19 related disclosures)
(PCAOB 2020c) 55. I consider these key takeaways when analyzing my findings, noting
that any identified audit deficiencies related to these key takeaways are captured in my
coding of the nature of the audit deficiency (e.g., deficiencies impacting ICFR, AS 2201)
and affected audit area (e.g., fraud).
3.3 Audit Area of the Deficiency
For each inspection report, I also code the audit area of the deficiency. I leverage
the audit area codes included in Church and Shefchik (2012). Additionally, I include
several other audit areas based on commonly inspected areas as were identified in Step 1
of my coding process. I use the “related audit area affected,” as is stated within each
inspection report, as a basis for my coding. 56 I code each audit deficiency into one or more
of following audit areas 57: 1) revenue and/or accounts receivable (includes allowance for
doubtful accounts; REVENUE); 2) inventory (includes excess and obsolete reserves;
INVENTORY); 3) the impairment of goodwill, intangibles, and other long-lived assets58
(FV MEASUREMENT); 4) income taxes and related accounts (e.g., tax contingency
reserves), as well as other accounting estimates (e.g., deposit liabilities; ACCOUNTING
The PCAOB also identifies supervision, staffing, and review, to be another facet of the audit process that
auditors should pay close attention to (PCAOB 2020c). However, findings related to personnel management
and engagement performance are part of the PCAOB’s assessment of the audit firm’s quality control systems;
i.e., Part II of the inspection report. The findings of these inspections are not part of my analysis. Additionally,
quality control systems findings during COVID-19 (i.e., 2020 inspection findings) are not yet publicly
available.
56
The audit area affected, as is disclosed within the inspection report, is based on the specific account (e.g.,
revenue, inventory, allowance for loan losses, deposit liabilities) or transaction (i.e., business combination).
I elect to aggregate some of these areas. For example, I include allowance for loan losses within the fair value
measurement code, given that it relates to impairment assessments for loans. This method is consistent with
Church and Shefchik (2012).
57
An audit deficiency may relate to more than one audit area. For example, a failure in the issuer’s IT system
could impact multiple audit areas such as revenue and inventory. In this instance, the audit deficiency related
to the IT control failure would be coded as both revenue and inventory. As such, these codes are not mutually
exclusive.
58
This includes the testing of financial instruments (e.g., derivatives), loans and allowance for loan losses,
contingent liabilities, post-retirement benefit obligations, and pensions.
55
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EST); 5) the combination of one or more businesses, or an event in which an acquirer
obtains control of one or more businesses (BUSINESS COMB); evaluating whether an
issuer will continue as a going concern (GOING CONCERN); 6) fraud risk (FRAUD); and
other accounts (e.g., research and development, payroll expense, sales commission;
OTHER). I include the coding definition for each audit area within Appendix I. 59
4. RESULTS
I begin this discussion with an overview of the PCAOB inspection findings made
publicly available during 2020-2022 for inspection years 2018-2020. Throughout the
remainder of the results section, I reference the inspection years as 2018, 2019, and 2020;
the year in which the audit was performed. 60 As is shown in Table 3.3 Panel A, across both
Big 4 firms and next-tier firms (i.e., GT, BDO, RSM, and Crowe), the PCAOB reviewed a
total of 884 audits of individual issuers (hereafter referred to as audits) across the threeyear period: 299 audits in 2018; 322 audits in 2019; and 263 audits in 2020. Further, of the
total 884 audits reviewed, 201 of those audits had Part I.A deficiencies; i.e., 23 percent of
audits reviewed had at least one Part I.A deficiency. Additionally, across the 201 audits
with Part I.A deficiencies, there were a total of 883 individual inspection findings (i.e.,
deficiencies); an average of approximately four deficiencies per audit.
[Insert Table 3.3 Panel A: Summary of Inspections by Year Here]
In examining the inspection results of Big 4 firms, the PCAOB reviewed a total of
659 audits across the three-year period: 213 audits were performed in 2018; 236 audits

59
I do not include a table with examples of the audit area as it would not provide additional information than
what is provided within Appendix I.
60
As is discussed within the background section, there is a delay between when the audit is completed, and
when the PCAOB engages in their inspection and subsequently releases their findings. Thus, audits
completed in 2018, are inspected during 2019, and the findings of those inspections are released in 2020. For
purposes of my discussion of the results, I use the year in which the audit was completed; e.g., 2018.
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were performed in 2019; and 210 audits were performed in 2020. Of the total audits
reviewed, 130 have at least one Part I.A deficiency; i.e., 20 percent of all audits reviewed.
Of the total 130 Big 4 audits with Part I.A deficiencies, 53 audits were performed in 2018
(25 percent of all audits reviewed have Part I.A deficiencies), 52 audits were performed in
2019 (22 percent of all audits reviewed have Part I.A deficiencies), and 25 audits were
performed in 2020 (12 percent of all audits reviewed have Part I.A deficiencies). Further,
across both Big 4 and next-tier firms, there is an average of four deficiencies per audit
issuer (e.g., issuer A) for the three-year period (2018-2020). By year, the average number
of deficiencies per audit is slightly higher in 2019 (mean = 4.69, n = 80) as compared to
2020 (mean = 4.30, n =43), but the difference is not significant (t = 0.490, p = .609).
Additionally, for Big 4 firms, the average number of deficiencies per audit is higher in
2019 (mean = 4.62, n = 52) as compared to 2020 (mean = 3.76, n =25), but again the
difference is insignificant (t = 1.04, p = .339). Taken together, these findings suggest that
despite a decrease in the average number of deficiencies per audit when comparing across
the three years, such differences in total, and for Big 4 firms, are not significant; providing
initial evidence of no change in audit quality.
For next-tier firms, the PCAOB reviewed a total of 225 issuers for the three-year
period: 86 audits were performed in 2018; 86 audits were performed in 2019; and 53 audits
were performed in 2020. Of the total audits reviewed, 71 have Part I.A deficiencies; i.e.,
32 percent of the audits reviewed have Part I.A deficiencies. For 2020, the inspection
results for RSM and Crowe are not yet available. Thus, the decline among the total nexttier audits reviewed in 2020 is a result of those two firms not being included. Of the 71
audits with Part I.A deficiencies, 25 audits were performed in 2018 (29 percent of total
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audits reviewed have Part I.A deficiencies), 28 audits were performed in 2019 (33 percent
of total audits reviewed have Part I.A deficiencies), and 18 audits were performed in 2020
(34 percent of total audits reviewed have Part I.A deficiencies). The average number of
deficiencies per audit is slightly higher for next-tier firms (mean = 4.77, n= 71) as compared
to Big 4 firms (mean = 4.18, n=130), but the difference is insignificant (t = -1.04, p = .268).
However, in contrast to the findings for Big 4 firms, among next-tier firms the average
number of deficiencies per audit is slightly lower in 2019 (mean = 4.82, n = 28) as
compared to 2020 (mean = 5.06, n =18), but again the difference is insignificant (t = -.147,
p = .975).
Finally, of the total 201 audits with Part I.A deficiencies from 2018-2020, 136
deficiencies impact both the audits of the financial statements and internal controls over
financial reporting (ICFR). Refer to Table 3.3, Panel B for a summary of deficiencies by
type; i.e., financial statement impact, ICFR impact, or both. The total deficiencies
impacting either the audit of only the financial statements or ICFR is relatively constant
year over year. However, for Big 4 firms, there is a decrease in the total number of
deficiencies impacting both the audit of the financial statement and ICFR from 2019 (38
audits with deficiencies) to 2020 (15 audits with deficiencies).
[Insert Table 3.3 Panel B: Audits with Deficiencies by Type Here]
4.1 Severity of Deficiencies
I code the severity of 883 individual inspection findings, across 201 audits with
Part I.A deficiencies from 2018-2020 for each of the Big 4 firms, and four next-tier firms
(i.e., GT, BDO, RSM, and Crowe). 61 Adapting the coding used by Church and Shefchik

As previously noted, the 2020 inspection results do not include findings for RSM and Crowe as these two
reports were not yet publicly available when this analysis was completed.
61
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(2012), I code deficiencies as severe if the inspection report indicates at least one of the
following: 1) the issuer restated the financial statements (RESTATE-FS); 2) the issuer
identified a previously unidentified material weakness, and the accounting firm
subsequently modified its evaluation of the effectiveness of the issuer’s internal controls
over financial reporting (RESTATE-ICFR); 3) the accounting firm failed to identify and
appropriately address a departure from GAAP (NON-GAAP); and 4) the accounting firm
failed to identify and appropriately address an accounting error (including insufficient
and/or inaccurate financial statement disclosures; ERROR).
Further, I code deficiencies as less severe if the inspection report indicates at least
one of the following: 1) the accounting firm failed to test an account, transaction, and/or
internal control (NO-TEST); 2) the accounting firm failed to adequately or properly
evaluate an accounting issue and/or whether the accounting treatment was appropriate
(inclusive of an evaluation of the issuer’s financial statement disclosures; NO-EVALGAAP); 3) the accounting firm failed to adequately or properly evaluate the design of the
issuer’s ICFR (NO-EVAL-ICFR); and 4) the accounting firm failed to perform or
document sufficient procedures when engaging in substantive testing and/or internal
control testing (NO-SUFF). These subcategories are listed in order of severity (most severe
to least severe). Examples of deficiencies for each subcategory are shown in Table 3.1, and
are discussed in the method section. The severity coding results are presented in Table 3.4.
[Insert Table 3.4: Audit Deficiencies by Severity over Time Here]
I begin by examining the severity of the identified deficiencies in total for the threeyear period (2018-2020). Of the total 201 audits with Part I.A deficiencies from 2018-2020,
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25 audits (12 percent 62) have at least one severe audit deficiency. The most common severe
deficiency is RESTATE-ICFR, resulting in deficiencies across 12 audits; i.e., 46 percent
of audits with severe deficiencies. Across all subcategories of severity, the two categories
with the greatest number (percentage) of deficiencies are NO-SUFF and NO-TEST,
resulting in deficiencies across 177 audits (88 percent) and 96 audits (48 percent),
respectively. 63 Thus, despite RESTATE-ICFR being the most common severe deficiency
type, a majority of audit deficiencies for both Big 4 firms and next-tier firms across the
three-year period are less severe (NO-SUFF and NO-TEST).
Next, I examine differences in the severity of deficiencies between the inspection
periods, addressing research question one. In doing so, I observe an increase in the number
of severe deficiencies from 2018 to 2019, driven by a significant increase in the proportion
of audits with RESTATE-ICFR deficiencies from 2018 to 2019 (p = 0.032 using Chisquared test), and implying a decline in audit quality from 2018 to 2019. In contrast, there
is some preliminary evidence of an improvement in audit quality from 2019 to 2020.
Specifically, I observe a decline in the total number of severe audit deficiencies from 2019
to 2020, driven by a significant decrease the proportion of audits with RESTATE-ICFR
deficiencies (p = 0.014 using Chi-squared test). Further, when comparing year over year,
NON-GAAP deficiencies increased from 2018 to 2019, and declined from 2019 to 2020,
but again the difference year over year is insignificant at the 5% level (p > 0.5 using Chisquared test). Finally, ERROR deficiencies increased across the three-year period, with a

62
This percentage (also referred to as the proportion) is calculated based on the total number of audits with
an audit deficiency of the described deficiency nature, type and/or audit area, divided by the total number of
audits with Part I.A deficiencies, as is presented within Table 4. I reference this percentage throughout my
discussion.
63
The most common severity type (NO-SUFF) is consistent with the findings of Church and Shefchik (2012)
who analyze earlier PCAOB inspection reports (2004 to 2009 inspection years).
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significant increase in deficiencies from 2019 to 2020 (p = 0.05 using Chi-squared test).
Taken together, the increase in the proportion of severe deficiencies from 2018 to 2019 is
significant (p = 0.015 using Chi-squared test), driven by a significant increase in
RESTATE-ICFR deficiencies, and implies a decline in audit quality. In contrast, while the
observed decline in the proportion of severe deficiencies from 2019 to 2020 is insignificant
(p = 0.598 using Chi-squared test), its directionally in line with an improvement in audit
quality.
For less severe audit deficiencies, the vast majority of deficiencies across the threeyear period (85 percent of audits with Part I.A deficiencies) result from the less severe NOSUFF and NO-TEST audit deficiencies. When comparing the severity year-over-year,
there is no change in the total number of audits with less severe audit deficiencies from
2018 to 2019. However, there is a decline in audits with less severe audit deficiencies from
2019 to 2020; 49 percent decline. Yet, overall, the proportion of less severe deficiencies
for each subcategory is similar when comparing across the three years (p > 0.06 using Chisquared test). Taken together with my findings for severe deficiencies, there is limited
evidence to suggest a change in audit quality year-over-year, based on the severity of audit
deficiencies.
Finally, in addressing research question two, differences in the severity of the audit
deficiencies between Big 4 firms and next-tier firms, I find that in total across the threeyear period, the proportion of deficiencies for each severity subcategory is similar for Big
4 firms and next-tier firms (p > 0.2 using Chi-squared test), with the exception of ERROR
and NO-EVAL-GAAP. Upon further examination, among the more severe ERROR
deficiencies, Big 4 firms have two audits (2 percent) with ERROR deficiencies as
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compared to six audits for next-tier firms (8 percent), a difference that is statistically
significant (p = 0.024 using Chi-squared test). Further, a majority of these audit
deficiencies relate to audits conducted during 2020; one Big 4 firm audit and four next-tier
firm audits. Similarly, among the less severe NO-EVAL-GAAP deficiencies, Big 4 firms
have a total of eight audits with such deficiencies as compared to 14 audits for next-tier
firms, a difference that is statistically significant (p = .005 using Chi-squared test). Both of
these results provide limited evidence of higher audit quality, as is evaluated based on the
severity of the audit deficiency, for Big 4 firms as compared to next-tier firms. In contrast,
a majority of the deficiencies for both Big 4 firms and next-tier firms are less severe, with
most resulting in NO-SUFF or NO-TEST, consistent with the findings when examining
severity type year-over-year. This provides evidence of overall high audit quality (less
severe audit deficiencies) among both Big 4 and next-tier firms.
Thus, in conclusion, there is limited evidence based on the severity of deficiencies
of a change in audit quality year-over-year, and more specifically, between 2019 (preCOVID-19) and 2020 (COVID-19). While I find that the difference in the proportion of
RESTATE-ICFR deficiencies across the three years is statistically significant; in total a
majority of audit deficiencies across all three-years, and for both Big 4 firm and next-tier
firms, are less severe in nature. Additionally, the aggregate difference between 2019 and
2020 for both severe and less severe deficiencies is not significant. Further, I find limited
evidence to suggest that among the more severe deficiency category of ERRORs, Big 4
firms have higher audit quality (fever audits with deficiencies) as compared to next-tier
firms. However, the proportion deficiencies for a majority of the severity subcategory is
not significantly different for Big 4 firms as compared to next-tier firms.
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4.2 Nature of Deficiencies by Audit Area
I next examine the nature (type) of the deficiencies, categorizing each deficiency
based on the applicable auditing standard, as is denoted within the inspection reports (e.g.,
auditing ICFR AS 2201). Additionally, I code each deficiency to the respective audit area
that it impacts (e.g., REVENUE, FV MEASUREMENT). 64 I elect to discuss both the
impacted auditing standard and audit area together, allowing for an analysis of the types of
deficiencies identified among commonly inspected audit areas. The coding results for
nature and audit area for 2018-2020 are presented in total within Table 3.5, Panel A
[Insert Table 3.5 Panel A: Audit Deficiencies by Issue Type and Audit Area Here]
As is shown in Table 3.5 Panel A, of the total 201 audits with Part I.A deficiencies
across all three-years for both Big 4 and next-tier firms, REVENUE has the greatest
number of audits with deficiencies, a majority of which relate to audit procedure
deficiencies; i.e., 64 percent of audits with Part I.A deficiencies result from insufficient
REVENUE testing. Further, insufficient testing over the issuer’s internal controls over
REVENUE (auditing ICFR, AS 2201) is the second most frequent deficiency type (38
percent). The testing of FV MEASUREMENT is the second most common audit area with
deficiencies, a majority of which are audit procedure deficiencies (31 percent) and ICFR
deficiencies (30 percent), consistent with the findings for REVENUE. Other audit areas
with frequent audit deficiencies include: BUSINESS COMB., ACCOUNTING EST., and
INVENTORY.

A full discussion of the deficiency types (e.g., auditing ICFR, audit procedures) and audit areas (e.g.,
REVENUE, INVENTORY, FV MEASUREMENT) are included within method section, and are further
described within Appendix I.
64
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Table 3.5, Panels B-D show deficiency type by audit area for each of the three years
(2018-2020). In addressing research question one, I examine trends in the nature and
affected audit area of deficiencies year-over-year. I observe that for both Big 4 firms and
next-tier firms, the proportion of audit deficiencies across type and audit area remains
relatively consistent year-over-year with the exception of several observation. First, I
observe a downward trend in the proportion of deficiencies year-over-year relating to
BUSINESS COMBS., and more specifically, audit procedure and ICFR deficiencies within
this audit area, although statistically insignificant (p > 0.05 using Chi-squared test).
Second, when comparing across the three years, I observe changes in the number and
proportion of deficiencies impacting FV MEASUREMENT. Specifically, from 2018 to
2019, the number (proportion) of audits with FV MEASUREMENT ICFR deficiencies
increased. In contrast, FV MEASUREMENT audit procedure and ICFR deficiencies
declined from 2019 to 2020. However, the changes year over year are statistically
insignificant (p > 0.1 using Chi-squared test). Finally, when comparing across years, I
observe a downward trend in the number and proportion of deficiencies impacting
ACCOUNTING ESTIMATES. Specifically, the number (proportion) of audits with audit
procedure deficiencies impacting ACCOUNTING ESTIMATES declined from 2019 to
2020, but again the decrease is insignificant (p = 0.159 using Chi-squared test).
[Insert Table 3.5 Panel B-D: Audit Deficiencies by Issue Type and Audit Area Here]
Surprisingly though, despite the potential impact of COVID-19 on the audit risks
relating to FRAUD and GOING CONCERN, there were no audit deficiencies identified
within these two audit areas in 2020. Thus, auditors increased emphasis on fraud and going
concern appears to have translated into fewer deficiencies (higher quality) among these
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two audit areas. In contrast, the proportion of audits that audit procedure deficiencies
related to REVENUE increases from 2019 (63%) to 2020 (91%), representing a statistically
significant increase (p < 0.01 using Chi-squared test), and thus evidence of a decline in
audit quality related to revenue audit testing procedures.
Additionally, I compare the nature (type) and audit area of deficiencies for the
three-year period (2018-2020) between Big 4 firms and next-tier firms, addressing research
question two. I find that across deficiency type and affected audit area, the percentage of
deficiencies are relatively consistent between Big 4 firms and next-tier firms, with the
exception of REVENUE ICFR deficiencies. More specifically, 70 percent of audits
performed by next-tier firms that receive at least one Part I.A deficiency, have a deficiency
impacting the auditing of the issuer’s internal controls over REVENUE, as compared to 35
percent of Big 4 firm audits with Part I.A deficiencies, a difference that is statistically
significant (p < 0.01 using Chi-squared test).
Finally, when comparing the number and percentage of deficiencies between Big 4
firms and next-tier firms for each of the three years (2018-2020), I find that the proportion
of deficiencies across deficiency type and audit area remains relatively consistent between
Big 4 firms and next-tier firms when comparing between 2018 and 2019. However, in
examining 2020, the year impacted by COVID-19, I observe several differences in
deficiency type and audit area between Big 4 firms and next-tier firms. First, in the testing
of INVENTORY, five audits (20 percent) conducted by Big 4 firms receive audit procedure
deficiencies; e.g., insufficient audit sample sizes. Among next-tier firms, there are no
observed audit procedure deficiencies for INVENTORY. The difference is significant at
the 10% level (p =0.06 using Chi-squared test). Second, for FV MEASUREMENT, Big-4

158

firms had a higher percentage of audit procedure deficiencies (32 percent), as compared to
next-tier firms (6 percent), a difference that is again significant at the 10% level (p = 0.057
using Chi-squared test). 65
Taken together, these results provide mixed evidence with regards to the nature and
audit area of deficiencies. On the one hand, there is evidence to suggest an improvement
in the testing of some audit areas such as FV MEASUREMENT, ACCOUNTING
ESTIMATES, and BUSINESS COMBINATIONS, given the downward trend in the
number and percentage of deficiencies in these areas year-over-year. Additionally, in
contrast to an expected higher risk relating to GOING CONCERN and FRAUD during
COVID-19, there are no observed deficiencies in these two audit areas in 2020. Thus,
despite concerns relative to these two audit areas, there is no evidence of a decline in audit
quality. However, when examining difference between Big 4 firms and next-tier firms,
there is some, albeit limited, evidence to suggest that Big-4 firms have lower audit quality
in the testing of INVENTORY and FV MEASUREMENT, resulting in a higher percentage
of audits with audit procedure and ICFR deficiencies among these two areas, as compared
to next-tier firms. In contrast, Big-4 firms have a significantly lower proportion of audits
with REVENUE ICFR deficiencies as compared to next-tier firms.
5. CONCLUSION
This study is the first to use recent PCAOB inspection findings to provide insight
into the impact of COVID-19 on audit quality. Examining 22 inspection reports across a
three-year period (2018-20220) for the top eight largest audit firms, I hand code the

Audit procedure and ICFR deficiencies among Big 4 firms primarily related to insufficient testing over
key assumptions and/or underlying data used by the issuer in their analysis.
65
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severity, nature, and affected audit area of 883 deficiencies (inspection findings) across
201 audits (issuers) within Part I.A findings. Doing so allows me to identify common and
recurring deficiencies, as well as identify any changes in the severity, nature, and affected
audit area of deficiencies over time and between Big 4 firms and next-tier firms.
Specifically, I focus on examining changes occurring between 2019 and 2020, providing
insight into any negative impact on audit quality arising from the disruption of COVID-19.
Due to the pervasive impact that COVID-19 is having across the audit process
(Alberti et al. 2022b), an empirical question arises as to what, if any, impact such changes
to existing auditing practices will have on audit quality. On the one hand, given that
auditors have had to quickly respond to arising challenges, with limited guidance from
regulators on whether changes to existing auditing processes adhere to standards, audit
quality may suffer. Additionally, COVID-19 is likely impacting audit risks, such as going
concern, fraud, and estimation. Thus, audit quality may be negatively impacted if auditors
fail to appropriately identify, and response to, these changing risks. In contrast, given the
increased focus by regulators and investors on auditors response during this time, audit
firms are putting forth substantial resources to ensure that their people and processes are
adequately supported (Alberti et al. 2022b).
Overall, I find mixed evidence regarding changes in audit quality across the threeyear period, and between Big 4 firms and next-tier firms However, I make several
surprising observations based on my analysis. First, while I do not find consistent evidence
of a change in audit quality, I find evidence of a significant decline in the proportion of
severe deficiencies resulting in a previously unidentified material internal control weakness
from 2019 to 2020, suggesting higher audit quality in the audit testing of issuers internal
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controls. Furthermore, a majority of the audit deficiencies across years, and firm size, are
less severe in nature, suggesting that, overall, audit firms are maintaining a high level of
audit quality, despite the disruption of COVID-19. Second, I find no deficiencies impacting
auditors’ assessment of, and response to, issuers’ going concern and fraud risk during 2020,
despite initial concern that these areas may result in higher risk during COVID-19. Finally,
while I find that audit firms are continuing to achieve relatively high audit quality, they are
receiving the greatest proportion of deficiencies in the audit areas of revenue and fair value
measurement. Such deficiencies primarily relate to audit testing procedures and internal
control testing, with far fewer deficiencies impacting areas such as the use of the work of
specialists.
In aggregate, these findings help to shed light on areas that warrant greater attention
by both researchers and practitioners. For example, while recent research focuses on
auditors’ use of specialists (e.g., Hux 2017; Bauer and Estep 2019; Griffith 2020), my
findings suggest that among the top largest firms, this is not an area of concern; i.e., there
are very few deficiencies in this area. Thus, both researchers and audit firms should focus
on audit areas that give rise to PCOAB inspection findings in recent years e.g., internal
controls testing for revenue and fair value measurement.
The findings of this study should be interpreted in light of various limitations. First,
this study codes the deficiencies as are described in the PCAOB inspection reports. Thus,
I rely on the consistency of the wording contained in those reports when conducting my
analysis. Second, I analyze the top eight largest public accounting firms over the most
recent three-year period (2018-2020) for which inspection reports are publicly available.
As a result, my findings do not empirically generalize to smaller public accounting firms.
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Future research could examine PCAOB inspection findings for smaller firms. Additionally,
this study analyzes Part I.A of the inspection report which relates to deficiencies that impact
the sufficiency and/or appropriateness of audit evidence. Thus, Part I.B and Part II have
not been examined, presenting an opportunity for future research. Finally, this study
examines the outcome of the PCAOB inspection process (i.e., inspection findings). Further
research could examine whether there was variation in the inspection process during
COVID-19. For example, did the quality of the inspection process change for those
inspections performed virtually as compared to face-to-face.
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FIGURE 3.1
Inspection Process Timeline (adapted from Aobdia 2018)
End of fiscal
year t+1

End of
fiscal year t
End of
audit
year t

PCAOB fieldwork (March
through November)

Year t
45-day relief
period from
inspections,
granted by the
PCAOB in 2020

Year t+1
Comments (precursor of
Part I Findings)
communicated by
PCAOB to firm (usually
prepared on site)

End of
audit
year t+1

Inspection
report
release

Year t+2
Comments and Part I
Findings
communicated by firm
to issuer? (Timing
unclear if it happens)

The figure depicts the inspection process of selected audit firms’ audit work; i.e., Part I of the PCAOB’s inspection findings. I
have excluded the timeline for the review of audit firm’s quality control systems; i.e., Part II inspection findings. Such findings
which are only made available to the public after a one-year remediation period, and only if the audit firm did not sufficiently
respond to the PCAOB’s findings within that time. This study examines Part I findings.
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FIGURE 3.2
Textual Analysis Process (following the methodology of Church and Shefchik 2012)

Step 1: Review
inspection reports

Download the
2018, 2019 and
2020 year-end
PCAOB
inspection reports
for selected firms
Manually review
inspections
reports,
summarizing the
inspection
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area, type, and
auditing standard
within excel.
Extract out Part
I.A of the
inspection report
and upload into
NVivo

Step 2: Code the
Severity of
Deficiencies

Step 3: Code the
Nature of the
Deficiencies

Using the NVivo
code deficiencies
into two categories:
severe and less
severe
Using NVivo code
severe deficiencies
into the following
categories:
RESTATE-FS;
RESTATE-ICFR;
ERROR; NONGAAP
Using NVivo code
less severe
deficiencies into the
following categories:
categories: NOTEST; NO-EVALGAAP; NO-EVALICFR; NO-SUFF

Using NVivo code
the nature of the
deficinecy based on
the applicable
auditing standard
that the deificiency
relates too. These
coding
categorizations are
included in
Appendix B. Note
that the inspection
reports identify the
related auditing
standard for each
audit deficiency.
Thus, my coding
aligns to what is
included in the
report.

Step 4: Code the
Audit Area of the
Deficiencies

Using NVivo
code the audit
area of the
deficiency into
one the following
categories:
Revenue,
inventory, FV
measurement,
accounting
esimates, business
combinations,
going concern,
fraud, and other.

Note: Definitions for each of the coding categories is included within Appendix I
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Step 5: Compare yearover-year inspection
reports

Manually
compare
inspection report
findings for 2018,
2019 and 2020
using the
outcomes from the
previous steps

Draw inferences
about the yearover-year changes
in the inspection
findings

TABLE 3.1
Examples of the Severity of Audit Deficiencies
Severity of
Audit Deficiency
(note 1)
RESTATE-FS

RESTATE-ICFR

NON-GAAP

ERROR

Sample Wording/Phrases Commonly Used
The issuer reevaluated its accounting for…and
concluded that a material misstatement existed
that had not been previously identified. The
issuer subsequently restated its financial
statements, and the firm revised and reissued its
report on the financial statements.
As a result of our inspection…the issuer
identified a material weakness related to… that
had not been previously identified. The firm
modified its report on the effectiveness of the
issuer’s ICFR to include this material weakness.
The firm did not identify, at the time of the
audit, the issuer’s recognition of certain revenue
from arrangements…was not in conformity with
FASB ASC Subtopic 985-605
The firm did not identify, and evaluate the
significance to the notes related to the financial
statements of, the issuer's omission of a required
disclosure…
The firm did not identify, and evaluate the
significance to the financial statements of,
misstatements in a required disclosure.

NO-TEST

NO-EVAL –
GAAP

Sample Report
Reference
PwC 2019, Issuer D

EY 2018, Issuer A

KPMG 2019, Issuer A

KPMG 2018, Issuer Q

BDO 2020, Issuer J

In testing the operating effectiveness of... the
firm did not identify a formulaic error.
The firm did not identify and test any controls
over…

KPMG 2020, Issuer D

The firm did not perform any substantive
procedures to test.
The firm did not identify, and evaluate the
significance to the notes related to the financial
statements of, the issuer's omission of a required
disclosure.

Deloitte 2019, Issuer B

The firm did not evaluate the appropriateness of
the assumptions the issuer used in its
determination.
The firm did not perform sufficient substantive
procedures to evaluate the issuer’s identification
of performance obligations in conformity with
FASB ASC Topic 606…
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RSM 2018, Issuer B

KPMG 2018, Issuer Q

BDO 2019, Issuer C

GT 2019, Issuer F

NO-EVAL –
ICFR

The firm did not evaluate whether these two
controls sufficiently mitigated the identified
control deficiencies.
The firm identified various controls that it
believed would compensate for this deficiency,
but its conclusion that these controls had a
mitigating effect was inappropriate because
these controls did not address the risk of
potential misstatement.
The firm did not evaluate whether the criteria
used by the control owner to identify items for
follow up were sufficiently precise to detect
misstatements.
The firm did not evaluate whether these controls
were appropriately designed.

NO-SUFF

EY 2018, Issuer C

PwC 2018, Issuer A

GY 2018, Issuer C

Deloitte 2019, Issuer D

The firm identified an exception in the operation
BDO 2020, Issuer B
of this control but did not evaluate the effect of
this exception on the operating effectiveness of
this control.
For the items in its sample for which the
BDO 2018, Issuer B
requested confirmations were not returned, or
were returned with exceptions, the firm did not
perform alternative procedures that provided
sufficient evidence.
The firm did not perform any procedures,
beyond inquiring of management.

Crowe 2019, Issuer A

The sample sizes the firm used in certain of its
substantive procedures to test…were too small
to provide sufficient appropriate audit evidence.

Deloitte, Issuer B

The firm did not perform substantive procedures
to test, or (as discussed above) test controls
over, the accuracy and completeness of certain
information used in its substantive testing.

EY 2019, Issuer A

The firm’s substantive procedures to test the
KPMG 2020, Issuer C
occurrence and accuracy of…did not provide
sufficient appropriate audit evidence.
Note 1: Definitions of each of the severity types are including within Appendix I.
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TABLE 3.2
Examples of the Nature of Audit Deficiencies
Nature of Audit
Deficiency
Using the Work of
Specialists (AS
1210)

Audit Planning
(AS 2101)

Audit of ICFR
(AS 2201)

Sample Wording/Phrases Commonly Used
The firm did not sufficiently test the projected
cash flows provided to the specialists…

Sample Report
Reference
RSM 2018, Issuer A
(FV Measurement)

The firm did not perform any procedures to test
the accuracy and completeness of the
development cost, production, and pricing data
that the issuer provided to the external
specialist.
In determining the extent to which audit
procedures should be performed at these
business units, the firm did not evaluate
whether (1) specific risks of material
misstatement existed at these business units
and (2) the risks of material misstatement the
firm identified for the business units subject to
more extensive audit procedures also applied to
these business units such that, in combination,
these risks presented a reasonable possibility of
material misstatement.
The firm did not test, beyond inquiry, any
controls that addressed the accuracy and
completeness of these system-generated reports
used in the performance of these controls.

PwC 2019, Issuer E
(FV Measurement)

The firm did not evaluate the specific review
procedures the control owner performed to
assess the reasonableness of these cash flows.

PwC 2018, Issuer A
(FV Measurement)

The firm did not identify and test any controls
over the existence of inventory at certain of the
issuer’s locations.

Deloitte 2019, Issuer A
(Inventory)

The firm tested certain automated and ITdependent manual controls that used data from
these IT systems. As a result of the deficiency
in the firm’s testing of IT general controls
discussed above, the firm’s testing of these
automated and IT-dependent manual controls
was not sufficient.

EY 2020, Issuer D
(Revenue)

The firm did not evaluate whether the issuer’s
review was sufficient to address the risk of
material misstatement given not all customers
were covered by this control.

GT 2020, Issuer B
(Revenue)
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BDO 2019, Issuer B
(Revenue)

RSM 2018, Issuer C
(Revenue)

Auditors’
Response to Risk
of Material
Misstatement
(note 1)

Substantive
Analytical
Procedures (AS
2305)

Confirmation
Process (AS 2310)

The firm did not perform any substantive
procedures to test these loans receivable,
including unfunded commitments (AS 2301).

KPMG 2018, Issuer A
(Other)

The firm did not perform any substantive
procedures to test the accuracy of the historical
revenue data of the acquired business that the
issuer used to determine the attrition rates (AS
2502).

PwC 2018, Issuer F
(Business Comb)

For revenue recognized from certain
customers, the firm did not perform procedures
to determine whether the transactions selected
for testing met the revenue recognition criteria
(AS 23010).

Crowe 2019, A
(Revenue)

The firm did not obtain sufficient appropriate
audit evidence that the cycle- count procedures
the issuer used for this inventory were
sufficiently reliable… (AS 2510).

Deloitte 2019, Issuer D
(Inventory)

The firm’s procedures to test the forecasted
gross margin percentages were not sufficient
because they were limited to inquiring of
management… (AS 2502)

EY 2020, Issuer C
(FV Measurement)

The firm did not perform any substantive
procedures to test, or…sufficiently test controls
over, the accuracy and completeness of these
reports (AS 1105).
The firm did not test, or in the alternative, test
controls over, the accuracy and completeness
of data the firm used to develop the expectation
used in the performance of its substantive
analytical...

GT 2020, Issuer A
(Revenue)

The firm’s substantive procedures to test
certain inventory costs consisted of analytical
procedures. The firm did not perform
procedures to obtain evidence that the
expectations it used would be predictive of the
inventory costs as of year-end.
The firm sent positive confirmation requests to
the issuer’s customers for a sample of deposit
liabilities. For the items in its sample for which
the requested confirmations were not returned,
the firm did not perform alternative procedures
that provided sufficient evidence that the
recorded amounts of the deposit liabilities were
accurate as of the confirmation date.

Crowe 2019, Issuer F
(Inventory)
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RSM 2018, Issuer C
(Revenue)

Deloitte 2018, Issuer F
(Estimate)

Audit Sampling
(AS 2315)

Consideration of
Internal Audit (AS
2605)

Evaluating Audit
Results (AS 2810)

The firm did not maintain control over the
confirmation requests because the issuer sent
the requests. Further, the responses were
returned by email, but the firm did not consider
performing procedures to verify the source of
these responses.
The sample sizes the firm used in certain of its
substantive procedures to test revenue and
accounts receivable were too small to provide
sufficient appropriate audit evidence because
these procedures were designed based on a
level of control reliance that was not supported
due to the deficiencies in the firm’s control
testing discussed above.
The firm used only the work of the issuer’s
internal audit as evidence about the
effectiveness of certain controls related to the
issuer’s reviews of the loan risk ratings. This
approach did not provide sufficient appropriate
audit evidence that these controls were
designed and operating effectively because of
the amount of subjectivity and judgment
involved in evaluating the appropriateness of
the loan risk ratings and determining any
changes to these ratings.
The issuer identified errors in certain of the
selected items it tested through the operation of
one of the two compensating controls
discussed directly above, but the firm did not
evaluate the implications of these errors on its
opinion on the issuer’s financial statements.

EY 2020, Issuer H
(Other, research and
development expenses)

The firm did not identify, and evaluate the
significance to the financial statements of, the
issuer's omission of certain required
disclosures under FASB ASC Topic 606.

GT 2019, Issuer B
(Revenue)

KPMG 2018, Issuer C
(Revenue)

PwC 2019, Issuer N
(FV Measurement)

EY 2018, Issuer C
(Revenue and
Estimates)

During the audit, the firm did not identify, and BDO 2020, Issuer M
(FV Measurement)
evaluate the significance to the financial
statements of, misstatements related to lease
expense information included in a required
disclosure under FASB ASC Topic 842,
Leases.
Note 1: I include as part of this coding, failures to design and perform audit procedures to obtain
sufficient appropriate audit evidence related to substantive testing procedures (AS 11105). Further,
I include failures to adhere to specific audit guidance regarding the evaluation of fraud (AS 2401),
going concern (AS 2415), estimates, including fair value measurement (AS 2501), and inventories
(AS 2510). As such, I denote the specific standard that the issue relates to following each audit
deficiency example.
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TABLE 3.3
Summary of Inspection Results by Year

Panel A: Summary of Inspections by Year
Total Audits Reviewed
Total
[Big 4 Firms]
(Next-tier Firms)
Audits with Part I.A Deficiencies
Total
[Big 4 Firms]
(Next-tier Firms)
Proportion of Audits with Deficiencies over
Total Audits Reviewed
Total
[Big 4 Firms]
(Next-tier Firms)
Total Number of Deficiencies
Total
[Big 4 Firms]
(Next-tier Firms)

Panel B: Audits with Deficiencies by Type
Deficiencies in Financial Statement Audits
Only
Total
[Big 4 Firms]
(Next-tier Firms)
Deficiencies in the ICFR Audit Only
Total
[Big 4 Firms]
(Next-tier Firms)
Deficiencies in Financial Statement & ICFR
Audits
Total
[Big 4 Firms]
(Next-tier Firms)

2018

2019

2020

2018-2022

299
[213]
(86)

322
[236]
(86)

263
[210]
(53)

884
[659]
(225)

78
[53]
(25)

80
[52]
(28)

43
[25]
(18)

201
[130]
(71)

26%
[25%]
(29%)

25%
[22%]
(33%)

16%
[12%]
(34%)

23%
[20%]
(32%)

323
[210]
(113)

375
[240]
(135)

185
[94]
(91)

883
[544]
(339)

2018

2019

2020

2018-2022

8
[6]
(2)

15
[9]
(6)

10
[6]
(4)

33
[21]
(12)

16
[11]
(5)

10
[5]
(5)

6
[4]
(2)

32
[20]
(12)

54
[36]
(18)

55
[38]
(17)

27
[15]
(12)

136
[89]
(47)

The 2020 inspection results for next-tier firms include only GT and BDO. RSM and Crowe
are not included given that their inspection reports were not publicly available as of the
current date of this paper. Additionally, the proportion of audits with deficiencies
represents audits with Part I.A deficiencies as a percentage of total audits reviewed. Finally,
the total number of inspection findings represent the total number of individual deficiencies
across each of the Part I.A inspection reports.
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TABLE 3.4
Audit Deficiencies by Severity over Time
Panel A: Severe Audit Deficiencies
RESTATE-GAAP (material misstatement)
Total
Big 4 Firms
Next-tier Firms
RESTATE-ICFR (material weakness)
Total
Big 4 Firms
Next-tier Firms
NON-GAAP
Total
Big 4 Firms
Next-tier Firms
ERROR
Total
Big 4 Firms
Next-tier Firms

2018

2019

2020

2018-2022

-

3 (3) [4%]
2 (2) [4%]
1 (1) [4%]

-

3 (3) [1%]
2 (2) [2%]
1 (1) [1%]

2 (4) [3%]
2 (4) [4%]
-

10 (16) [13%]
8 (10) [15%]
2 (6) [7%]

-

12 (20) [6%]
10 (14) [8%]
2 (6) [3%]

-

2 (2) [3%]
2 (2) [4%]
-

-

2 (2) [1%]
2 (2) [2%]
-

1 (1) [1%]
1 (1) [2%]
-

2 (2) [3%]
2 (2) [7%]

5 (6) [12%]
1 (1) [4%]
4 (5) [22%]

8 (9) [4%]
2 (2) [2%]
6 (7) [8%]
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Panel B: Less Severe Audit Deficiencies
NO-TEST
Total
Big 4 Firms
Next-tier Firms
NO-EVAL-GAAP
Total
Big 4 Firms
Next-tier Firms
NO-EVAL-ICFR
Total
Big 4 Firms
Next-tier Firms
NO-SUFF
Total
Big 4 Firms
Next-tier Firms

2018

2019

2020

2018-2022

40 (65) [51%]
23 (39) [43%]
17 (26) [68%]

41 (82) [51%]
31 (62) [60%]
10 (20) [36%]

15 (24) [35%]
6 (12) [24%]
9 (12) [50%]

96 (171) [48%]
60 (113) [46%]
36 (58) [51%]

8 (9) [10%]
4 (4) [8%]
4 (5) [16%]

11 (12) [14%]
4 (5) [8%]
7 (7) [25%]

3 (4) [7%]
3 (4) [17%]

22 (25) [11%]
8 (9) [6%]
14 (16) [20%]

15 (19) [19%]
11 (15) [21%]
4 (4) [16%]

7 (10) [9%]
5 (8) [10%]
2 (2) [7%]

5 (5) [12%]
3 (3) [12%]
2 (2) [11%]

27 (34) [13%]
19 (26) [15%]
8 (8) [11%]

66 (175) [85%]
47 (115) [89%]
19 (60) [76%]

69 (209) [86%]
42 (121) [81%]
27 (88) [96%]

42 (118) [98%]
25 (63) [100%]
17 (55) [94%]

177 (502) [88%]
114 (299) [88%]
63 (203) [89%]

The numbers represent the total number of audits that have at least one audit deficiency coded to the respective severity code. I
include in parentheses, the total number of individual inspection findings coded to the respective severity code. Finally, in
brackets, I include the deficiency ratio which is calculated based on the total number of audits with an audit deficiency of the
described deficiency type and audit area (e.g., audit planning and revenue), divided by the total number of audits with Part I.A
deficiencies, as is presented within Table 4. Additionally, the 2020 inspection results for next-tier firms include only GT and
BDO. RSM and Crowe are not included given that their inspection reports were not available as of the current date of this paper.
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TABLE 3.5
Audit Deficiencies by Issue Type and Audit Area
Panel A: 2018-2020 Inspection Findings
Deficiency Type REVENUE INVENTORY
(Note 1)
Audit Planning
Total
3 (1%)
1 (0.5%)
Big 4 Firms
2 (2%)
Next-tier
1 (1%)
1 (1%)
Firms
Auditing ICFR
Total
77 (38%)
26 (13%)
Big 4 Firms
45 (35%)
19 (15%)
Next-tier
50 (70%)
7 (10%)
Firms
Audit
Procedures
Total
129 (64%)
28 (14%)
Big 4 Firms
81 (62%)
23 (18%)
Next-tier
48 (68%)
10 (14%)
Firms
Concluding
Audit
Procedures
Total
12 (6%)
1 (0.5%)
Big 4 Firms
5 (4%)
1 (1%)
Next-tier
7 (10%)
Firms
Other
Total
Big 4 Firms
Next-tier
Firms

FV
MEASUREMENT

ACCOUTING
EST.

BUSINESS
COMB.

GOING
CONCERN

FRAUD

OTHER

-

-

-

-

-

-

60 (30%)
41 (32%)
19 (27%)

26 (13%)
15 (12%)
11 (15%)

27 (13%)
16 (12%)
11 (15%)

1 (0.5%)
1 (1%)

-

12 (6%)
9 (7%)
3 (4%)

62 (31%)
41 (32%)
21 (30%)

23 (11%)
12 (9%)
11 (15%)

29 (14%)
20 (15%)
9 (13%)

1 (0.5%)
1 (1%)

2 (1%)
1 (1%)
1 (1%)

15 (7%)
12 (9%)
3 (4%)

6 (3%)
4 (3%)
2 (3%)

3 (1%)
2 (2%)
1 (1%)

5 (2%)
1 (1%)
4 (6%)

-

-

3 (1%)
2 (2%)
1 (1%)

5 (2%)
3 (2%)
2 (3%)

-

4 (2%)
4 (6%)

-

-

-
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Panel B: 2018 Inspection Findings
Deficiency Type REVENUE INVENTORY
(Note 1)
Audit Planning
Total
1 (1%)
Big 4 Firms
Next-tier
1 (4%)
Firms
Auditing ICFR
Total
30 (38%)
12 (15%)
Big 4 Firms
18 (34%)
9 (17%)
Next-tier
12 (48%)
3 (12%)
Firms
Audit
Procedures
Total
40 (51%)
13 (17%)
Big 4 Firms
24 (45%)
10 (19%)
Next-tier
16 (64%)
3 (12%)
Firms
Concluding
Audit
Procedures
Total
4 (5%)
Big 4 Firms
3 (6%)
Next-tier
1 (4%)
Firms
Other
Total
Big 4 Firms
Next-tier
Firms

FV
MEASUREMENT

ACCOUTING
EST.

BUSINESS
COMB.

GOING
CONCERN

FRAUD

OTHER

-

-

-

-

-

-

19 (24%)
13 (25%)
6 (24%)

13 (17%)
8 (15%)
5 (20%)

16 (21%)
11 (21%)
5 (20%)

-

-

7 (9%)
6 (11%)
1 (4%)

26 (33%)
16 (30%)
10 (40%)

14 (18%)
7 (13%)
7 (28%)

15 (19%)
12 (23%)
3 (12%)

-

-

9 (12%)
8 (15%)
1 (4%)

1 (1%)
1 (2%)
-

1 (1%)
1 (2%)
-

2 (3%)
1 (2%)
1 (4%)

-

-

2 (3%)
1 (2%)
1 (4%)

1 (1%)
1 (4%)

-

1 (1%)
1 (4%)

-

-

-
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Panel C: 2019 Inspection Findings
Deficiency Type REVENUE INVENTORY
(Note 1)
Audit Planning
Total
2 (3%)
Big 4 Firms
1 (2%)
Next-tier
1 (4%)
Firms
Auditing ICFR
Total
31 (39%)
9 (11%)
Big 4 Firms
19 (37%)
6 (12%)
Next-tier
12 (43%)
3 (11%)
Firms
Audit
Procedures
Total
50 (63%)
10 (13%)
Big 4 Firms
36 (69%)
8 (15%)
Next-tier
14 (50%)
2 (7%)
Firms
Concluding
Audit
Procedures
Total
7 (9%)
1 (1%)
Big 4 Firms
2 (4%)
1 (2%)
Next-tier
5 (18%)
Firms
Other
Total
Big 4 Firms
Next-tier
Firms

FV
MEASUREMENT

ACCOUTING
EST.

BUSINESS
COMB.

GOING
CONCERN

FRAUD

OTHER

-

-

-

-

-

-

29 (36%)
19 (37%)
10 (36%)

10 (13%)
6 (12%)
4 (14%)

8 (10%)
5 (10%)
3 (11%)

1 (1%)
1 (4%)

-

2 (3%)
1 (2%)
1 (4%)

27 (34%)
17 (33%)
10 (36%)

8 (10%)
5 (10%)
3 (11%)

10 (13%)
7 (13%)
3 (11%)

1 (1%)
1 (4%)

2 (3%)
1 (2%)
1 (4%)

2 (3%)
2 (4%)
-

4 (5%)
3 (6%)
1 (4%)

1 (1%)
1 (2%)
-

1 (1%)
1 (4%)

-

-

1 (1%)
1 (2%)
-

4 (5%)
3 (6%)
1 (4%)

-

3 (4%)
3 (11%)

-

-

-

175

Panel D: 2020 Inspection Findings
Deficiency Type REVENUE INVENTORY
(Note 1)
Audit Planning
Total
1 (2%)
Big 4 Firms
1 (4%)
Next-tier
Firms
Auditing ICFR
Total
16 (37%)
5 (12%)
Big 4 Firms
8 (32%)
4 (16%)
Next-tier
8 (44%)
1 (6%)
Firms
Audit
Procedures
Total
39 (91%)
5 (12%)
Big 4 Firms
21 (84%)
5 (20%)
Next-tier
18 (100%)
Firms
Concluding
Audit
Procedures
Total
1 (2%)
Big 4 Firms
Next-tier
1 (6%)
Firms
Other
Total
Big 4 Firms
Next-tier
Firms

FV
MEASUREMENT

ACCOUTING
EST.

BUSINESS
COMB.

GOING
CONCERN

FRAUD

OTHER

-

-

-

-

-

-

12 (28%)
9 (36%)
3 (17%)

3 (7%)
1 (4%)
2 (11%)

3 (7%)
3 (17%)

-

-

3 (7%)
2 (8%)
1 (6%)

9 (21%)
8 (32%)
1 (6%)

1 (2%)
1 (6%)

4 (9%)
1 (4%)
3 (17%)

-

-

4 (9%)
2 (8%)
2 (11%)

1 (2%)
1 (6%)

1 (2%)
1 (6%)

2 (5%)
2 (11%)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

The numbers represent the total number of audits that have at least one deficiency coded to the respective severity code. I include in parentheses, the
deficiency ratio, calculated based on the total number of audits with an audit deficiency of the described deficiency type and audit area (e.g., audit planning
and revenue), divided by the total number of audits with Part I.A deficiencies, as is presented within Table 4.
Note 1: The following auditing standards are coded to each issue type: audit planning – AS 2101; Auditing over Internal controls over FR – AS 2201 and
AS 2105 specific to internal controls; audit procedures – AS 2301, AS 2305, AS 2310, AS 2315, AS 2401, AS 2415, AS 2501, AS 2502, AS 2510, AS
1105 specific to substantive procedures; concluding audit procedures – AS 2810; and other – AS 1210 and AS 2605. Note that the total number of audits
(issuers) by audit area is great than the total 201 audits with Part I.A deficiencies given that each audit deficiency may relate to multiple audit area.
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APPENDIX H

Example: 2019 PCAOB Inspection Report RSM 66
OVERVIEW OF THE 2019 INSPECTION AND HISTORICAL DATA BY
INSPECTION YEAR
The following information provides an overview of our 2019 inspection as well as data from
the previous two inspections. We use a combination of risk-based and random methods to
select audits for review and to identify areas on which we focus our review. Because our
inspection process evolves over time, it can, and often does, focus on a different mix of audits
and audit areas from year to year and firm to firm. As a result of this variation, we caution that
our inspection results are not necessarily comparable over time or among firms.
Audits Reviewed

2019

2018

2017

Total audits reviewed

15

17

15

Audits in which the firm was the
principal auditor

15

17

15

10

12

12

Risk-based selections

13

17

15

Random selections

2

0

0

Integrated audits of financial
statements and ICFR

Part I.A Deficiencies in Audits Reviewed
In 2019, two of the three audits appearing in Part I.A were selected for review using risk-based
criteria. In both 2018 and 2017, all audits appearing in Part I.A were selected for review using
risk-based criteria.

2017

2018

2019

1

1

Audits without Part I.A deficiencies

1

Audits with Part I.A deficiencies

If a deficiency is included in Part I.A of our report, it does not necessarily mean that the firm
has not addressed the deficiency. In many cases, the firm has performed remedial actions after
the issue was identified. Depending on the circumstances, remedial actions may include
performing additional audit procedures, informing management of the issuer of the need for
This appendix represents an abbreviated version of the full 2019 PCAOB inspection report for RSM. I
exclude from this exhibit the executive summary, table of contents, and an overview of what is included
in the report.
66
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changes to the financial statements or reporting on ICFR, or taking steps to prevent reliance
on prior audit reports. Our inspection normally includes a review, on a sample basis, of the
adequacy of a firm's remedial actions, either with respect to previously identified deficiencies
or deficiencies identified during the current inspection. If a firm does not take appropriate
actions to address deficiencies, we may criticize its system of quality control or pursue a
disciplinary action.

178

The fact that we have included a deficiency in our report — other than those deficiencies for
audits with incorrect opinions on the financial statements and/or ICFR — does not necessarily
mean that the issuer’s financial statements are materially misstated or that undisclosed material
weaknesses in ICFR exist. It is often not possible for us to reach a conclusion on those points
based on our inspection procedures and related findings because, for example, we have only the
information that the auditor retained and the issuer’s public disclosures. We do not have direct
access to the issuer’s management, underlying books and records, and other information.
Audits Affected by the Deficiencies Identified in Part I.A

2019

Deficiencies in
both financial
statement and
ICFR audits

2018

2017

Deficiencies in the
financial statement
audit only

Deficiencies in the ICFR audit
only
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The following tables and graphs summarize inspection-related information, by inspection
year, for 2019 and the previous two inspections. We caution against making any
comparison of the data provided without reading the descriptions of the underlying
deficiencies in each respective inspection report.
Most Frequently Identified Part I.A Deficiencies
Deficiencies in audits of financial
statements
Did not perform substantive procedures
to obtain sufficient evidence as a
result of overreliance on controls (due
to deficiencies in testing controls)
Did not sufficiently evaluate significant
assumptions or data that the
issuer used in developing an
estimate

Audits with Part I.A deficiencies

2019

2018

2017

1

3

5

1

2

6

Audits with Part I.A deficiencies

Deficiencies in ICFR audits
Did not perform sufficient testing of the
design and/or operating effectiveness of
controls selected for testing
Did not appropriately evaluate control
deficiencies
Did not identify and/or sufficiently test
controls over the accuracy and
completeness of data or reports that
the issuer used in the operation of
controls

2019

2018

2017

2

3

5

1

2

1

1

3

4

180

Audit Areas Most Frequently Reviewed
This table reflects the five audit areas we have selected most frequently for review in each
inspection year (and the related Part I.A deficiencies). For the issuer audits selected for
review, we selected these areas because they were generally significant to the issuer’s
financial statements, may have included complex issues for auditors, and/or involved
complex judgments in (1) estimating and auditing the reported value of related accounts
and disclosures and (2) implementing and auditing the related controls.
2019
Audit area

2018

Audits with
Audits
Part I.A Audit area
reviewed deficiencies

Revenue
and related
accounts
Investment
securities
Allowance
for
loan losses
Inventory
Cash and
cash
equivalents

8

1

6

1

4

2

4

1

4

0

2017

Audits with
Audits with
Audits
Part I.A Audit area Audits
Part I.A
reviewed deficiencies
reviewed deficiencies

Revenue
and related
accounts
Investment
securities
Inventory
Business
Combinate
-ions
Allowance
for loan
losses

9

3

6

0

5

0

4

3

4

2

Revenue
and related
accounts
Investment
securities
Allowance
for
loan losses
Business
Combinate
-ions
Inventory

10

5

7

2

5

4

4

1

4

0

Audit Areas with Frequent Part I.A Deficiencies
This table reflects the audit areas with the most frequently identified Part I.A deficiencies in each
inspection year with
the corresponding results for the other two years presented.
2019
Audit area

2018

Audits with

201
7
Audits with

Audits with

Part I.A

Audits

Part I.A

deficiencies

reviewed

Allowance for loan
losses
Revenue and related
accounts
Investment securities

2

4

2

1

8

1

Inventory
Business
combinations

Audits

Part I.A

Audits

deficiencies

reviewed

4

4

5

3

9

5

10

6

0

6

2

7

1

4

0

5

0

4

0

3

3

4

1

4

deficiencies reviewed
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Allowance for loan losses: The deficiencies in 2019, 2018, and 2017 primarily related to
testing controls over the valuation of the allowance for loan losses and the resulting
overreliance on controls when performing substantivetesting.
Revenue and related accounts: The deficiencies in 2019 related to testing controls over
revenue and related accounts. The deficiencies in 2018 and 2017 related to substantive testing
of, and testing controls over, revenue and related accounts.
Investment securities: The deficiencies in 2019 and 2017 primarily related to testing controls
over investment
securities.
Inventory: The deficiencies in 2019 related to testing controls over inventory.
Business combinations: The deficiencies in 2018 related to substantive testing of, and
testing controls over, the inputs and assumptions that the issuer used to value the
acquired assets. The deficiency in 2017 related to the substantive testing of the valuation
of acquired inventory.
Auditing Standards Associated with Identified Part I Deficiencies
The following lists the auditing standards referenced in Part I.A of the 2019 and the previous
two inspection reports and the number of times that the standard is cited in Part I.A.
PCAOB Auditing Standards

2019

2018

2017

AS 1105, Audit Evidence

0

2

2

AS 1210, Using the Work of a
Specialist
AS 2201, An Audit of Internal Control
Over Financial Reporting That
Is Integrated with An Audit of
Financial Statements
AS 2301, The Auditor’s Responses to
the Risks of Material
Misstatement

0

3

0

8

19

32

1

3

6

0

1

0

AS 2315, Audit Sampling

1

4

9

AS 2501, Auditing Accounting
Estimates

1

0

5

0

3

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

AS 2305, Substantive Analytical
Procedures

AS 2502, Auditing Fair Value
Measurements and Disclosures
AS 2605, Consideration of the Internal
Audit Function
AS 2810, Evaluating Audit Results
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PART I: INSPECTION OBSERVATIONS
Part I.A of our report discusses deficiencies that were of such significance that we believe the
firm, at the time it issued its audit report(s), had not obtained sufficient appropriate audit
evidence to support its opinion on the issuer’s financial statements and/or ICFR. Part I.B
discusses deficiencies that do not relate directly to the sufficiency or appropriateness of
evidence the firm obtained to support its opinion(s) but nevertheless relate to instances of
non-compliance with PCAOB standards or rules. Consistent with the Act, it is the Board’s
assessment that nothing in Part I of this report deals with a criticism of or potential defect in the
firm’s quality control system. Any such criticisms or potential defects are discussed in Part II.
Further, you should not infer from any Part I deficiency or combination of deficiencies that a
quality control finding is identified in Part II.
PART I.A: AUDITS WITH UNSUPPORTED OPINIONS
This section of our report discusses the deficiencies identified, by specific issuer audit
reviewed, in the audit worksupporting the firm’s opinion on the issuer's financial
statements and/or ICFR.
We identify each issuer by a letter (e.g., Issuer A). Each deficiency could relate to several
auditing standards, but we reference the PCAOB standard(s) that most directly relates to the
requirement with which the firm did not comply.
Issuer audits are presented below within their respective deficiency classifications (as
discussed previously). Within the classifications, we generally present the audits based on
our assessment as to the relative significance of the identified deficiencies taking into
account the significance of the financial statement accounts and/or disclosures affected,
and/or the nature or extent of the deficiencies.
Audits with an Incorrect Opinion on the Financial Statements and/or ICFR
None
Audits with Multiple Deficiencies
Issuer A – Financials
Type of audit and related areas affected
In our review, we identified deficiencies in the financial statement and ICFR audits related to the
Allowance for Loan
Losses (“ALL”) and Investment Securities.
Description of the deficiencies identified
With respect to the ALL:
The firm selected for testing two review controls over the qualitative component of the ALL.
The firm did not evaluatethe review procedures that the control owners performed, including
the procedures used to identify items for follow up and the procedures to determine whether
those items were appropriately resolved. (AS 2201.42 and .44)
The firm’s approach to substantively test the qualitative component of the ALL was to review
and test management’s process. The firm did not sufficiently evaluate the appropriateness of
the issuer’s ALL methodology and the reasonableness of the significant inputs and
assumptions used because it limited its procedures to comparing the basis-point adjustments
for economic and other factors that the issuer used at year end to those used in the prior
period. (AS 2501.11)
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With respect to Investment Securities:
The issuer recorded the fair values of available-for-sale securities based on the prices it
obtained from an external pricing service. The firm selected for testing a control that
consisted of the comparison of these prices to prices obtained from another external pricing
service. In evaluating the design of this control, the firm did not identify that the prices
obtained from the other pricing service were derived from the same pricing source as the one
the issuer used to record the fair value of the securities. (AS 2201.42)
Issuer B – Financials
Type of audit and related area affected
In our review, we identified deficiencies in the financial statement and ICFR audits related to the
ALL.
Description of the deficiencies identified
The firm selected for testing a control that the issuer intended to be an objective review of
assigned loan grades. The firm concluded that this control was deficient because the control
owners were not independent of the department responsible for assigning the loan grades.
The firm identified other controls over the review of assigned loan grades that it believed
would compensate for this control deficiency. The firm did not identify that the control
owners for these controls also were not independent of the department responsible for
assigning the loan grades. (AS 2201.68)
The sample sizes the firm used in certain of its substantive procedures to test the
reasonableness of assigned loan grades were too small to provide sufficient appropriate
audit evidence because these procedures were designed based on a level of control reliance
that was not supported due to deficiencies in the firm’s control testing discussed above. (AS
2301.16, .18, and .37; AS 2315.19, .23, and .23A)
Issuer C
Type of audit and related areas affected
In our review, we identified deficiencies in the ICFR audit related to Revenue,
Inventory, and Sales Commission Expense and Sales Commission Payable.
Description of the deficiencies identified
The issuer processed and recorded transactions related to revenue, inventory, and sales
commission expense and sales commission payable using several information-technology
(“IT”) systems, including its enterprise resource planning (“ERP”) system. The accuracy and
completeness of the data and reports from the ERP system depended on effective IT general
controls (“ITGCs”). The firm identified a significant deficiency in ITGCs related to user
access to the ERP system.
With respect to Revenue:
The firm selected for testing an automated control designed to recognize revenue when
goods were shipped based on interfaces between various IT systems. The firm did not
directly test this control because its procedures were substantive in nature. (AS 2201.42,
.44, and .B9)
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The firm selected for testing a control that consisted of the issuer’s review of revenue
transactions for appropriate cut-off that used data and reports generated and maintained by the
ERP system and an inventory management system. The firm’s testing of this control was not
sufficient because it did not consider the implications of the ineffective ITGCs over the ERP
system as discussed above. Further, the firm did not identify and test any controls over the
accuracy andcompleteness of the data and reports from the issuer’s inventory management
system, beyond determining that the control owner had reviewed the parameters of the reports
generated by this system. (AS 2201.39 and .46)
With respect to Inventory:
The firm selected for testing various controls over inventory that used data maintained by the
ERP system. The firm’s testing of these controls was not sufficient because it did not consider
the implications of the ineffective ITGCs over this system as discussed above. (AS 2201.46)
The firm selected for testing an automated control that consisted of the recording of
inventory upon receipt. The firm did not obtain an understanding of how the system was
configured to initiate, process, and record the receipt ofinventory. As a result, the firm did not
test the configuration of this control or perform other procedures that would have provided
sufficient appropriate audit evidence that the control was designed and operating
effectively. (AS 2201.34, .42, and .44)
With respect to Sales Commission Expense and Sales Commission Payable:
The firm selected for testing controls that consisted of the issuer’s reviews of sales
commission expense, sales commission payable, related adjustments, exceptions, and a
reconciliation of data between certain systems. The firmdid not identify and test any controls
over the accuracy and completeness of the commissionable sales volume data that the control
owners used in the operation of these controls. (AS 2201.39)
Audits with a Single Deficiency
None
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PART I.B: OTHER INSTANCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PCAOB
STANDARDS OR RULES
This section of our report discusses any deficiencies we identified that do not relate directly
to the sufficiency or appropriateness of evidence the firm obtained to support its opinion(s) but
nevertheless relate to instances of non- compliance with PCAOB standards or rules. When we
review an audit, we do not review every aspect of the audit. As a result, the area below was not
necessarily reviewed on every audit. In some cases, we assess the firm’s compliance with
specific PCAOB standards or rules on other audits that were not otherwise selected for review
and may include instances of non-compliance below.
We identified the following deficiency:
In one of 15 audits reviewed, the firm’s audit report did not include statements that (1) the
audit was conducted in accordance with the standards of the PCAOB and (2) PCAOB
standards require that the auditor plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance
about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement,whether due to error
or fraud. In this instance, the firm was non-compliant with AS 3101, The Auditor’s Report on
an Audit of Financial Statements When the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion.
PART II: OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO QUALITY CONTROL
Part II of our report discusses criticisms of, and potential defects in, the firm's system of quality
control.
Deficiencies are included in Part II if an analysis of the inspection results, including the
results of the reviews of individual audits, indicates that the firm's system of quality
control does not provide reasonable assurance that firm personnel will comply with
applicable professional standards and requirements. Generally, the report's description of
quality control criticisms is based on observations from our inspection procedures.
Any changes or improvements to its system of quality control that the firm may have
brought to the Board’s attention may not be reflected in this report, but are taken into
account during the Board’s assessment of whether the firm has satisfactorily addressed the
quality control criticisms or defects no later than 12 months after the issuance of this
report.
Criticisms of, and potential defects in, the firm’s system of quality control, to the extent any
are identified, are nonpublic when the reports are issued. If a firm does not address to the
Board’s satisfaction any criticism of, or potential defect in, the firm's system of quality
control within 12 months after the issuance of our report, any such deficiency will be made
public.
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APPENDIX I

First-Level
Code

Sub-Code

Coding Scheme
Definition

RESTATE-FS
RESTATE-ICFR

Severity of the
Audit
Deficiency:
Severe

NON-GAAP
ERROR

NO-TEST

NO-EVAL – GAAP

Severity of the
Audit
Deficiency:
Less Severe

NO-EVAL – ICFR

NO-SUFF

Nature of the
Audit
Deficiency
(note 1)

Independence (AS 1005)
Using the Work of
Specialists (AS 1210)

This issuer has restated certain of its financial
statements due to a previously unidentified
material misstatement.
The issuer has identified a material weakness
related to previously unidentified control
deficiencies resulting in the accounting firm’s
modification of its evaluation of the
effectiveness of the issuer’s ICFR.
The accounting firm failed to identify and
appropriately address a departure from GAAP.
The accounting firm failed to identify and
appropriately address an accounting error. The
accounting firm failed to evaluate the
sufficiency, accuracy, and completeness of the
issuer’s financial statement disclosures.
The accounting firm failed to test an account,
transaction, and/or internal control. Thus, this
includes the failure to perform both substantive
testing procedures and internal control testing.
The accounting firm failed to adequately or
properly evaluate an accounting issue and/or
whether the accounting treatment was
appropriate. This includes failures related to the
evaluation of the issuer’s disclosure.
The accounting firm failed to adequately or
properly evaluate the design of the issuer’s
internal controls over financial reporting. The
accounting firm failed to evaluate whether the
design of their control testing procedures was
sufficient to identify material misstatements.
The accounting firm failed to perform or
document sufficient procedures when engaging
in either substantive or internal control testing,
or both.
Failure to adhere to independence requirements
Failure to adhere to the standards regarding the
use of a specialist engaged by the auditor’s firm
(“auditor-engaged specialist”) to assist the
auditor in obtaining or evaluating audit evidence
with respect to a relevant assertion of a
significant account or disclosure.
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Audit Planning (AS 2101) Failure to adhere to the standards regarding the
planning of an audit.
Consideration of
Failure to adhere to the standards regarding the
Materiality (AS 2105)
auditor’s consideration of materiality in planning
and performing an audit.
Identifying and Assessing Failure to adhere to the standards regarding the
Risk of Material
process of identifying and assessing risks of
Misstatement (AS 2110)
material misstatements of the financial
statements.
Audit of ICFR (AS 2201) Failure to adhere to the standards that apply to
when an auditor is engaged to perform and audit
of management’s assertion of the effectiveness
of internal control over financial reporting that is
integrated with an audit of the financial
statements. Additionally, I include as part of this
coding, failures to design and perform audit
procedures to obtain sufficient appropriate audit
evidence related to an issuer’s internal controls
(AS 11105)
Auditors’ Response to
Failure to adhere to the standards regarding
Risk of Material
designing and implementing appropriate
Misstatement (AS 2301)
responses to the risk of material misstatement.
Additionally, I include as part of this coding,
failures to design and perform audit procedures
to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence
related to substantive testing procedures (AS
11105). Further, I include as part of this coding,
failures to adhere to specific audit guidance
regarding the evaluation of fraud (AS 2401),
going concern (AS 2415), estimates, including
fair value measurement (AS 2501), and
inventories (AS 2510).
Substantive Analytical
Failure to adhere to the standards regarding the
Procedures (AS 2305)
use of substantive analytical procedures in an
audit.
Confirmation Process
Failure to adhere to guidance regarding the
(AS 2310)
confirmation process in an audit.
Audit Sampling (AS
Failure to adhere to guidance regarding the
2315)
planning, performing, and evaluating audit
samples.
Consideration of Internal Failure to adhere to the guidance regarding the
Audit (AS 2605)
consideration and use, of internal auditors to
provide direct assistance to the auditor in an
audit.
Evaluating Audit Results Failure to adhere to the standards regarding the
(AS 2810)
auditor’s evaluation of audit results and
determination of whether he or she has obtained
sufficient appropriate audit evidence.
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REVENUE
INVENTORY
FV MEASUREMENT

ACCOUNTING EST

Audit Area of
the Audit
Deficiency

BUSINESS COMB

GOING CONCERN

FRAUD
OTHER

Revenue and/or Accounts Receivable (includes
allowance of doubtful accounts)
Inventory and/or excess and obsolete reserves
Evaluating goodwill, intangibles, and other longlived assets for impairment. This also includes
the testing of financial instruments (e.g.,
derivative instruments, securities, investments,
etc.), loans and allowance for loan losses,
contingent liabilities, post-retirement benefit
obligations, and pensions.
Accounting for income taxes and related
accounts (e.g., tax contingency reserve,
valuation allowance, deferred tax assets) and
other accounting estimates (e.g., estimated
liabilities such as self-insurance reserves and
deposit liabilities, and asset retirement
obligations).
Accounting for the combination of one or more
businesses (mergers), or an event in which an
acquirer obtains control of one or more
businesses (acquisitions).
Evaluating whether an issuer (company) will
continue as a going concern; i.e., the issuer’s
ability to continue operating over the next 12
months.
Evaluating and responding to an issuer’s fraud
risk
Evaluating other accounts include the following:
research and development, payroll expense,
sales commission expense and sales commission
payable, trades payable, PP&E, debt, general
expenses, partnership interest, loans receivable,
gain on sale of an asset, reinsurance recoverable,
leases, and period-end financial reporting.

Note 1: The definition for each standard was obtained directly from the PCAOB’s auditing
standards (PCAOB 2010), adapted to include the phrase “failure to adhere to” before each
definition, given that the coding is for inspection findings; i.e., these are instances when the audit
firm did not adhere to the applicable auditing standard. Note that while all auditing standards were
considered when conducting the coding process, only those presented within this table were
identified in the inspection findings. Thus, for brevity, I have included a definition for only those
standards.
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